

Evaluation Report  
NIMD Mozambique programme  
2007-2013

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## Introduction

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This evaluation report on NIMD's programme in Mozambique for the period 2007-2013 is a result of NIMD's policy to evaluate two of its country programmes per year. In order to stimulate NIMD's internal learning process this evaluation was conducted as a so-called peer evaluation. A team composed of one NIMD HQ Programme manager and Financial Programme Officer, its Africa Regional Representative and the Executive Director of the NIMD Georgia Country Office, did extensive narrative and financial desk research and visited the Mozambique Country Office during the last week of February for discussions, interviews with stakeholders and visits to in-country activity locations. The Political Context Scan and the Partner scan that are part of the newly developed internal Baseline and Review Toolkit (BART) were some of the tools that were used during the discussions.

The Mozambique programme was selected for this type of evaluation because of some unique characteristics of the programme:

- It is NIMD's longest running programme, having started before NIMD was even founded.
- NIMD Mozambique has always worked as a visible foreign presence and under its international name. The only significant change in the set-up of the office has been that it went from being Dutch expat led, to having full local representation.
- It is an exceptional programme in the sense that it has applied *all* NIMD's approaches: Inter Party Dialogue (an alternative form of a Center for Multiparty Democracy), Direct Party Finance / Direct Party Assistance ('bilateral support programme'), Schools for Democracy and the Strategic Planning Tool.

Despite the limited scope of the evaluation (2007-2013), we do aspire that this report revives some of the lost institutional memory, and along with programme findings gives insight to NIMD's early theory of change, its conceptual thinking, its operational models and its programme design.

Next to a more traditional, retrospective character of this evaluation, an important objective is to provide practical recommendations for the NIMD programme manager and the director of the country office in Mozambique for the post-October 2014 general elections. These elections are currently expected to deliver a further consolidation of last elections' ground breaking result in Mozambican politics: the move from a two-party to three-party political landscape.

To provide recommendations the CO<sup>1</sup> can use, the evaluation will use the lessons learned from the three components of the Mozambique programme: 1.) Direct Party Assistance (DPA), often referred to as 'the bilateral programme, 2.) Interparty Dialogue and 3.) Schools for Democracy. Next to that it will make use of a future scenario that is based on desk research and interviews including expectations on political developments, as well as basic demographic, sociological and technological developments. Finally, when formulating these recommendations, the evaluation team has also taken in mind internal strategic discussions at NIMD HQ concerning potential adaptations in its intervention logic and key objectives for the post 2015-period.

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<sup>1</sup> When we talk about CO we generally mean the Country Office + the Programme Manager based in the Netherlands

## Executive summary

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The history of the NIMD Mozambique programme reads like three phases. From 2000 to 2005 the predominant focus was on bilateral party support in an experimental approach (now known as Direct Party Assistance or DPA). From 2005 to 2008 the programme gradually tried to move more towards interparty dialogue and from 2009 onwards, the team pushed many of the choices that had been made even further. As a consequence, Interparty Dialogue and the Schools for Democracy have taken over from the bilateral component when it comes to main focus and budget of the programme.

The evaluation team concluded that the Mozambican programme could not be seen as one programme with three components, but rather as three separate programmes implemented by the same organization.

### *Direct Party Assistance*

The Direct Party Assistance (DPA) component is the longest running part of the Mozambique programme, preceding even the existence of NIMD, since NZA, NIMD's predecessor, was the original entity to start implementing a programme for the period 2000-2003. Under this DPA component, generally referred to as the 'bilateral programme', the current CO team has taken several important decisions, some with remarkable results. As a result of tactical maneuvering they have managed to achieve changes without jeopardizing their constructive relations with the relevant political parties. Rather, these relations have improved and intensified. The move can generally be seen as one from quantity (budget) to quality (engagement). However, it has not become clear to what extent the annual activities that the political parties implemented with NIMD funding in the years 2008-2014 have contributed to 'increased policy-seeking capacities of parties' or 'programmatically parties' as NIMD has decided to pursue. Together with decreased budgets and general lack of insight into actual impact, this report recommends no technical or practical areas of improvement, but a more fundamental decision on how to continue this programme component post-2015.

### *Inter-Party Dialogue*

The political context in Mozambique makes inter-party dialogue both necessary and difficult. Although two decades have passed since the end of civil war, the country bears all characteristics of a post-conflict society. Levels of trust, particularly between the two former rivals, FRELIMO and RENAMO, remain very low. The military escalation between RENAMO and the government in the recent years, demonstrated how precarious and shaky the political stability still is. The political space continues to be dominated by one party, FRELIMO, although there are indications that MDM is slowly challenging this status quo. The fact that FRELIMO enjoys an absolute, even constitutional, parliamentary majority means that within the confines of Parliament, the other political players have very minimal legal leverage over key democratic reforms. This makes inter-party dialogue outside the legislature a fundamental alternative if reforms that have to be pursued can be inclusive and sustainable. Under the prevailing political environment, the relevance of pursuing inter-party dialogue as one of the strategic objectives for NIMD in Mozambique cannot be questioned. This sentiment is also echoed by almost all the stakeholders that the evaluation team consulted.

*Schools for Democracy (SfD)*

The evaluation team found that the NIMD Schools for Democracy (SfD) in Nampula and Chimoio have provided a valuable and unique contribution to the development of democratic culture in local societies. They are effective in laying the foundations for democracy, they contribute to a genuine multi-partisan dialogue on local levels and empower active citizens. Although the programme started out as more civil society focused, it has proven to have direct benefits for citizens interested in active participation in local governments. The programme would benefit from being more strategically placed in the overall NIMD strategy to contribute to national democratization, being more visible and better connected, and with its training programmes more adapted to local contexts. Incorporating alumni activities more fully into the overall programming will further enhance its effectiveness and reinforce its benefits.

*Some recommendations on the three programme components:*

- Slowly but surely redirect and redesign the DPA component in its current form while not ceasing to pursue a focus on policy-seeking or programmatic parties.
- Explore possibilities of working with parliamentary commissions.
- Remain cautious when appointing Country Coordinators because of their images and/or personal relations.
- In the case of IPD, have the CO convene meetings but out-source the facilitation role to another actor that is politically neutral and accepted.
- Enrich the IPD agenda by increasingly including broader democratic reforms and policy debates.
- Develop a tailor made and context specific monitoring and evaluation framework.
- Continue with the SfDs but make careful analyses with an eye on national political developments when deciding on new locations.
- Incorporate Alumni activities more fully into the overall programming for SfDs.
- Review and update the SfD curriculum.
- Put special effort into increasing visibility when it comes to the SfDs.
- Further explore possibilities for cost sharing in SfD programmes.

In general the evaluation team has a positive appraisal of the CO and the programmatic shifts the team has made. The majority of the recommendations made will therefore push to further explore these self-chosen directions.

## Chapter 1 Mozambique 2014: from '20+ years Post-conflict' to 'Horizon 2020'

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The history of the NIMD Mozambique programme reads like 3 phases. From 2000 to 2005 the predominant focus was on bilateral party support in an experimental approach with less focus on expected results. From 2005 to 2008 the programme gradually tried to move more towards interparty dialogue and brought more focus to the bilateral programmes by concentrating on programmatic capacities. As of 2009, the team pushed many of these choices even further, successfully seizing several windows of opportunity. As a consequence Interparty Dialogue and the Schools for Democracy have taken over from the bilateral component when it comes to main focus and budget of the programme.

Recommendations in this evaluation report, along with the above mentioned retrospect, would do insufficient justice to the fact that during the past 15 years the country context has started to move significantly and, to the opinion of many, seems to be on the verge of a breaking point towards a more genuine multiparty landscape. For the recommendations of this evaluation and the report to be of use for the programme team in the post October 2014 general elections context, one needs to envision possible scenario's based on the political history and current developments of Mozambique as well as recent demographic and sociological and even IT developments.

### **Political developments**

Mozambique became independent in 1975. After sixteen years of destabilizing and violent civil war between the rebel movement RENAMO and the ruling party FRELIMO, a Peace Agreement was signed in 1992. With the Peace Agreement, Mozambique adopted the system of multiparty democracy. But almost 4 decades years of continuous ruling by FRELIMO has enforced the powerful position of the President in the political system. Incumbent President Guebuza fits in this tradition. There is a formal separation of powers between the legislative, executive and judicial branches of government in Mozambique. However, in practice, the powers are closely related through an ineffective network of influence that has created connections between the elite in all sectors of society. FRELIMO has, over time, become overwhelmingly dominant, with a solid 2/3 majority in Parliament, whilst the position of the opposition has gradually weakened. In 2009 a new party MDM split-off from RENAMO, instantly winning seats in national, local and regional elections. MDM appealed to many citizens as a promise of a new spirit, but has faced difficulties in extending their support base, due to the uneven political playing ground and their own internal challenges. RENAMO has been steadily losing support due to internal struggles and their decision late 2013 threatening to boycott the local elections and to pick up arms. FRELIMO, in turn, held its national conference early 2014 (while the evaluation team was in Mozambique) to select the party's next presidential hopeful. Somewhat against expectations it nominated a relatively unknown Guebuza-trustee, It remains to be seen whether after the October 2014 elections, Guebuza will be accepted to stay on as party president

But there are broader trends at work which seem conducive for a diversification of the political party playing field.. With the typical demographics of a developing country, Mozambique will increasingly see a young electorate whose political reference is less and less based on the historically polarized civil war dynamic. So far, MDM seems to have been relatively successful in attracting these first-time voters. At the same time, FRELIMO and RENAMO are faced with the aging of their traditional support base

Very informal examples of changing views are that intermarriages between youth from traditional RENAMO and FRELIMO families are increasingly taking place, and that workplaces are diversifying as well. Communication technology has decreased distance between citizens and regions at a fast rate, making the traditionally politically apathetic Mozambican society at least better informed and connected. Increasing middle class incomes, as Mozambique is indeed witnessing, are always a promising setting for increased citizens engagement.

The tentative scenario, obviously in need of permanent re-assessment and subject to many variables and possible political turns, is that Mozambique will see an even further equilibrated parliament with three parties. It is expected that FRELIMO possibly will lose its constitutional majority but surely hold on to its absolute majority, From this follows the expectation of more space for democratic reform dialogue, more room for policy dialogue in the term-period between elections. A larger number of seats and party positions will potentially be held by delegates with more democracy or reform inspired values, being more oriented towards inclusive processes.

## Chapter 2 Direct Party Assistance (DPA)

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The Direct Party Assistance (DPA) component is the longest running part of the Mozambique programme, preceding even the existence of NIMD, since NZA, NIMD's predecessor, was the original entity to start implementing a programme for the period 2000-2003. Under this DPA component, generally referred to as the 'bilateral programme', which refers to the arrangement of providing each party with a preset budget for which it can propose self-managed activities, the current CO team has taken several important decisions, some with remarkable results. As a result of tactical maneuvering they have managed to achieve changes without jeopardizing their constructive relations with the relevant political parties. Rather, these relations have improved and intensified, specifically through the Strategic Planning Tool process (SPT). The move can generally be seen as one from quantity (budget) to quality (engagement).

However, it has not become clear to what extent the annual activities that the political parties implemented with NIMD funding in the years 2008-2014 have contributed to 'increased policy-seeking capacities of parties' or 'programmatic parties' as NIMD has decided to pursue. It is important to stress that the analysis next to the Mozambique context, in many ways looks at NIMD internal policy logic and methodological choices, where the CO's activities were often part of a larger trend driven from NIMD HQ. This is considered a benefit of the peer-approach of this evaluation. With general lack of insight into actual impact after 15 years, and the current budget levels, this report recommends a fundamental decision on how to continue this programme component post-2015.

### **Trust building**

DPA in Mozambique mainly served as a trust-builder, despite it never having been explicitly used in this fashion in comparison to other NIMD programmes. This trust was created by NIMD assisting in making an in-depth internal analysis of their organization with the Strategic Planning Tool (SPT) exercise in 2012 and 2013 (see below) as well as through the fruitful work of the NIMD country team on the Interparty Dialogue programme component (IPD) in the period of 2009-2011. This trust is also demonstrated by the fact that NIMD was the only outside entity to be invited to participate in the full programme of the party conferences of FRELIMO, RENAMO and MDM in 2012.

### **Focus on beneficiaries**

After 8 years of supporting a wide range of unrepresented political parties, including through the construction of a Center for Multiparty Democracy (CMD), the CPDM, the PM and the CO decided to end the bilateral support when none of these parties managed to gain a seat in the new parliament after the 2009 elections (even though the electoral threshold for new parties had even been lowered that year). The evaluation team considers this to be an understandable and wise decision.

### **Focus in budgetary matters**

In the light of the reality that parties have considerable other sources of income, but that they have prioritized expenses related to their cadre, members and constituency, makes that the bilateral programme, even with its decreasing funds, is a permanent reminder/opportunity to continue to focus on (programmatic) capacity development. Parties are not institutionally rich, but nonetheless substantial sums of money still flow through them. Parties seem to feel they have no choice but to prioritize the vast majority of these funds (one interviewee estimated some 80%) to keep their members, supporters and constituencies engaged via salaries and other arrangements. Earmarked budget for capacity (even more if not directly transferred to them) then helps to keep this objective on the agenda. This may explain why even with decreasing budgets parties themselves remain interested in these now 'small' amounts.






Figure 1 Overview of DPA per party from 2005 to 2014

### Budget and impact

In the 15 years of DPA, NIMD budgets per party have known a wide variety of amounts, differing per period and per (non) established party. There are however no impact analysis related criteria to determine what a sensible budget is related to impact. The setting of the budget was initially based on the parliamentary size of the party and with that their implicit country relevance and therefore also the relevance of the relation between this party and NIMD. This makes relationship building the driving objective, or so it would seem. As of 2009 the programme succeeded to move to equal distribution of approximately 16.000 Euro per party, based on an apparent principal belief that ‘equal is more fair’. But impact analysis related criteria were still absent

As argued above the earmarked budget may have been vital to keep capacity development on the agenda. However, if NIMD applies its focus on programmatic parties in order to counter personality-based parties (as it does in its theory of change) and this personalistic element in turn is heavily related to patronage which informs most of the parties’ other expenditures, one could argue NIMD has done little to push the parties to reform, or may even have sustained and supported this practice by freeing up the parties’ own budget for other use.

Depending on what is looked at and which aspects of the programme are taken into account, the outcome or impact of actions can go in an endless number of directions. But to simplify matters, one can say that outcome can either be positive (observable increased capacity), neutral (no effect whatsoever), or potentially negative (explicit misuse or unintended side-effects/ counter-effects). The overall conclusion is that we really do not know the DPA’s additional impact. In this light this report also refers to the soon to be finalized NIMD overall DPA external evaluation report, which will give insight into why measurement of institutional party support in a context of multiple budget streams and multiple democracy assistance agencies is quite problematic.

### Focus in topic

Even before the programmatic capacity objective of DPA became an official part of the allover NIMD 2012-2015 PP2 Multi-annual framework, the bilateral proposal guidelines of the Mozambique programme from 2008 onwards, already ‘limits’ the topics the parties can propose activities on to strategic or programmatic. Focusing on programmatic development is not an uncontroversial step in light of the ‘electoral focus’ Mozambican politics is and always has been experiencing. This situation

is best described as a country being 'stuck in gear 1 of democratic transition' where it needs support in shifting more focus towards the deepening democracy / non-electoral phase of the electoral cycle.

However, based on a quick scan of all party proposals from 2008 to 2014, one can question how much of a programmatic focus there actually was. Most projects in the last few years have either been focused on 'electoral' preparation, or post-election trainings of newly elected party cadre. And while activities in both phases could in theory be policy and programmatic capacity oriented, the reality is that this featured as a secondary objective. Electoral observation, electoral strategy, electoral communication, technical financial skills to perform in elected functions, etc. are the main activities that have been proposed.

The most understandable explanation for this is that the decision to orient towards programmatic capacity is strictly NIMD HQ-driven and not a local demand by the political parties. During the interviews for this report with political party representatives, two of the three parties mentioned they were displeased in the past they were no longer allowed to propose activities concerning 'democracy' but had to propose 'policy projects'. These remarks show 2 important problems:

- They misinterpreted the policy focus because democracy to them is little more than elections
- They didn't understand they had to have policy positions, but thought they had to start implementing social / civic activities as if they were CSO's or NGO's.

A strong driver to explain the lack of focus in practice is that the NIMD internal project appraisal and reporting checklist ask mainly technical/operational questions: timeframe, deadline, literally 'tick the box' on whether it is the 'programmatic objective', and a lot of space for the individual country coordinator or programme manager to make their own interpretations. Added to that the fact that NIMD HQ has quite unclear directives or guidelines of what it means by it. What happens in practice is that between the party proposal which is driven by internal party management priorities and electoral focus, and NIMD's programmatic driven appraisals of said proposal, room for negotiation is created. NIMD has to take into consideration its relationship with the party and continued timely implementation of the activities and in return the programmatic focus is allowed to be rather modest or indirect. This is not specific towards the NIMD Mozambique team, but is an all-round problem.

NIMD appraisals and checklists also give very little room to check who exactly participates and how the acquired knowledge is institutionalized. The majority of projects is targeted at local or regional cadre with a clear internal party top down message: to instruct and/or brief. It is rare that the activity is aimed at national party figures.

The administrative framework from NIMD HQ provides sufficient tools to financially account the expenditure, but with that largely no more than input level-data (training held, 30 participants finished training') from a PME-perspective.

While NIMD is a political party support organization, with the origins of its direct party assistance programmes lying in the desire to strengthen institutional capacity of the party organization, we see that with the exception of 2 or 3 activities, the project outputs are not aiming to produce a policy, strategy or an organizational body. And while it is said that human resource is the most important capital of any organization, that applies to its professional staff and not to temporary elected officials and volunteers. That being said, the FRELIMO 2014 plan does include the development of a national Policy body/commission in the party. This was a result of the Strategic Planning Tool process NIMD undertook with the party and can be seen as a good development.

### **Focus on long term planning**

The implementation of the Strategic Planning Tool (SPT) in 2012 served the parties programmatically, but it also provided NIMD with an opportunity to better inform its DPA-programme, since the parties' plans for NIMD function as a form of baseline assessment for each party. On the programmatic side three types of values can be identified: 1.) the exercise of the -generally absent-

critical self-analysis by political parties is introduced, leading to 2.) the exercise of prioritizing rather than considering all problems of equal relevance, which is followed by 3) a planning for a period of multiple years rather than ad hoc responses.

Already in 2002-2003, strategic plans were produced with support of NZA/IMD budget, but that project largely failed due to a lack of trust in the process on the side of the political parties. NIMD re-proposed it in 2012, building on a much more solid base of trust amongst the political parties. FRELIMO expressed that they deliberately prefer to consider the result of the SPT-process not as a multiannual plan, but as a strategic plan. It does cover a multi-annual period, but any short term (often electoral) strategic interest will be considered more important. 'Election Strategy' and 'organisational strategic planning' are of course two very different things, but that difference generally seems lost in translation. Strategy in terms of making choices is there, but short term needs will still inform allocations; the long-term planning objective is therefore not yet achieved. The annual guideline for the party project proposal often speaks of 'programmatically or strategic topics' (strategic meant as long-term organizational planning'). As parties have been given quite some space not to opt for a programmatic topic, they clearly often haven't.

Partly as unintended positive effect, the SPT has proven to be a 'creative' strategy/solution to a gradually decreasing DPA-budget without seeming to decrease the support effort. To a certain extent one can even say the support intensified in terms of time investment and trust received. A second unintended positive effect is that while the SPT is strictly implemented bilaterally per party (as to ensure confidentiality), the NIMD country team ensured there was agreement by all the parties to endeavor at the same time on the same process. The parties' focal points for the DPA and the NIMD-team now periodically meet to discuss the DPA programme component in multiparty setting, introducing an IPD-element to DPA.

The Strategic Planning Tool functions as a great tool to have parties internally assess themselves and for NIMD to get insight in the organization. A list of strengths and points for improvement that follows form that can be the starting point of discussion which policy or programmatic activity NIMD can support. That surely is a plus. But it should be realized that as of that point the original DPA logic is back in action: first budget was determined by NIMD, then activities were proposed, and results can only be formulated after that. Incorporating SPT does not fill that gap in the intervention logic.

### **Absence of country entry-analysis**

When reading the 2000-2003 NZA/NIMD programme evaluation, little analytical framework is found for the programme to come to DPA as the best possible contribution to political parties in Mozambique. It seems to have been seen both as a strategy of positive and constructive country-entry where one has something to offer, as well as an experiment with the new Political Party Assistance approach, which ECDPM's 2000 evaluation of the SNZA-programme evaluated as positive, 'if complementary to other governance interventions'.

Mozambique however is a country that already had an exceptionally comfortable state funding arrangement for all registered political parties, even being open to parties who are not running in elections. Additionally, for electoral contesting parties there is a state arrangement for campaign funding. One can still question the capacity and the non-financial resources available to political parties, but the more fundamental question of the necessity of DPA in countries that already have these locally created and owned arrangements, remains. Additionally, on practical level with regard to impact measurement one can look at other sources of income that parties have available to assess what impact one's contribution can have per activity, or to what extent the additional contribution informs the use of the parties' other sources of income. This analysis however, is absent. The country analysis in the 2009 annual plan also mentions Mozambique's state funding for parties to be 'exemplary', leaving unclear whether the opinion is that the arrangement is in line with ideal or developed democracies, or whether it is fitting for the state of development of this country. Yet at

the same time this observation did not inform NIMD's opinion on the desirability of a DPA component in the Mozambique programme.

### Key observations and recommendations DPA

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DPA, the bilateral contracts arrangement, was at the heart of NIMD's founding as an innovation in itself: demand-driven, locally owned and financially self-managed. But demand and ownership applied when parties were allowed to target their activities at any party institutional matter. When a strategic and programmatic focus was 'imposed', effectively NIMD took away ownership and started working supply-driven. Additionally, for different reasons, financial management responsibility was taken away. Decreasing budgets in this case strengthens that picture. At each stage all these steps seem logical defensive steps as a consequence of doubt and uncertainty by the team whether DPA was sensible and sensibly implemented.

The context in which NIMD supplied funding and support makes it hard to measure impact in any case (see near future DPA evaluation report), and the logic for dividing up the available budget was either relational or equitable (parliamentary size) or principle (equal distribution), but related to position of the party in the field and what sensible type of activity and relate budget were needed to see change; it isn't based on impact. The SPT process should not be confused to improve that matter. Expectations as such have always been unclear. Additionally, lack of a country entry-analysis show that it wasn't considered whether DPA was the best idea in a context where parties receive wide state funding.

In practice the programmatic and strategic focus also limitedly caught on, despite increased personal engagement by the team through SPT.

An external programme evaluation, less aware of the larger internal context of NIMD would likely elaborate more on the country specific context to inform recommendations and propose practical steps to tune and improve the logic and implementation of the IPD component, and would likely approve of the teams to develop a PME-system around DPA. As a peer-evaluation there is the benefit of increased understanding of original NIMD overall policy considerations, including some of the less strong elements of them. Next to that, a further 'investment' in effort of improved PME, in still a financially very small programme component, without not so much practical but fundamental design changes, makes that it has been decided to not provide such type of recommendations.

#### **Consider strong redesign of DPA and seek other avenues to pursue 'programmatic parties'**

The programme team has within the context it was operating in, taken wise decisions to try and apply more focus by making tactical and practical adjustments. Naturally, when one makes such adjustments it seems logical to continue the programme for another few years to appreciate the changes and hopefully find results. However, the evaluation team has not found many concrete results to report back. This, in our view, is not a negative reflection on the team but rather an indication that they should start looking at more fundamental strategic changes. Entering the 15<sup>th</sup> anniversary of NIMD's DPA component in Mozambique, the evaluation team believes that it is time for a fundamental decision how to redesign DPA.

This decision cannot be made instantly. Multiannual expectations have been created towards the parties with regard to the outcomes of the SPT process. However, the evaluation team recommends that scenarios for redirection and redesign of DPA should be made. Any convenient timeframe can be considered, as long as expectations are managed well and it is combined with an additional explanation on how the parties' newly developed strategic plans could and should be used for

resource mobilization efforts towards other international NGO's, PPAP's<sup>2</sup> and donors. However, the evaluation team does not believe that NIMD should make funds available to this end, as it would then not be supporting parties to become more programmatic, but it would be supporting their institutional financial and fundraising capacity instead. This way, NIMD gives a direct example of the long-term view and planning that it tries to stimulate with the SPT process, without again opening up its DPA funding to general institutional political party development.

Proposing to re-invent DPA as a *means*, does not in any way mean that it is being proposed to terminate pursuing programmatic parties (nor strategic planning for that matter, although it must be said that this is still to be more seen as an 'intermediate intervention' rather than an objective).

What is being challenged is that the intervention logic (provide budget), the implementation modality (self-proposed and self-managed activities by parties), the general NIMD management instruments provided (objectives, guidelines, appraisal sheets, reporting checklists), the driver (top-down supply driven), and lastly the Mozambican context (other large money streams around and in the parties), which than all takes place in an party internal 'isolated setting' is actually conducive for the policy-seeking capacity objective in mind.

The country team should feel free to consider whatever type of activities it wants to implement to contribute to achieving that objective and/or outcome, but is not obliged to seek a sensible use of the current instrument it is using now. Using the bilateral projects arrangement more in line with other programme components which relate more to actual real-life political processes taking place in the country, seems much more conducive to success. Two practical suggestions:

#### **A. IPD offers many avenues for Programmatic parties**

As will be elaborated under the chapter interlinkages, coherence between DPA and IPD will become increasingly important with the reduction of budgets. IPD processes often make use of less controversial topical issues to get parties around the table before the true contentious issues are discussed. In Mozambique this was never the case since, for good reason, it was always linked to political conflict reduction negotiations around election issues. In line with the recommendation under IPD to find ways to move away from the 'electoral focus' (but which NIMD is advised to nonetheless continue to support), we recommend that the programme tries to find additional avenues for dialogue on other topics. These topics can be complemented by training events or other classical capacity strengthening activities, to ensure successful participation of the parties in the IPD-process on that topic (for example policy briefing to prepare for participation in policy dialogues and legislation). The team could decide whether it still wants to maintain a separate 'Programmatic parties' or even capacity strengthening programme component to that end, but it is very well conceivable that such activities can be written and budgeted under its IPD- (or in theory even its democracy Schools) plans.

#### **B. The party vs parliament; a long lost avenue for organizational programmatic orientation**

On both local and national level, the political constellation seems to be slowly moving to a more balanced multiple party constellation and what the evaluation team assumes to become a more balanced parliament, which is subsequently assessed to be conducive to increased programmatic interests. After the 2014 national elections the evaluation team foresees a large number of inexperienced politicians (MP's and councilors) entering the stage. NIMD originally positioned itself explicitly as supporting the Secretary-General, extra-parliamentary organisational side of parties. That reputation and niche is now well established, but the political representation 'unit' of parties, their parliamentary sections, are still the most likely part of their party organisation to show (service) delivery to the population. Particularly if one works with parliamentary commissions, which is what the evaluation team recommends, the chance of change towards programmatic parties will be

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<sup>2</sup> Political Party Assistance Providers

increased. At the same time parliamentary factions are notorious for the difficulty with which the SG-party organizations are able to control them or even communicate with them. Another suggestion is therefore to work with parliamentary factions, but offered and organized through the party, not the parliament as institution.

## Chapter 3 Inter-Party Dialogue (IPD)

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The political context in Mozambique makes inter-party dialogue both necessary and difficult. Although two decades have passed since the end of civil war, the country bears all characteristics of a post-conflict society. Levels of trust, particularly between the two former rivals, FRELIMO and RENAMO, remain very low. The military escalation propagated by RENAMO in 2012 demonstrated how precarious and shaky the political stability still is. The political space continues to be dominated by one party, FRELIMO, although there are now indications that the rise of MDM is slowly challenging this status quo. The fact that FRELIMO enjoys an absolute, even constitutional, parliamentary majority means that within the confines of Parliament, the other political players have very minimal legal leverage over key democratic reforms. This makes inter-party dialogue outside the legislature a fundamental alternative if reforms that have to be pursued can be inclusive and sustainable. Under the prevailing political environment, the relevance of pursuing inter-party dialogue as one of the strategic objectives for NIMD in Mozambique cannot be questioned. This sentiment is also echoed by almost all the stakeholders that the evaluation team consulted.

### **Inter-Party Dialogue in Mozambique: an exercise in flexibility, sensitivity and innovation**

Based on the review of reports, discussions with the programme team at the Country Office and also interviews with the various stakeholders, the evaluation team concludes that NIMD in Mozambique has been innovative, flexible and sensitive in pursuing this strategic objective in an otherwise very difficult and polarized context. A number of initiatives and approaches bear testimony to this effect.

Having noted that dialogue directly involving the two political parties (RENAMO and FRELIMO) had understandably been proven difficult since the beginning of the programme in 2002, the CO opted in 2009 to rather start facilitating dialogue between political parties and the electoral management body, the National Commission for Elections (CNE). This was a strategic initiative that with the benefit of hindsight demonstrates the need to take advantage of windows of opportunities in facilitating inter-party dialogue. The Mozambican Constitutional Council, a body that plays an important role in the electoral process, had just handed down a very strong negative evaluation of the way the 2009 national elections had been managed. Consequently the Constitutional Council called for measures to be taken “to raise the level of trust and credibility that the electoral administration should deserve”. Embarking on facilitation of engagement between the CNE and political parties could therefore be considered a direct response to a clearly defined local demand. In the process, however, this initiative meant that political actors across the political divide were indirectly going to be engaged in a dialogue both with each other as well as with the CNE. The evaluation team found that since 2009, a series of dialogue sessions involving the CNE and political parties had been successfully carried out with the participation of political actors from across the entire political spectrum. Inevitably, issues discussed in these dialogue series initially revolved around elections and electoral reforms. Later (from 2010 onwards) the CO carefully started to include other topics which although they still touched on elections related issues, they also focused on wider democratic reform issues such as “Political Party Funding”.

By managing to regularly bring the various stakeholders around the table, the NIMD CO succeeded to establish itself as an important interlocutor and facilitator while at the same time being able to catalyze the evolution of trust between and among the players involved. The fact that the CNE greatly acknowledges and has now institutionalized this kind of interface with political parties and the fact that NIMD remains a strategic partner to the CNE goes a long way in underscoring the success of this particular approach.

In 2011, the role of the NIMD CO in facilitating inter-party dialogue was further reinforced by the request from the Parliamentary Committee on Constitutional Reform for the CO to facilitate a cross-



party debate to resolve contentious electoral reform issues that parties were not able to resolve in Parliament. Through series of inter-party dialogue series, 27 of the 30 contentious issues were resolved and presented to Parliament where they were subsequently passed into law.

Building on the successes gained through the CNE-political parties' dialogue initiative, but still faced with the difficulties in making a breakthrough with any high-level inter-party dialogue initiative, the evaluation team found that the CO was innovative by exploring other dialogue platform alternatives that could still give visibility and momentum to the ideal of inter-party dialogue. In this regard, two initiatives are noteworthy. In 2011, the CO initiated a dialogue platform for youth leagues (the Youth Round Tables) and young Parliamentarians from all the three parliamentary parties. The Youth Round Tables continued in the year 2012. A wide range of political topics were discussed including constitutional and electoral reforms. Also in 2011, the CO organized a dialogue platform exclusively for Women Members of Parliament from three parties represented in Parliament. This was done in partnership with AWEPA. These initiatives, for different reasons, turned out to have been one off events as the evaluation team was not able to establish any follow-ups beyond 2011. The idea behind these initiatives was novel; demonstrating to the senior level political actors that inter-party dialogue was both possible and necessary. The evaluation team noted however that while the "Youth Roundtables" continued over a period of two years (2011-2012), the dialogue initiative involving women parliamentarian was rather short-lived. A possible explanation that can be discerned here is probably the lack of a strategic local partner that could work with NIMD. While the CNE and the Juvenile Parliament were strategic local NIMD partners in the CNE-political parties and Youth Dialogue initiatives respectively, there was no local partner to accompany NIMD in the Women Dialogue initiative. Finally, in 2011 a potential topic for dialogue presented itself when the president announced a constitutional reform process, and some first dialogue events were subsequently organised. However, the process was soon halted and the window for dialogue on this topic closed.

In 2012, the CO also initiated quarterly cross-party meetings involving parties represented in Parliament that are benefiting from the NIMD's direct party assistance (DPA). While these meetings served mainly as joint reviews of the bilateral DPA, they did at the same time give further momentum to inter-party dialogue. It is through these quarterly meetings that NIMD successfully sold the idea of political parties to undertake strategic planning as part of the Direct Party Assistance (DPA). As noted elsewhere in this report, the strategic planning initiative has offered NIMD the opportunity to further intensify its contacts with political parties and further gain trust of these political parties. These quarterly meetings have continued to date.

Also in the same year 2012, the CO took advantage of the celebration of twenty years of peace in Mozambique by organizing (in partnership with AWEPA) an all-parties conference to jointly reflect on the role of political parties in promoting peace and democracy. A communiqué established by participating parties (about 40 in total) served as a basis for consensus on a common agenda of areas of mutual concern among political parties in Mozambique that required continued dialogue. Two important steps for the future of the programme were that at this conference it was achieved to include high-level leadership of the main parties. In addition, the common agenda cautiously mentioned opening up dialogue on more than electoral issues and democratic reform matters, including a broader policy debate.

### Key observations and recommendations on IPD

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There is no doubt that the political environment within which NIMD Mozambique has pursued IPD initiatives has not been as conducive as one would desire. This notwithstanding, all key stakeholders consulted confirm the necessity and desirability of such initiatives. In retrospect, a number of important lessons can be drawn.



The story of Mozambique is one that underscores the unique case of pursuing inter-party dialogue in a post-conflict situation. It is apparent that the rivalry and mistrust between FRELIMO and RENAMO is historic and deep rooted in their being sworn enemies during the civil war. This historic legacy cannot simply be wished away. Rather, it needs to be acknowledged and taken into account. The NIMD Mozambique has succeeded in this regard. The key lessons that we draw under these circumstances include the quest for flexibility, sensitivity, tact, patience and always being on the lookout for windows of opportunities. Of course, working in this way risks the programme becoming too malleable to the extent of losing focus. For now, the evaluation team did not find evidence to suggest that this losing of focus is happening. What can be said however is that more praise may be given to the fact that while it has for a long time proven hard to work with the parties towards a joint reform agenda horizon (as a 'goal' of IPD), it has effectively for years on end played a permanent conflict reducing role (around the 'new' battlefield of election issues) with its facilitation (the 'means' of IPD). While this has never been a conscious design for an NIMD programme in post-conflict or fragile and conflict affected states, it does in many ways contain features of what more consciously developed programmes would include.

### **Managing expectations**

The evaluation team noted that there was a feeling, particularly at the level of the Programme Manager in the Hague, that the Mozambique programme was not bearing the expected results with regard to IPD. Understandable as this may be, we did not find enough ground on which to justify it. In any case, the related lesson that the political context of Mozambique suggests is that aiming at high-level engagement in this particular context may continue to be too big an ambition which can only succeed in creating frustration.

It is therefore important to be modest and acknowledge the otherwise small but important steps being taken. Of course, this means that the programme should have the relevant capacity to systematically track those small but important steps and always link them up with the wider picture. In very practical terms, it would mean that the Mozambique programme needs to invest in developing a tailor made and context specific monitoring and evaluation framework.

### **Cautious behavior**

Given the sensitivities that characterize politics and political dialogue, the role of a facilitator is fundamental. In this regard, the interviewers specifically asked the various stakeholders as to how they assess the role of NIMD as a facilitator and yet it is in effect a foreign organization. The findings as presented above confirm the acceptability of NIMD.

One conclusion we can draw here is that under certain environments, particularly in the case of Mozambique, NIMD has succeeded partly because of it being a "double faced organization". As an institution, NIMD has a formal international status in Mozambique. With this status, key actors could not link this organization with any particular side in this otherwise very polarized society. At the same time, it is important to also underline, the role and reputation of national staff. Politics in Africa remains highly informal and complex. To succeed, one requires a great degree of understanding of these informal and yet very influential networks and political dynamics. An entirely foreign organization may find it difficult to penetrate through local politics. The fact that the whole office in Maputo is managed by local staff mitigates this limitations and has proven valuable in the case of Mozambique.

That said, it is important to pay special attention to the need for political neutrality of particularly the local staff. Presently, the team that is in Maputo is unquestionably accepted and respected by the relevant stakeholders, both national and international. However, this has not always been the case and therefore need not be taken for granted. One political party for instance told the evaluation

team of the serious reservations they had with one of the previous Country Coordinators on the grounds of perceived partisanship. The key lesson and recommendation here is therefore that while local staff will always remain very much integral to country offices, a great deal of caution needs to continue to be exercised particularly in the identification of the Country Coordinator.

As noted at the outset, the evaluation team observed that the very challenging political environment makes interparty dialogue to remain an important area in the pursuit of democratic consolidation in Mozambique. The dialogue between political parties and the CNE is bearing positive results as manifested in the improved levels of trust between CNE and political parties. This kind of dialogue has already found a “parent” since it is being institutionalized by and within the CNE. Similarly, dialogue between and among the political actors themselves has started gaining some momentum. The shared reform agenda that is contained in the communiqué of the all-parties conference of 2012 and the adoption of the political parties code of conduct are some concrete illustrations in this regard. However, what will remain a challenge is the question of institutionalization and sustainability of this particular form of dialogue.

Based on the findings of this evaluation team, the programme in Mozambique has three options to consider: (a) to maintain the status quo, whereby the NIMD CO continues to serve as both the facilitator and convener; (b) maintain a qualified status quo, whereby the NIMD CO remains the convener but out sources the facilitation role to another actor that is politically neutral and acceptable; and (c) transfer both roles of convener and facilitator to an inter-party dialogue platform (the CMD Model).

The evaluation team exercised its mind on all these options. The first option is what is already in practice. We did not find any stakeholder who had reservations to NIMD playing this role. Thus, as NIMD is increasingly enjoying the confidence and trust of the political players. It would be prudent to continue with this approach. The challenge, however, is that of sustainability and broadening of local ownership in the long run. The second option shares the merits of the first approach but mitigates the risks of sustainability if there is an understanding with the facilitator that the process of IPD can in the end be fully taken over by the local partner. NIMD has already experimented this approach with positive experiences. The third option, the CMD-Model may can at best be considered at a far-fetched dream at the moment given the political context. Thus, having considered the various options, the evaluation team would recommend the second option.

### **Learning from the past**

During interviews with the two preceding country coordinators, it was noted that they were quite honest in identifying some of the mistakes they felt to have made in attempts to start up IPD. Where NIMD after 10 years of piloting years now has captured how important it is to ‘set the scene’, work on interpersonal relations, and start dialogue on less contentious issues, the early years of IPD in Mozambique were quite the opposite with NIMD ‘entering the scene like a bull in a china shop’. It proposed topics such as the separation of state institutions and FRELIMO party structures, misuse of public means by political parties. Not surprisingly FRELIMO did not appreciate the topics nor the supposed need to dialogue with RENAMO.

Under the current country team, understandably and well identified, the IPD agenda involving the political actors has been dominated by elections and electoral related issue, when local demand offered that window of opportunity. However, there is a risk here for NIMD to increasingly but unknowingly becoming an organization that considers elections its niche thereby falling into the trap of “electoral fallacy”, whereby democracy is reduced to elections.

It is therefore important that NIMD enriches the IPD agenda by increasingly including broader democratic reforms and development issues. As a matter of fact, some of the important political

players expressed their interest and support to initiate debate on national issues that go beyond elections. Here, the Communiqué of 2012 serves as a perfect starting point since it is generated by the political parties themselves and encompasses quite a number of important policy and legal reforms issues beyond elections.

## Chapter 4 Schools for Democracy

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In 2009, following the sense to innovate and change approach based on a less than satisfactory feeling on the successes of the Direct party assistance and the Interparty Dialogue components, a different approach was piloted: moving away from working on a national level to a local level, and focusing less on political parties but more on civic potential leaders. This pilot was based both on experiences of the NIMD Indonesia programme as well as a programme and curriculum developed by South-Africa based NGO IDASA. While NIMD eventually managed the programme without IDASA, a larger NIMD & IDASA 'African Political Leadership' curriculum (iLEDA) followed from this experimental joint venture.

### **Democratic values and ideas, educating civil society actors and empowering individuals to become leaders thereby transforming local political culture**

NIMD Schools for Democracy (SfD) play an important role in embedding democratic values and ideas amongst the most active parts of society – i.e. active citizens, representatives of political parties and CSOs, and local journalists. By using a curriculum of four weeks (spread out over several months), which covers leadership, local government, elections, accountability and transparency related issues, and by focusing on debates and discussions among the participants of the group, the SfDs succeed in establishing local centers which spread democratic ideals. The process of joint learning, constructive debate and free exchange of ideas is playing an equally important role in harnessing local democratic potential as the training sessions themselves. In this context, the process is just as important as the content. On several occasions during the assessment meetings, participants noted that the schools enabled them to constructively discuss politics with their political opponents and that this is something they would have never thought possible before.

By using a four week curriculum the school provides civil- and political society actors with valuable knowledge on important matters such as *citizenship (week 01); leadership, problem identification, organization versus mobilization, lobbying versus advocacy (week 02), Local governance, public participation, accountability, finances, planning, transparency, taxation, revenues, budgeting, project proposal design (week 03) public speaking and presentations, reducing social distance between community activists and local or national government representatives*. All of these topics culminate in the writing of a project proposal on a topic chosen by individual participants (week 4). To the knowledge of the evaluation team, no comparable educational opportunity exists in the regions which were visited by the assessment team.

The programme enables participants to feel more confident and self-assured while engaging with each other or third parties, be it a local government, political parties or any person in a position of power. Debate and training, coupled with the skill building exercises on leadership and public speaking allow and encourage them to assume a role of leader and to feel their social and political responsibilities as citizens. Some participants have highlighted these very features of the programme, while some have noted that they have, as a result of trainings at SfDs become more actively involved in politics. Several alumni have already assumed leadership roles in the local municipality of Nampula and Chimoio, either through official government structures or by setting up their own associations.

The emergence of new leaders that are more deeply attached to democratic norms, behavior and values, the presence of open spaces for discussion and debate, the gradual improvement of quality of political debate, the rising awareness on the privileges of citizenship and the responsibilities of the elected all have a potential to transform local political cultures into being more open, more democratic and more dynamic.

The programme has an important networking function. It enables likeminded individuals to meet and join hands in collaborative efforts. The establishment of such networks, which in some cases result in formal alumni structures (such as in Chimoio and Nampula) allows for aggregating individual capacities into collective action, systematization of experience and resource sharing (between alumni) and establishing long-term personal and professional bondages between the participants.

The current political reality of Mozambique is such that especially on a local level, the dominance of the ruling party FRELIMO is increasingly contested. The party that has been able to capitalize most on the space created is MDM. Being a relatively new party they do not have the same structures some of the older parties have. They are often in dire need of trained personnel, capable of taking up leadership roles. In the two municipalities that were visited, it became obvious that MDM has capitalized most on the group of newly trained professionals. As one interviewee said: 'MDM looks at the capacities of a person and asks them to join, thinking that they will become a member later. The ruling party does it the other way around. They are only interested if you are a member.' Hence, SfDs find themselves in an increasingly beneficial position to leverage their capacities to further democratization processes locally.

### Key observations and recommendations on SfD

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Based on the results achieved over the past few years, the programme merits continuation. A standard proposal could be created, capturing everything there is to say about the Schools for Democracy, including the various results (both intended and unintended). It should be made clear what the return on investment is for a funder and what kind of long-term gains could be achieved. If funds for continuation of the school cannot be raised, the NIMD office in Mozambique should at least consider to develop a programme around the alumni that goes beyond facilitating meetings between alumni and government officials.

The Schools for Democracy are successful initiatives making positive contributions to the development of democratic culture and traditions in the societies in which they operate. However, the evaluation team believes that more can be done in terms of strategic relations with regional or local stakeholders and in public communication efforts to further enhance the visibility of SfDs, and to leverage more funding opportunities. As an illustration, the newly elected mayor of Nampula and the President of its local assembly were not aware of the existence of an SfD in their city, despite the fact that for example, the chief of staff of the newly elected Mayor is an alumni of SfD. Additionally, the programme would greatly benefit if it enhanced contacts with regional party leaders, local assembly members and officials and if it invested more in creating visibility materials to these ends.

#### **Location, location, location**

When opening new SfDs in other regions, one should aim at locating the schools strategically, i.e. with an eye on its potential impact and relevance for regional and national politics as opposed to the availability of implementing partners willing to cooperate, which appears to be the case in the SfD of Chimoio, which has a rather small constituency and comparably more limited potential for growth or alumni activities. In hindsight, the location of Nampula proved extremely strategically chosen, since the population size and thereby the number of national parliamentary seats bears potential to bring the schools more in relation to a national or countrywide view of the NIMD country strategy. SfDs in Mozambique should be conceptualized and implemented as part of NIMD's overall theory of change/strategy and, where possible, be more interlinked with other NIMD Mozambique activities (DPA, multiparty dialogue formats) thereby being more strategically placed into an overall NIMD portfolio in Mozambique. By doing so, the programmes will attain more coherence and inter-linkage, allow for more output per investment and make the NIMD democratization efforts more effective and sustainable.

### **Making full use of the potential available to you**

Alumni activities (support to, monitoring, empowerment, networking etc) should be incorporated more fully in the overall programming of SfDs. For the programme to contribute more directly and effectively to the development of genuine multiparty democracy in the regions, it should make use of alumni as resources for democratic transformation. Various funding, networking and empowerment opportunities should be considered, such as: funding small scale alumni projects (with focus on potential for practical success), organizing regional or national meetings and collaborative projects (to encourage the creation of national contacts and resource pooling), inviting the alumni at high profile NIMD Mozambique events in the capital or elsewhere, introducing successful alumni to different party leaders and officials (thereby supporting their climbing of career ladders), supporting their continuous development with periodic refresher trainings, keeping the alumni information network up-to-date, via periodic e-mail newsletters, usage of social media and mobile apps, and organizing regular alumni dinners and other activities.

The alumni of SfDs tend to organize themselves under formal structures. Such organization efforts have obvious benefits: more organized alumni activities, more collective action possibilities, higher leverage over local, regional or national issues, better opportunities for fundraising, et cetera. At the same time, there are potential drawbacks that merit attention. Political infighting, capture of influence by a single party, non-transparent decisions and funding allocations, and the creation of organizational bottlenecks that inhibit effective action are some examples of things that can go wrong. Repressive or dominant authorities also find it easier to influence or clamp down on hierarchical and formally organized institutions than on horizontal networks knit together by shared principles but operating with lower formal interdependencies. These considerations must be judged based on the local political context and the degree to which the NIMD wishes to associate itself with these structures.

The curriculum that is currently being used was taken from the institute of democracy in Africa (IDASA), translated into Portuguese and adapted somewhat to the Mozambican context. However, facilitators have pointed out that the language used sometimes makes it difficult to understand what is being discussed and that the examples that are used mostly cover other countries instead of Mozambique. The curriculum should therefore be reviewed and most likely adapted even more. This will provide for the discussion of real-time, practical issues, alongside broad matters of citizenship. Issues related to HIV/AIDS, the abuse of power and other locally pertinent issues could be more extensively covered. Side note to this is that one should tread carefully on how “local” any training or educational programme can be. There are practical considerations of costs and scalability that should be taken into account.

### **Visibility**


Encouraging local ownership is to be welcomed and supported. However, this should not come at the expense of the visibility of NIMD, especially when the organization (both globally and locally in Mozambique) is prioritizing fundraising efforts in light of declining funding. Awareness of the NIMD’s role in conceptualizing, initiating and funding the SfDs is considerably limited in both Nampula and Chimoio. At the two alumni events attended, neither NIMD’s logos nor other materials were available and many of the people that were interviewed seemed to have only limited knowledge of the role NIMD has played. Since NIMD is now investing more efforts into fundraising from external sources, it should ascertain that its name is properly branded and recognized, especially when having contributed to successful efforts such as SfDs.

Programmes that outsource their activities to other agencies (local NGOs etc.) tend to end up paying higher costs. Direct implementation or sharing of facilities with public agencies are, depending on the aims and scope of the action, some possible options that can be considered.

## Chapter 5 Interlinkages between the three programme components: Coherence in programme design and seizing opportunities

The NIMD programme in Mozambique historically consisted of multiple bilateral political party relations and funded projects. DPA was thus the basis of the programme and took up the vast majority of the programme budget (see graph underneath). The first years did see an increase in cross-party activities, that is to say jointly initiated activities in multiparty settings. While this could be seen as a step up to Interparty Dialogue, it did not necessarily develop that way. Jointly initiated activities in multiparty setting have often consisted of trainings and did not automatically mean that the setting for mutual exchanges of ideas and opinions was created. Additionally, in the period before 2009 it seems that the NIMD team both in The Hague and Maputo had tried to set up IPD as a separate entity on democratic reform agenda topics, and from the outset did so with the creation of a CMD as a future but ultimate objective. This met with many disappointments, and the freer approach that was taken up from 2009 onwards seems to have been more effective.

Before the current successes of the new IPD approach became visible, the team seemed uncomfortable with the results of both DPA and IPD and was seeking for new dynamics. The Democracy Schools seem to have been guided more by a lack of confidence in IPD and DPA than a direct desire to start an entirely new programme. The move to Schools was however an interesting step forward as it was an experiment to go into an entirely different direction by moving away from the national level towards a local level and changing from primarily politics focused activities towards capacitating civic talent.



### Coherence

While experiences with one programme component might have led to the development of another, the three seem to have few crosslinks. For the different components, even for the two national ones DPA and IPD, different regular contacts exist within the participating parties. Secretary-Generals and other senior levels are meant to be kept informed by the party liaisons, but the country team admits



that considerable efforts have to be made by them to ensure that this really happens (this, however, is not unique to the Mozambican programme but can be seen in many NIMD programmes).

The Mozambique programme could not be seen as one programme with three components, but as three separate programmes implemented by the same organization. However, this is not necessarily bad. Three components or programmes which are each effective and for which the urgency and relevance is clear, could be interpreted as an outstanding form of planning; in case of difficulties in one of the components, the others are not automatically compromised.

#### **Link DPA and IPD**

So coherence is not a goal in itself but with the current very limited DPA budget levels the evaluation team believes that, should it continue, linking it better to (at least) IPD is a must. Impact, just through DPA, can barely be expected anymore, and thus the intense communication with the parties seems to not be worth it. At the same time, in line with the recommendations done under DPA and IPD to re-orient towards policy dialogue, it could be used to reinforce added advantages on substantive matters, which will increase cost effectiveness.

#### **Link between local SfD and national political parties (DPA and IPD)**

The rise of MDM as a national political trend is also reflected in the experiences of the Schools for Democracy (SfD), with this party, unintendedly, being the main actor at local level to seize the opportunities the schools have to offer. While the schools are still a relatively new programme component, the evaluation team recommends that the intervention logic for the schools should include measurable results on how they contribute to democratization nationally or at national level. Due to scope and size, isolated schools on local level can only have a modest impact on country wide developments, while NIMD's strategy per country programme will continue to be based on a national view or strategy.



## Chapter 6 Recommendations for the NIMD Country Office in Mozambique on Institutional Capacity

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Recommendations for the organisational capacity of the Country team following from the BART Partner Scan (annexed) and the evaluation report's recommendations, for future focus.

The evaluation team has a very positive appraisal of the staff of the country team. To use a quote from the Dutch ambassador in Maputo: "it is highly impressive how this team of effectively a bunch of youngsters is successfully maneuvering at the highest levels of politics while achieving results".

Most programmatic shifts the team has made have been positively appraised by the evaluation team and the majority of recommendations basically push to further explore these self-chosen directions. The evaluation team does not see capacity gaps following directly for the recommendations it makes, but does overall refer to the BART Partnerscan results (Annex 3). Here too it needs to be appreciated that the Programme Manager and Executive Director of the Country Office have intensively worked on the capacity identification themselves in the last few years.

### **Strategic plan**

One of the results of the Partner-scan of the BART that does stand-out is the lack of a multi-annual strategic plan for the Country Office itself. The a) identified absence of links between the programme components, b) the IPD having for too long been pursued to be sustained by a CMD and c) the IPD in practice having been more electoral issues as a stage for permanent demand-driven political conflict reduction mediation, are matters one would hope to resolve with a guiding multiannual strategic plan that provides a helicopter's view capacitating the team to rise above the daily tactical work.

### **Successor**

A larger risk, again already duly identified by the PM and ED themselves, is the possible future departure of the ED to seek new career opportunities. With the political work being very much based on personal relationships, networking and trust, a departure would surely cause problems. Current staff at the CO is more than capable to perform the tasks they have been performing over the years but replacement for the ED is not necessarily found within the team.

It is advised to a) agree with the ED on a gradual process of hand-over to a future successor, whereby b) the ED will additionally as Special Advisor, Ambassador or some form of position on a to be created Advisory Board or Council of Patrons, such that in a lighter but prominent form will remain related to the NIMD Country Office for considerable time. This engagement would serve the purpose of continued advice to the new ED, as well as to mobilize him for high-level engagement directly with party agents if needed from time to time.

## ANNEXES:

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### ANNEX 1: 2014 Mozambique Evaluation Contacts

#### NIMD Steering Committee

Eugenia Boutylkova	PME-manager
Anne-Mieke van Breukelen	Mozambique Programme manager
Hans Christiaanse	Financial Programme Officer

#### NIMD Peer Evaluation Team

Augustine Magolowondo	African Regional Representative
Jerome Scheltens	Programme manager
Levan Tsutskiridze	Executive Director, NIMD Georgia and Caucasus Programme
Debbie Vermeij	Financial Programme Officer (Evaluation team leader)

#### Interviewed at NIMD HQ:

##### NIMD HQ Staff:

Anne-Mieke van Breukelen	Mozambique Programme manager
Egbert Pos	Programme manager, formerly managed Mozambique programme

#### Interviewed in Maputo:

##### NIMD Country Office staff:

Hermenegildo Mulhovo	Country Representative, head of Country Office
Artimisa Dava	Finance and Administration Officer
Dercio Alfazema	Programme Officer
Izidro Ractone	Programme Officer

João Pereira	Former NIMD Country Representative, currently director of MASC
Adriano Malache	Former NIMD Country Representative, currently civil servant at Mozambican Minister of Defense
Neila Nomade	Former Country Office staff, currently British High Commission Maputo Political Affairs Officer

#### Political Party Representatives:

##### FRELIMO:

Zaida Matola	Central Committee's Head of Department for training and coaching of party higher cadre and leadership
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##### RENAMO

Manuel Zeca Bissopo	Secretary-General
Nunes P Nenele	Executive Secretary to the Party President
	Party focal point for NIMD bilateral programme

##### MDM

Lutero Simango	Whip of MDM Parliamentary bench
	Director of International Affairs + Head of Training Department
	Party focal point for NIMD bilateral programme

**PIMO** (as one of leading members of former CPDM)

Ya-Qub Sibindy

Chairman

Nunes Nenele

Executive-Secretary

**National Democratic Institutions:**

**CNE Electoral Commission**

Abdul Carimo

Chairman of the CNE

**STAE Electoral Management Body**

Felisberto Naife

General Director

Claudiop Albasine Langa

National Director for Training and Civic Education

**Experts and peer NGO's:**

Miguel de Brito

EISA Country Director

Dinis Matsolo

President of Observatoria Eleitoral

Luis de Brito

Director of Instituto de Estudos Sociais e Economicos

Bishop Reverend

Silva Mulambo

Political expert

Hilario Siteo

Political expert & independent consultant

**Donors:**

Anders Karlsen

Deputy Head of Mission of Embassy of Denmark

Frederique de Man

Netherlands Ambassador to Mozambique

ANNEX 2: Consulted Documents

**2014 NIMD Mozambique Programme Evaluation**

**Annex X**

**Documents Consulted**

***Background Research***

- 2005 Parties and Political Development in Mozambique (EISA, Siteo et al.)
- 2009 Mozambique: Democracy and Political Participation (AfriMap & OSISA)
- 2011 Mozambique Democratic Movement (MDM): an analysis of a new opposition party in Mozambique
- 2011 UNDP Mozambique Quick Facts
- 2012 Bertelsmann Transformation Index Mozambique
- 2012 IHS Mozambique: Political Dynamics, Regulatory Outlooks, and Infrastructure Risks
- 2012 Mozambique: Post-war socio-economic and political challenges (Institute for Security Studies)
- 1996-2012 World Bank Country Data Report for Mozambique
- 2013 Local Elections: Mozambique political process bulletin (CIP & AWEPA)
- 2013 (June) Think Africa Press “Mozambique’s Elite Development and Mass Poverty” Thembi Mutch
- 2013 (Aug) Africa Confidential: “RENAMO ramps up the pressure”
- 2013 (Oct) Dr. Joseph Hanlon (OSISA): “History Matters in Mozambique”
- 2013 (Nov) AllAfrica: “Mozambique: FRELIMO Wins Maputo With Greatly Reduced Majority”
- 2013 (Dec) AllAfrica: “Mozambique: An Incomplete Peacebuilding Process?” Siongile Gida & Amanda Lucey
- 2013 (Dec) AllAfrica: “Mozambique: Another Dialogue Session Boycotted by RENAMO”
- 2013 (Dec) AllAfrica: “Ten Civilians Murdered by RENAMO in Six Weeks”

***NIMD & Partners Plans, Appraisals, Reports, Evaluations***


- 2000-2003 Evaluation Report on NZA/IMD Mozambique Programme
- 2008 Interim Report Supervision NIMD Field Office
- 2008 Interim Report, Part 2, Supervision NIMD Field Office
- 2008 Reaction to 2008 Interim Report
- 2009 NIMD Mozambique Annual Plan
- 2009 Appraisal Mozambique RENAMO
- 2009 Appraisal Mozambique FRELIMO
- 2009 Appraisal Mozambique MDM
- 2009 Annex to Appraisal Mozambique MDM
- 2009 Bilateral Programme Memo (confidential)
- 2009 Communication with Netherlands MFA, Frans Bijvoet
- 2009 Programme Update Frank Sellies to Jasper Veen
- 2009 Mozambique Annual Report
- 2010 NIMD Mozambique Annual Plan
- 2010-2013 iLEDA School Mozambique Project Plan
- 2010 Appraisal Mozambique Bilateral Programme Reports
- 2010 Guidelines Mozambique Bilateral Programme
- 2010 Appraisal Mozambique RENAMO
- 2010 Response to Mozambique Bilateral Proposals 2010
- 2010 Mozambique Annual Report
- 2008-2010 End Report Supervision NIMD Field Office
- 2011 Mozambique Annual Plan
- 2011 Mozambique Annual Report
- 2012 Mozambique Annual Plan

- 2012 Appraisal Mozambique MDM
- 2012 Fundraising Mobilization Strategy Mozambique Country Office
- 2012 Mozambique Annual Report
- 2012 Reaction to Evaluation Report
- 2013 Mozambique Annual Plan
- 2013 OSISA Grant Pre-Assessment Form
- 2013-2014 OSISA Workplan Template
- 2013-2014 OSISA Budget, Elections with Integrity: Dialogue Platform on Electoral Processes

ANNEX 3:

**Report Programme Review Mozambique  
Based on NIMD's Baseline & Programme Review Toolkit**

**February 2014**



## **1. Introduction**

This report describes the results of a political context review scan, programme scan and organisational assessment scan undertaken in February 2014 at the NIMD Country Office in Maputo, Mozambique. The scans are part of NIMD's Baseline and Review Toolkit, that are currently under development, and of which part have been piloted in Kenya and Tunisia. In Mozambique the scans were used as part of a broader peer evaluation of the NIMD Mozambique programme. They served to provide the evaluation team with general insights in, and a shared understanding of the political situation, the programme developments and the organisational development in Mozambique. The results of the scans, together with the outcome of the evaluation, aim to assist the NIMD Mozambique team in further developing the programme strategy, and serve as an input for a Multi-Annual Plan for NIMD Mozambique.

## **2. Political context scan**

### **2.1 Facts and figures on the Mozambican political situation**

A half day participatory workshop was held at the NIMD Country Office with NIMD Mozambique staff, the NIMD Programme manager for Mozambique, two experts (who partially attended) and the NIMD evaluation team (see Annex 1 for Participants List). During the workshop, the political context scan was presented, looking specifically into three main intervention areas; political system, political

actors and political culture (see Annex 2). Participants were requested to define the most significant changes in the Mozambican political environment over the last few years, as well as the most significant challenges for working in this environment over the next years. Before delving into the dynamics of the Mozambican political situation, the participants defined a few basic features of the Mozambican political situation. As a group, the participants agreed on the following contours of the current political context:

- Mozambique can be considered as a **semi-presidential** system, but with a concentration of power in the presidency. The president is directly elected, is both head of state and head of government, appoints the vice president without parliamentary approval, appoints high court judges, and has thus more power than on paper would fit with a semi-presidential system.
- The parliament is weak, and has little executive power
- Current President will step down, but remain president of the FRELIMO party. This makes the party more personality-based, where the party serves its president, rather than the party outliving the president of state. This can lead to a new dynamic between head of state, president of party and speaker of house
- The **electoral system** is a mixed system, with a proportional electoral system with districts with multiple seats. It is a closed list system, only featuring the party on the ballot. As candidates are unknown, this leads to party dominance on MP selection.
- It is not clear how many **political parties** are exactly registered. In 2009 there were 42 officially registered parties, but now numbers seem to have risen to over a 100 parties. Most of them are not visible, except for during electoral periods. NIMD staff say that about 10 of them are operational and have some social base around one or two personalities with media exposure. There are 3 parliamentary parties: FRELIMO, RENAMO and MDM.
- **Legal framework:** in order to register a political party you need to have party statutes, a certain number of signatures of people supporting your party and proof of criminal clearance of the founding members. In order to participate in the elections, a separate registration is required.
- The parliamentary political parties are entitled to **state funding**. Campaign funding is disbursed to all political parties participating in the general elections (in 2009 about 110 political parties received campaign funding).
- **Coalitions and alliances** are allowed, but currently non-existent. In the past there was a Democratic Alliance with 6 political parties, including RENAMO, but then RENAMO took over and it disappeared.
- **Voter turnout** during the general elections has been gradually decreasing from 88% during the elections in 1994 to 44% in 2009.

## 2.2 Results of political context scan and Most Significant Changes & Challenges

Below, the results of the political context scan are presented together with the identification of the Most Significant Changes (looking backwards) and the Most Significant Challenges (looking forward) at the three levels.

### System level

Indicators	Stage 1 Basic	Stage 2 Developing	Stage 3 Maturing	Stage 4 Established
1. Level of political representation	AvB AD DA SM	HM HS		
2. Level of political participation		AvB HM	AD	HS

		DA SM		
3. Access to the political system by parties	DA		AvB HM HS SM	AD
4. Level of development of the party system		AvB DA SM	HM HS	AD
5. Free, fair and credible elections		AvB HM DA	AD HS SM	

The discussion on the results presented above made it clear that the Mozambican political system currently finds itself between developing (2) and maturing (3), having made significant strides away from basic (1).

With regard to the level of political representation it is noted that on paper the Mozambican political system does allow for the representation of different groups in society, and that there are spaces for civil society to participate in politics (e.g. within the EMB both political parties and civil society members are incorporated). In practice it remains elite dominated though. Civil society organisations are often dominated by the government, and behind the scenes a lot of manipulation and intimidation is going on to prevent critical citizens, as well as members of opposition parties, from active participation in politics.

This also relates to the level of political participation and access to the system. Formally, there are no big barriers to actively participate in politics. Criteria for the registration of a political party and for participation in an election are reasonable and state funding is provided to allow all parties to run a campaign for the elections. In practice however, opposition parties face quite a lot of challenges when entering the political arena, in terms of intimidation and fraud. They don't have fair chances to compete on an equal level with the party in government because of the state resources and clientelism chains that are used by the ruling party. Opposition parties often also face an internal lack of capacity to compete. Participation in elections requires a huge logistical effort, due to the large territory that needs to be covered and the large number of polling stations that need to be supplied with human resources.

With regard to the level of development of the party system, participants pointed out that the ruling party clearly dominates politics, and that only the parliamentary parties have real capacity to participate in elections. The extraparliamentary parties lack basic capacities to participate, despite the provision of campaign funding in the run-up to the elections. FRELIMO as a ruling party is not blamed for this however, as on paper all parties seem to get a fair chance to engage in elections. MDM has shown that it is indeed possible to found a new party, register for elections and to mobilise the minimum capacity to participate. They are now slowly developing into a more stable party that is increasingly well prepared for participation in elections.

When it comes to the elections, it is important to point out that Mozambique has gone through four general elections (1994, 1999, 2004, 2009) and four local elections (1998, 2003, 2008) since the signing of the peace agreement in 1992, and that the 5<sup>th</sup> general elections are upcoming (October 2014). Although these elections certainly faced localised incidents of intimidation and fraud, the elections have internationally been qualified as free. The participants feel that the quality of the



electoral process has gradually improved over the past decades. And even though the elections are certainly not free of irregularities and deficiencies, the credibility of the electoral process seems to be increasing.

On the basis of these findings, the participants identified the following changes and challenges at the level of the Mozambican political system:

Main changes	Main challenges
Rise of MDM as opposition party; now ruling in 4 municipalities and 30% of votes during local elections in 2013	Renewal of the political system; finding a new balance between the parliamentary parties after the 2014 elections
Upcoming middle class and modern information technology	Increased politicisation of the EMB (CNE, STAE and polling stations)
Electoral reforms, leading to correction of errors and new composition of the EMB	Peace consolidation after the rising tensions and violent incidents between RENAMO and government forces
Approval of electoral law, and new composition of EMB leading to military conflict	Post-election tension between the parties
Withdrawal of threshold for seats in parliament (allowing MDM to participate)	EMB's capacity to function independently, transparently and just
Rapid publication of electoral results	
Increased trust in electoral institutions	

#### Actor level

Indicators	Stage 1 Basic	Stage 2 Developing	Stage 3 Maturing	Stage 4 Established
1. Political parties develop program. positions on substantive issues	AD SM	AvB HM DA HS		
2. Rootedness in society	AvB AD HM DA SM			HS
3. Functioning party organisations		AvB (RENAMO) AD (no Parl ReP) HM DA SM	AvB (FRELIMO)	AD (with Parl. Rep) HS
4. Parties have a functional & effective relation with their MPs	AvB		AD HM SM	DA HS
5. Political parties translate& apply democratic principles in their functioning	DA SM	AvB (FRELIMO) AD HS	HM	

Overall, it was concluded that the political parties in Mozambique are 'developing', although it is important to acknowledge that there is a huge gap in terms of capacities between the three parliamentary political parties, and parties outside parliament. All extraparliamentary parties probably find themselves at the 'basic' level. As NIMD works mainly with the parliamentary parties, the participants focused in their scoring more on FRELIMO, RENAMO and MDM.

With regard to the extent to which the political parties in Mozambique are programmatically oriented, participants recognised that the parliamentary parties have some positions on priority issues, but that there is no real policy discussion on national issues. Parties still seem to function more around personalities than around comprehensive and shared party positions. With MDM entering as a third actor in the political arena, it seems that this is slowly changing. MDM tries to present itself as an alternative for the already existing parties, and has incorporated more educated and outspoken people within the party. Whether this will also force the parties into a more policy oriented debate remains to be seen, but at a local level, especially in the municipalities that are dominated by MDM, the need for having policy-oriented views seems to be felt and preliminary steps towards more engagement of citizens and are made.

The rootedness of parties in society remains rather weak though, and is by almost all participants scored as 'basic'. The parties in Mozambique do not have a traditional constituency to represent (there are no strong regional, religious or ethnic divisions) and there is very little interaction with the citizens in between elections. MDM is the first party that seems to move in the direction of a clearer constituency, as they are attracting primarily young, urban voters. Politics in Mozambique was for a very long time about peace reconciliation and unifying the country. Focussing on programmatic differences was unfitting for that. This also explains the historical lack of focus on policy issues in Mozambique.

With regard to the functioning of party organisations the participants see clear differences between the political parties. Extraparliamentary parties have hardly any party organisation at all, and at best evolve around one or two people who attract some media attention. RENAMO and MDM have a secretariat that provides basic support to the party, and FRELIMO can be considered as a relatively well organised party, with party structures going towards the grassroots levels. These rather big differences between the parties in terms of organisational capacity also explain why opposition parties are having a hard time in winning political ground.

The parliament as an institution is rather weak. It merely functions as a rubberstamping body, rather than a scrutinizing body that examines the work of the government or debates legislations. Due to the 2/3 majority of FRELIMO in parliament, it cannot effectively play its oversight function. With regard to the relations between the political parties and the members of parliament though, most participants were of the opinion that there are relatively strong links between them and that MPs usually represent the party views. In practice, most MPS do not respond so much to their constituency, but more the party. It is also important to point out that parties in parliament usually present themselves as a bloc. The party loyalty amongst MPs is high, and therefore they vote according to the party line.

When discussing the political parties' ability to translate and apply democratic principles in their functioning, participants indicated that the parliamentary parties have started to apply some democratic principles (such as transparency, inclusiveness, etc), but not very consistently, and often in a selective manner. The pressure for more internal democracy and application of internal rules and procedures seems to slowly increase though, as the recent hassles regarding the procedures for selecting FRELIMO's presidential candidate also demonstrate. Prominent members of the party filed

a formal complaint to the party's disciplinary body and internal pressure on the leadership to abide by the rules, was high.

On the basis of these findings, the participants identified the following changes and challenges at the level of the Mozambican political actor:

<b>Main changes</b>	<b>Main challenges</b>
New parliamentary party MDM appealing to needs and interest of citizens	To make political parties understand their main tasks in representing their constituencies
More internal pressure especially within FRELIMO on the leadership	To improve the interaction between PP, MPs and society
MDM has grown as alternative force for FRELIMO and RENAMO	Consolidation of power of MDM
CSOs and citizens have taken the lead in pressure on government for (peaceful) change	RENAMO reconstructing itself after internal crisis
RENAMO lost influence at a local level by boycotting the local elections	Development of party policies
Increased balance between political parties at local level	Further increase levels of internal party democracy
	To have balance of power in parliament between parties
	To develop strong leaders with political dominance and management capacity
	To develop political actors with the capacity to mobilize electorate

While several positive changes were mentioned, the discussion revealed that there still remain a large number of weaknesses in the institutional development of parties, rootedness of parties in society, and their policy orientation.

### Culture level

<b>Indicators</b>	<b>Stage 1 Basic</b>	<b>Stage 2 Developing</b>	<b>Stage 3 Maturing</b>	<b>Stage 4 Established</b>
1. Citizens have trust in the political parties	AD DA	AVB HM HS SM		
2. Level of inter party interaction		AvB AD DA HS SM	HM	
3. Rule bound behaviour by political actors	DA	AvB AD HM HS SM		

4. Level of political violence	SM	AD HM DA	AvB HS	
5. The level of tolerance of divergent political views		AvB DA	AD HM	

In the area of political culture, participants examined several aspects related to democratic values and behaviours, including trust in political parties, levels of political violence, interparty communication and interaction, and the extent to which political actors in practice uphold the rules and regulations they are bound by. The discussion on the results presented above make it clear that the participants assessed the behaviour of Mozambican political actors to be developing (2).

During the discussion on citizen's trust in political parties, it became clear that the participants see a negative tendency with regard to the trust in political parties. Mozambique not only faces a low voter turn-out during elections, citizens also seem to have very little faith in the government and in the ruling party specifically. This also explains partly the rise of MDM as a new opposition party. Many votes for MDM can be considered as a vote against the party in government. Whilst trust in political parties is low, levels of interparty interaction are increasing. Ten years ago the Mozambican parties would hardly meet outside the formal channels, such as parliament. But nowadays political party representatives do regularly meet in multi-party settings, usually in discussion fora on specific subjects. This trend can also be detected within the NIMD Mozambique programme, where an increasing level of interparty cooperation is experienced. Between the party leadership the relation remains challenging though, as the violent incidents between RENAMO and government forces in 2013 have demonstrated. Despite a formal dialogue at leadership level between RENAMO and FRELIMO many issues remain unresolved. At leadership level the interest in a constructive dialogue around national issues is still rather limited.

With regard to rule bound behaviour by political actors, participants pointed out that there is still a regular incomppliance with existing rules and regulations, but that increasingly critical voices within and outside the parties, question that behaviour (see earlier example on FRELIMO's candidate selection process). On paper reinforcement mechanisms are in place to scrutinize compliance with rules and regulations, but in practice these bodies are often not functioning effectively.

On the basis of these findings, the participants identified the following changes and challenges at the level of the Mozambican political actor:

Main changes	Main challenges
Increased interaction between political parties	Consolidating dialogue as an alternative for political violence
Rising tensions and violent incidents between RENAMO and government in 2013	Turn around the decreasing trust in democratic institutions and in political parties in particular
Reduction of insults, fights and personal attacks during campaigns	Role of the police in elections
Improved relations between opposition and ruling parties during political debates	Consolidation of a joint agenda of PPs
Reduction of violence during elections	Creating a peaceful environment for relations between RENAMO and FRELIMO
PPs interested in electoral Code of Conduct	FRELIMO accepting the emergence of other parties
More young people interested and participating	(Ab)use of public resources in elections

in active politics	campaigns
	Performance of the EMB

### 3. Programme review

After the political context scan, a start was made with an internal programme review. As this part of the Baseline and Programme Review Toolkit has not yet been finalised, it was conducted based on the suggestions by NIMD's PM&E Coordinator to create a programme timeline, listing the key actions and key changes per year. During a participatory workshop the NIMD Mozambique staff and the NIMD Programme Manager were requested to define the most significant actions and results under each of the three programme components (interparty dialogue, direct party assistance and democracy schools) for the period 2009-2013.

This exercise produced the following overview:

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
IPD	Multistakeholder platform on elections CMD-Malawi visit to Mozambique on pp-EMB dialogue platform	Dialogue platform on electoral issues continued; 4 content debates Decrease tension between CNE and pp Interparty dialogue tables; reduction of tensions between pp Annual review on multiparty political landscape	Contribution to consensus on electoral law reform Support to parliamentary committee for electoral law reform, on their request. Round tables and exchange to Mali & Ghana Youth & women dialogue ARP Conference on constitutional reform	Quarterly meetings with pp focal points institutionalised Support to parliamentary committee for electoral law reform New electoral law approved Conference 20 years of peace, resulting in joint agenda for pp	Meetings between pp after violent incidents leading to formal dialogue between RENAMO & FRELIMO PP meeting with Guebuza Electoral dialogue platform facilitated, ownership with CNE CoC adopted BRIDGE trainings
DPA	MDM's founding congress → Contributing to changing political landscape	Support to extraparlamentary parties stopped	Increased focus in policy development Management of DPA shifted to country office More systematic and regular support Decrease DPA without negative effect on IPD	Start of strategic planning process Increased trust & recognition	Implementation of party plans in line with strategic plans Presentation of strategic plans to donor community Strategic plans more than financing tool. Networking and resource mobilisation
SfD	Start of SfD in Manica	First group of graduates in Manica New source of funding for SfD (Danish Embassy)	Local ownership (shift from IDASA to NIMD) Consistent concept and systematic implementation Increasing involvement local government	4 groups of alumni graduated Increasing focus on strengthening alumni through interaction with local government and alumni networks Increasingly in line with NIMD mandate	Presidential debates at local level in run-up to local elections Support from other donors for alumni activities Increased link local and national politics Contribution to

			authorities Alumni debates and support	Increased sustainability of results	changing political and MDM elections in Nampula	local dynamics winning
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When discussing the results and changes with regard to the NIMD’s interventions in the area of interparty dialogue, a number of trends and particularities were identified:

- 1) Activities related to elections have been prominent in multiparty discussions. In 2009 the NIMD programme in Mozambique started with an electoral dialogue platform to reduce the tensions and increase the levels of understanding between the political parties and the CNE. This has gradually developed into a broader multistakeholder platform, including civil society actors and media, that focuses not only on the reduction of tensions, but also on capacity building (through BRIDGE trainings), and resolution of contentious issues (though the support to the parliamentary committee in charge of electoral law reforms, 27 of the 30 contentious issues were resolved in 2011, and 2 of the 3 outstanding issues were resolved in 2012). In 2013 the ownership of the electoral dialogue platform was gradually shifted from NIMD to the CNE, to increase sustainability.
- 2) The dialogue between the parties takes place at various levels in the parties and on a variety of topics, e.g. political party funding, women in politics, the role of political parties in consolidating peace and democracy etc. The programme has tried to involve different layers of the parties (SG’s, secretariat level, youth wings, women’s wings, parliamentary committee members) to further build up the momentum for dialogue, and started to work with political party focal points in 2012 to discuss programme planning and implementation. The programme has also worked towards the development of a joint agenda for the political parties, which was achieved during the conference on 20 years of peace agreement in 2012. This joint agenda, which was presented to the press in the form of a communique, has been used as a basis for the activities in 2013 and beyond.
- 3) A challenge for the interparty dialogue activities is the sustainability of the dialogue. At this moment in time the political space for, and genuine interest, in the set-up of a dialogue that is owned by the parties. They prefer an external stakeholder to facilitate the dialogue between them, which is for the moment working quite well, but hampers the sustainability of it (as NIMD would pull out the dialogue would effectively stop).

With regard to the Direct Party Assistance component of the Mozambique Programme, the following issues were pointed out:

- 1) The amounts allocated to the bilateral programme have been gradually decreasing over the years. In the early years of the Mozambique programme supported FRELIMO and RENAMO on a proportional basis. From 2009 onwards MDM also received bilateral support, and since 2010 bilateral support has been divided equally over the parties. The management of the bilateral programme gradually shifted from NIMD HQ to the NIMD Country Office. Until 2009 all bilateral project proposals were appraised by NIMD HQ and direct contracts were signed between NIMD HQ and the political parties. From 2010 onwards the process of assessing the proposals was taken care of by the Country Office, and currently contracts are directly being signed by NIMD Country Office and the parties. The financial management of the bilateral projects is in the hands of the NIMD Country Office (meaning that they pay most of the costs for the activities directly to the service provider, and only channel limited amounts of money to the parties).
- 2) It is hard to say what the results have been of the bilateral activities funded by NIMD over the years. For a long time activities were funded on a rather ad-hoc basis, and there seems to have been little consistency over the types of activities funded over the years. From 2010 onwards NIMD did make an attempt to get more focus and consistency in the bilateral support to the parties, by providing them with guidelines on the activity areas that were eligible for funding. In 2012 the programme embarked on a strategic planning process with the parties, with the aim to come to a clearer basis for agreement on future support to the political parties. The strategic planning process was a success in

the sense that it helped to build trust between NIMD and the parties, and that the parties now use their strategic plans as a fundraising tool towards other organisations as well. The implementation of the plans remains a challenge though.

- 3) Trust levels between NIMD and the parties seems to have gradually increased. In the early years of the programme NIMD was not welcome during party activities, (only during formal opening ceremonies of activities). The last few years NIMD is welcome to attend bilateral project activities in full. NIMD was also, as one of the few 'outsiders' invited to the party congresses of MDM, RENAMO and FRELIMO in 2012, which are to be considered as internal affairs.
- 4) In 2009 NIMD contributed to MDM's founding congress, on the specific request of the Dutch Embassy in Maputo. The decision to support a political party that was not yet formally established was an exceptional situation, and was done in secret, but has in hindsight had an enormous impact on the political landscape.

NIMD started with a Schools for Democracy Programme in 2009 in Manica Province, as there was little movement in the political landscape and reluctance towards interparty cooperation. Since the start of that programme some general trends can be detected:

- 1) Increasing local ownership of the programme. At the start, IDASA played an important role in the programme, and presented itself as the lead partner. In 2011 IDASA collapsed, and NIMD took full responsibility of the programme. The local partner organisations in Manica and Nampula increasingly became the local centers from where the Schools were run
- 2) Increasing focus on alumni activities and networks, in order to enhance sustainability. The programme in 2009 started as a 4-week training programme, but was gradually reinforced with regular alumni meetings and debates, permanent availability of trainers to support alumni with their projects, set-up of a local meeting space with access to computers, and support to the set-up of alumni networks
- 3) Increasing involvement of local government and other political stakeholders. At the start of the programme, the Schools for Democracy were almost entirely focused on building the capacities of civic leaders. Gradually specific training components for local assembly members were added, regular meetings between alumni and local assemblies were organized, contacts with local government enhanced and political parties specifically invited to participate. This made the programme gradually move closer to the NIMD mandate.
- 4) Interesting to see that the Schools for Democracy Programme seem to have contributed to the shifting political dynamics during the local elections in 2013, when MDM won in Nampula and got over 40% of the votes in Manica. Alumni were involved in the debates between the candidates for the local elections, and a number of alumni have occupied positions within the new local assemblies. Most of them on behalf of MDM.

#### **4. Organisational Assessment Scan**

On Friday 28 February 2014 an organisational development review was undertaken of NIMD Mozambique. The NIMD Country Office in Mozambique is, with over 12 years of existence, one of NIMD oldest partners. Over the past years the NIMD Mozambique team has invested substantially in the professionalization and independent functioning of the office, and during the yearly staff retreats regular attention was paid to organisational development. In an effort to document the strengths and weaknesses of the Country Office, and to identify possible organisational challenges or capacity needs for the future, the organisation was analysed through the "5 capabilities" (5C) framework for organisational development<sup>3</sup>. The 5C framework capabilities include: 1) commit and act, 2) deliver results, 3) relate to external stakeholders, 4) adapt and self-renew, and 5) balance diversity and coherence. The results from the organisational development review were meant to feed both the



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<sup>3</sup> A widely used framework for organizational development developed by ECDPM, please see the 'NIMD introduction to the partner scan' for further information on this tool.



Mozambique Country Team in their efforts to further professionalise the organisation, as well as to provide the peer evaluators with valuable information for the Mozambique programme review.

NIMD Country Office staff and the NIMD Programme Manager were requested to fill in the organisational assessment form (Annex 3) before the start of the workshop. During the workshop the results of the scan, based on the filled forms of the five people, were presented.



The results of the organisational assessment scan demonstrate that the NIMD Mozambique Team sees the Country Office as a relatively strong organisation with a broad range of capabilities. The organisation scores particularly high on the ability to relate to external stakeholders and balance coherence and diversity. More specifically, the participants indicated that the NIMD Country Office is considered as strategically solid and coherent organisation, has a high level of legitimacy and integrity and addresses relevant political situations and challenges. The work of NIMD in Mozambique is appreciated by its main stakeholders, as well as by likeminded organisations and



international donors, who regularly invite NIMD to share their political analysis or provide expert input or to meetings.

Besides these strengths, a number of points for improvement were also mentioned. E.g. despite the clarity of all staff on the direction of the organisation and the guidance provided by NIMD HQs multi-annual strategy, the development of a country specific multi-annual strategy would be useful. Not only to have a solid base for future programming, but also to ensure sustainability of strategy and programme development. Another area that requires improvement is the development of a sound monitoring and evaluation system, that allows for systematic information gathering and continuous learning. With regard to external communication it was pointed out that NIMD’s activities in Mozambique have been increasingly visible over the past years (e.g. through regular articles in newspapers), but that NIMD is not always recognised or visible as an organisation, as a lot of work is done behind the scenes. The absence of a communication plan and media strategy in that regard is felt, and a dedicated website for the NIMD Country Office would be useful.

For an overview of the highest and lowest scores, please see the table below:

Highest scores (4.5 out of 5)	Lowest scores (2.6 or below, out of 5)
Staff of the organisation is well-aware of the strategic plan and involved in its operationalisation and implementation	The vision and mission of the organisation are translated into a strategic plan with clear objectives
The leadership and the staff have an excellent understanding of the political environment in which the organisation operates	The strategic plan of the organisation includes a communication plan including a media policy
The organisation implements activities within budget	The political parties, as represented in the Board of the organisation are well-aware of the strategic plan and monitors its implementation.
The organisation is recognised by key democratic institutions and civil society actors as capable to contribute to strengthening democratic culture and systems through its work	The organisation has a system in place to ensure that planning is influenced by lessons learned from past activities
Annual plans are adjusted for changing contexts	A M&E system is in place to enable the organisation to monitor and improve achieved results
	The organisation has sufficient risk policies in place and trains the leadership and staff regularly in upholding emergency procedures in case crises emerge

## 5. Suggestions for improvement

During the course of the workshops, some suggestions were made for improvement of the tools:

- The political context tool: in the beginning it was not clear for the participants whether they should score the questions taking into account the paper reality or the reality on the ground. Would be good to clarify this in the explanations (e.g. in the powerpoint or the background documents on the tool)
- The political context tool: when discussing question 4 under the ‘political actors’ level on the relationship between parties and their MPs, it became clear that the effective relationship between parties and MPs does not necessarily say something about the quality of the parliament. In Mozambique the relationship between the two can be considered as effective, but the parliament as an institution is very weak. Maybe the question should/could be changed.
- Organisational Assessment: very much focused on CMD structures, with a lot of questions referring to board members or political parties represented in the governance structure of the organization. Maybe we can modify the questions, or prepare an Organisational Assessment Tool for non-CMDs.

**Annex 1 Workshop Participants**

<b>Name</b>	<b>Organisation/Function</b>
Hermenegildo Mulhovo	Country Coordinator NIMD Mozambique
Artimisa Dava	Finance & Administration Officer NIMD Mozambique
Dercio Alfazema	Programme Officer NIMD Mozambique
Anne-Mieke van Breukelen	NIMD Programme Manager for Mozambique
Silva Mulambo	Political expert
Hilario Siteo	Political expert & independent consultant
Levan Tsutskiridze	NIMD Representative Georgia Office & peer evaluator
Jerome Scheltens	NIMD Programme Manager & peer evaluator
Debbie Vermeij	NIMD Financial Officer & peer evaluator
Augustine Magolowondo	NIMD ARP Coordinator & peer evaluator

ANNEX 4:

ToR

Netherlands Institute for  
**Multiparty Democracy**

**Terms of Reference for the evaluation of the NIMD Mozambique programme 2009-2013**

NIMD, The Hague, January 2014

Steering committee:  
Mr. Hermenegildo Mulhovo, Country Coordinator NIMD Office Mozambique  
Ms. Anne-Mieke van Breukelen, NIMD Programme Officer at NIMD

Ms. Eugenia Boutylkova, PM&E Officer at NIMD

## **A. Background information**

Mozambique became independent in 1975. After sixteen years of destabilizing and violent civil war between the rebel movement RENAMO and the ruling party FRELIMO, a Peace Agreement was signed in 1992. With the Peace Agreement, Mozambique adopted the system of multiparty democracy. 37 years of continuous ruling by FRELIMO has enforced the powerful position of the President in the political system. Incumbent President Guebuza with his personal big-men leadership style, fits in this tradition. Officially, there is a separation of powers between the legislative, executive and judicial branches of government in Mozambique. However, in practice, there is an effective network of influence developed over decades of FRELIMO rule that has created connections between the elite in all sectors of society. FRELIMO has, over time, become overwhelmingly dominant, with a solid 2/3 majority in Parliament, whilst the position of the opposition has gradually weakened.

NIMD has started working in Mozambique in 2003. After a modest experimental programme in 1998/99, the Foundation for the New South Africa (SNZA) started a three-years programme in Mozambique in the year 2000 to strengthen the process of democratisation in this country. The main purpose of the programme was to support the political parties in Mozambique in the field of capacity-building and institutional strengthening, through a bilateral fund for direct projects with political parties and a special fund for cross-party activities. A permanent representation of the SNZA was established in Maputo to support the implementation of the programme. From January 1, 2003 onwards the SNZA was integrated in the Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy. A small NIMD Country office, headed by a Dutch representative, was established in Maputo to manage and implement the programme.

In 2004 local staff was contracted to manage the then already existing bilateral programmes and cross activities. Over the years, NIMD started to increasingly focus on interparty dialogue activities and getting parties together to discuss democratic reform issues, in an attempt to reduce the tensions between the political players in a highly polarized political environment. Establishing a multi-party dialogue in Mozambique has proved to be a big challenge, because of the animosity and lack of trust between the parties resulting from the civil war. Mainly in the light of the difficult political conditions, and the limited space for dialogue, it was decided to explore a new intervention area in 2009. A Schools for Democracy programme was started in Manica Province, in order to promote active democratic citizenship and to contribute to providing a new young generation of community leaders with democratic values and skills.

The substantial NIMD HQ input, support and advise, both on programme strategy, planning and implementation, has gradually decreased over the years, as an increasing number of tasks have been delegated to the Country Office in Maputo. In 2010, with the coming of the current Country Director, Hermenegildo Mulhovo, this process of increasing autonomy has taken a flight, and significant steps have been made to further professionalize the financial management system, internal procedures, human resource policies and planning and monitoring cycles.

With a history going back to the late 90s, the Mozambique programme is one of the longest-running programmes of NIMD. The programme was evaluated in July 2003, which led to a number of recommendations for future programming. Since then, no evaluation has been carried out to assess the development and impact of the programme.

## **B. Evaluation context**

NIMD has been working in partnership with the political parties in Mozambique for over 12 years and

has an NIMD Country Office in Maputo since 2003. The programme has not been evaluated since the official start of NIMD's presence in the country (after the hand-over by NZA end 2002). With the general elections in Mozambique upcoming in 2014, the evaluation of NIMD's efforts in Mozambique is very timely, as it could contribute to a rethinking of the programmatic and organisational strategies in the future. The outcomes of the evaluation should provide an insight in the achieved results and impact of the programme vis-à-vis the political context, as well as provide recommendations on strategic repositioning.

As there have been many changes in staff over the years, with the longest working staff member at the Country Office having started in September 2008, it might be difficult to reflect on all programme developments since the last evaluation in 2003. In the light of the increasing dominance of the ruling party in Mozambique, a thorough reflection on the scope of and space for NIMD's interventions is needed, especially with an eye on the future. This programme evaluation should therefore consciously focus on future programming against the background of current and expected political developments and NIMD's Multi-Annual Plan 2012-2015, rather than putting a narrow focus on past developments. In order to stimulate NIMD's internal learning process, this evaluation is proposed to be conducted as a peer evaluation.

### **C. Evaluation objectives**

The evaluation will be used to realign the current programmatic and organizational arrangements in Mozambique from the current towards the future political context. The objectives of this strategic review and programme evaluation can be divided into 4 main areas:

- To analyse the political context in Mozambique, including expected developments in the political context and the state of the multiparty system, with the aim to determine entry points for strategic interventions after the elections of 2014.
- To assess the achieved results of NIMD's programme in Mozambique in relation to the objectives as set out in NIMD's Multi-Annual Plans 2004-2007 and 2007-2012, as well as the synergies between the various programme components (interparty dialogue, bilateral support and democracy education).
- To review the link between the programme objectives and results and the organisational set-up of the NIMD country office
- To provide recommendations on strategic repositioning of interventions in the area of interparty dialogue, political party assistance, democracy education and their interlinkage.

### **D. Central questions**

For each of the three above mentioned evaluation areas, core questions are asked on issues of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability. The evaluation team is invited to reach beyond these questions in scope, but to answer these questions as a minimal requirement for the report. The additional questions are suggestions to take into consideration additionally and/or on how to approach the core questions.

**On political context analysis:**

**1) What are the –recent past, current and near future- challenges in the democratic system identified as problematic by stakeholders?**

- a. What are in reality the roles of political parties in Mozambique? How do political parties define their roles and responsibilities?
- b. What are the key characteristics of the political context political parties operate in?
- c. What is the power distribution between the political parties and how do parties currently relate to each other in parliament?
- d. How do political parties relate to each other in the context of multiparty deliberation?
- e. Which substantial issues does the political debate focus on? Which policy areas are of main concern for democracy to deliver on?
- f. Is there a common understanding or shared situation analysis between the donors and actors in the field of political party assistance and good governance? If not – what are the contested issues?

**On programme performance and achieved results:**

**2) Which programme components have had a strategic resonance in relation to the context?**

- a. What is the current role and position of the NIMD Country Office on the context of and possibilities for multiparty dialogue?
- b. Are the programme objectives and activities relevant in relation to the political context analysis?
- c. Is the NIMD Country Office relevant in relation to the political context analysis?
- d. How do the direct stakeholders view the mandate and role of the NIMD Country Office?
- e. How do other actors in the field of political party assistance (donors, academics, other NGOs) view the position, mandate and activities of the NIMD Country Office?
- f. What are the main real results as identified by stakeholders? Which activity has made a change for them?
- g. What are the main results as identified by other actors in the field of political party assistance? Which concrete activity can be identified as a catalytic factor for this result?
- h. How does the bilateral programme component relate to the relevance of the multiparty dialogue component?
- i. How do the Schools for Democracy relate to the relevance of the multiparty dialogue component?
- j. Are all programme components (interparty dialogue, bilateral support and democracy education) equally relevant?
- k. What would be the strategic objectives for NIMD and the bilateral programme in relation to the updated context analysis?
- l. What would be the “political” change objectives, what would be the organizational change objectives, and what would be the cultural and personal change objectives most relevant to the current context?

**3) What have been the most effective ways (implementation modalities) to achieve change related to the strategic objectives?**

- a. To what extent have the objectives identified in the last multi annual and annual plan of NIMD been achieved?
- b. Which of the activities has been the most substantial contribution to the stated objectives?
- c. What were the major factors influencing the achievement or non-achievement of the objectives?

**4) Was the NIMD Country Office able to implement the stated activities in an effective way?**

- a. How can the Country Office’s performance in implementing activities be increased?
- b. Are NIMD Country Office staff members fully equipped and capacitated to implement the programme they have planned for?
- c. What has been the role of NIMD in ensuring efficient implementation of activities?
- d. To what extent has the technical assistance provided by NIMD HQ made a contribution to the achievement of results?

- e. What have been the major contributing factors from NIMD HQ side to the achievement or non-achievement of stated objectives?
- f. Are there areas for improvement in the roles and responsibilities of NIMD HQ in relation to the NIMD CO?

**5) What are the positive and changes in the political party field in Mozambique that could reasonably be identified as a contribution made through the NIMD programme?**

- a. Which negative changes could reasonably be identified as consequences of the NMD interventions?
- b. What are the wider changes the programme contributed to - at the level of the functioning of the political party system (for example: power relations, level of conflict, political culture, ability to deliver in programmatic areas)?
- c. What are related changes the programme contributed to - at the level of organizational capacity and development of political parties (for example capability to relate to constituency or party cadre, act in Parliament, structure internal democracy, organize membership)?
- d. What are the direct and immediate changes the programme contributed to - at a personal or interpersonal level of political party actors (for example behaviour, trust, culture, experience though exchange, level of cooperation)?
- e. Are there unintended consequences (both positive and negative) or results of the programme?

**6) What is the sustainability of the NIMD programme in Mozambique, if it would be stopped without alternative funding?**

- a. What are the identified results and achievements that are sustainable after withdrawal of structural funding?
- b. What strategies are applied to ensure institutional sustainability?
- c. What strategies are applied to ensure sustainability of results?

**On recommendations for future programming**

**7) What would be the most critical activities for NIMD to focus on for the next three to four years and what indicators of change can be useful?**

- a. Is there a need for continuation of the programme, taking into account the political context and political developments in Mozambique?
- b. Considering the political context, and the programme results so far, what should be the focus of a future programme in Mozambique?
- c. Which programme methodologies or intervention strategies should be further developed or refined?
- d. What are possible indicators to measure the impact of NIMDs future interventions? What indicators of change can be used to monitor progress?

**E. Methodology**

- The evaluation will be executed by a team of NIMD colleagues, both from NIMD HQ as well as overseas partners. Optionally, a local consultant can be contracted to complement the team. The exact composition is to be decided on.
- We expect the evaluation to be conducted through in-depth interviews and group discussions with NIMD (former) staff members, NIMD (former) CO staff members, political party representatives in Mozambique, and local donors, academics, other NGOs, based on a semi- structured questionnaire, and a desk review of existing documentation
- As part of the evaluation methodology a stakeholder approach is to be applied. All the evaluation

topics should be addressed from a stakeholder perspective and with use of triangulation.

- The evaluation is considered a learning process in itself and participative and appreciative methods are to be employed.
- The evaluation will be monitored by a steering committee composed of the Mozambique Programme Manager, the Mozambique Country Coordinator, and the PME-coordinator.
- The responsibility for the practical facilitation of this evaluation will lie with the Mozambique Programme Manager. NIMD's PME-coordinator will receive the final report on behalf of the steering committee and is responsible for monitoring appropriate use and follow up of the report.

#### **F. Planning**

- Review of the archive at the NIMD office and interviews with NIMD staff by evaluation team
- Inception meeting between evaluation team, Mozambique PM and CC and PME Coordinator to discuss possible questions, based outcomes desk review, and to further sharpen evaluation focus.
- Field visit by evaluation team (5 days)
- Report writing by evaluation team
- First reading by Mozambique Team and others, possibility for comments
- Final Report by evaluation team
- Formulation of reaction and follow-up by Mozambique PM and Country Coordinator
- Implementation of follow-up actions.

The evaluation is expected to take place end February 2014. The final evaluation report should be available before the 15<sup>th</sup> of April 2014.

#### **G. Budget**

The available total budget for the evaluation is approximately €15.000, to be managed by the PME Coordinator. Most of the costs (approximately € 10.000) are costs for tickets and accommodation of the NIMD staff members involved in the evaluation. Those costs will be booked on NIMD's mission budget. Within the PME budget € 5.000 Euro is available for other costs related to this evaluation, e.g. expert input or costs for translation/interpretation.

#### **H. Deliverables**

- List of desired interviewees
- Draft report
- Final Report, including executive summary
- PowerPoint presentation outlining the key findings and recommendations

#### **I. Composition of the evaluation team:**

- 1 NIMD Programme Manager: Jerome Scheltens
- 1 NIMD Financial Programme Officer: Debbie Vermeij
- 1 NIMD Country Office Director: Levan Tsutskiridze
- 1 NIMD Regional Coordinator: Augustine Magolowondo



**J. Use of the report – audience**

In view of the stated objectives of this evaluation, we intend to use the report for a variety of purposes.

- For NIMD management and staff to be able to reposition the Mozambique programme according to outcomes of the evaluation
- To feed into the broader discussions at the level of NIMD HQ around exit criteria and working in a dominant political party context.
- For potential new partners and donors to have a good overview of the relevance, effectiveness and efficiency of the past programme interventions and possible opportunities for the future

**K. Documents for desk review**

- NIMD programme documents (strategic multiannual plans 2004-2007, 2007-2011 and 2012-2015, theory of change, past annuals plans, reports, internal papers and memo's on the bilateral programme)
- Political parties strategic multiannual plans, annuals plans, narrative and financial reports, contracts and correspondence with NIMD.
- Mozambique evaluation report 2003, reaction to the report.
- Programme management documents, reports by (management) consultants

The report should be written in English. It will be presented to the Executive Director of NIMD within two weeks after the conclusion of the last country visit. It will contain an executive summary (in English) and cover the issues that are mentioned in this Terms of Reference.