

EVALUATION REPORT
NIMD – PROGRAMME IN ZAMBIA
2004-2007

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

FDD: Forum for Democracy and Development

HP: Heritage Party

IPB: Inter Party Bureau

MMD: Movement for Multiparty Democracy

NCC: National Constitution Conference

NIMD: Netherlands Institute Multiparty Democracy

PF: Patriotic Front

SoP: Summit of Presidents

ULP: United Liberal Party

UNIP: United National Independence Party

UPND: United Party for National Development

ZCID: Zambian Center for Interparty Dialogue

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY¹

“The thing that threatens ZCID yet at the same time is its driving force is the turbulent nature of politics and political parties. The whole dynamic is a back and forth movement of positions. Turbulence lies at the heart of what parties hence ZCID is”.
(one interviewee about the nature of ZCID)

It is beyond any doubt that the NIMD funded programmes are a living experiment. Ambitious, unique, daring, risky, but utterly relevant and at the heart of what development really is all about: politics!

This report finds that bilateral party funding remains a very risky business in Zambia. Low levels of accountability and very little information on how parties actually function pose a huge challenge for any aid provider. This report does not recommend to drop the bilateral pillar, but to increase the monitoring efforts even more, introduce the use of track records and link this to carrots and sticks. The cross party initiatives on the other hand seem to produce quite a lot of tangible and intangible results. The efforts to install inter party dialogue have succeeded without any doubt. In a very short time, the Zambia programme has resulted in the creation of the *Zambian Centre for Inter-Party Dialogue* which provides a political platform where parties can discuss issues of national interest, and it assists parties in managing the NIMD funded projects and programmes. While looking at the 2004-2006 programmes and its results, this report also heavily emphasizes the future challenges with which the ZCID has to deal. Situated in a turbulent political environment, they have to walk a very thin line between the political world where predatory politics prevail and another universe where rules and regulations try to counterbalance arbitrary power abuses. The achievements realized up until now are impressive, yet some issues still have to be dealt with in the coming weeks and months. The most urgent issue (because of the emotional baggage it carries) is related to the role and place of the ZCID secretariat vis-à-vis the Board. There seems to be a problem with somewhat too much ownership of the board over the secretariat, with the risk that ownership turns into predatory tendencies. Closely related to this is the need for clarifying what the exact mission and vision is of ZCID and more particularly if it is a political actor itself, or if it only provides a platform, a stage upon which parties can come to agreements. By extension this discussion flows into a larger concern: can ZCID only be held accountable for processes, or also for outcomes?

¹ This report has benefited substantially from the insights provided by Mwenda Mumbuna, co-consultant during the mission in Lusaka, Zambia.

I. INTRODUCTION

I.1. Working with political parties - NIMD: mission, vision, strategy

Aid and development cooperation tend to focus exclusively on working with the recipient government in a developing country or working with and through civil society organizations. NIMD is one of the few institutions that addresses the weakest link in developing countries: political parties. There are two problems related with aiding political parties. The first one is political. Political parties are the least trusted institutions all over the world. Especially in developing contexts parties have very little credibility or integrity. Corruption is rampant, they tend to be organized around influential individuals but without having strong structures, programmatic vision, a clear ideology etc... Funding these entities thus entails huge fiduciary risks because they are not very transparent. Added to this, there is very little literature and very little knowledge on aid and political parties.

“We do not want to be checked on what we write.

We are politicians, we talk a lot and make a lot of promises.

We are in the promise business, but that doesn't mean that it will be done that way,
reality is something else”.

(one interviewee about the nature of politicians)

From this flows the expectation that whichever donor who starts working in this contentious, yet little explored terrain, will most probably do so on a trail and error basis, with often ad hoc solutions to problems that pop-up along the way, ... this should however be combined with profound investment in learning from trial and error, capitalize on that, close monitoring and constant long-term reflection on institutional development.

The main objective of NIMD is to support democratisation processes in young democracies. The particular emphasis of NIMD lies on strengthening political parties since they are the pillars of democracy. The long term goal is to help create a well-functioning, pluralist system of party politics. NIMD itself works in a non-partisan and inclusive manner.

The core business of NIMD centres around stimulating reform agendas which can be the result of a political parties planning process and/or an inter-party reform-oriented plan. A key principle is ownership, hence the political parties are in the drivers' seat when it comes to broadening or deepening democracy-oriented reforms.

NIMD interventions have to be closely linked to three interrelated objectives:

- reduce polarisation, increase social and political cohesion
- reduce fragmentation, increase stability and predictability in the political system
- enhance the institutionalisation of political parties, peaceful conflict resolution and policy development within the multi-party political system

In many NIMD programme countries, political parties have jointly established multi-party centres.

I.2. Terms of Reference and a note on methodology

The detailed terms of reference can be found in annex. Summarized, NIMD was particularly interested in getting a general assessment on how the still very young NIMD-ZCID programme was doing, what the added value of the programme is, which impact it has on the parties and the political system and whether the used approach is actually strengthening the political parties and by extension the functioning of multi-party democracy in Zambia.

Although the terms of reference often mention ‘impact evaluation’, this report clearly demonstrates in the next chapter that such a set-up leads to impossible and even dangerous conclusions.

Impact evaluation in the development business is never an easy, simple or straightforward thing. It involves a complex set of methodological tools and numerous challenges that have to be dealt with in sometimes most creative ways. One of the biggest problems in measuring impact is related to the problem of attribution: how can one objectively and without any doubt link a given, specific input with a given outcome? This implies isolating the effects of a specific input (in this case NIMD funding) from other inputs, throughputs, and all kinds of (intermediate) internal and external influences which might have an effect on the outcome. Another related problem is that aid is fungible and by financing political parties (which are highly non-transparent yet very active fundraisers) one cannot track the impact of aid of one donor on their strength, institutionalization, and, the improvement of the multi-party system in general. Lastly, there is the issue of a counterfactual: how would the situation have evolved without aid (of that specific donor)? In the development business these pose huge challenges for research and evaluation.

Yet another commonly acknowledged problem with wanting to do a rigorous evaluation (or scientific research for that matter) in developing countries is related to the quality of the data:

- data available are often patchy, incomplete and/or not detailed enough. In the case of this evaluation, there was almost no detailed ex-ante information available on the organizational status and institutional strength of the parties, and, the exact degree of distrust between them. Given this and the very short time span between the start of the programme it is impossible to assess whether this programme has contributed to the strengthening and the quality of the multi-party system in Zambia. It is therefore very difficult, if not impossible to objectively measure evolution in this sense. On a smaller scale one could maybe look at the performance indicators of the funded projects and programmes, but it became very clear that these were not formulated in a ‘measurable way’. This report will illustrate how often indicators like ‘more transparency’ or ‘more democracy’ are forwarded as performance indicators, but without a more quantitative benchmark ex-ante or ex-post, assessing this is impossible. As such, a first suggestion emanating from this evaluation is related to need of establishing ‘baseline surveys or baseline assessments’ which give a better view on the problems of parties, and secondly to the quality of the documents (project and programme proposals). Going through the documents it becomes obvious that the authors have little experience with logical frameworks. Often there is confusion on the difference between goals and activities, and this leads more often than not to an erroneous formulation of the performance indicators.

Suggestions:

Organize a baseline survey or assessment on the actual status of political parties (organisational strength, institutional challenges, etc...)

Provide the opportunity for training on logical framework and the formulation of SMART indicators (SMART stands for are specific, measurable, achievable, realistic, and timely). NIMD might consider investing in these skills, both on the level of the parties (might be a good cross-party initiative), but also at the level of the ZCID secretariat because they will have to assess the completeness and soundness of proposals in terms of format.

By way of conclusion: linking impact and aid is very challenging in and by itself, but it becomes even more difficult when dealing with organisational, institutional development. In the social sciences we have no roadmaps or manuals on how to build a strong institution, let alone a whole set of them which, in the end, strong democracies mostly consist of.

But if in this particular situation it is impossible to objectively measure impact, what then is the next best option? We opted for a qualitative evaluation. Context matters and it is thus important to

understand the Zambian context and the evolution of the programme in that context. Understanding the political and institutional dynamics of the involved actors at play, gathering perceptions on what the effects, the strong and weak points of the programme are, and, contrasting this with the general objectives of NIMD and ZCID already gives a very rich picture of what ‘is’ versus what ‘should be’².

How did we go about this? After having thoroughly studied the NIMD documents, we held in-depth interviews with all direct and indirect stakeholders³:

- all political parties represented in parliament
- representation of political parties outside parliament
- some influential civil society actors
- a selection of involved donors
- ZCID staff⁴

Most interviews took about 2 hours. The interviews were carried out by myself and a Zambian consultant (Mwenda Mumbuna), both external to NIMD and ZCID. Nobody from ZCID was present during the meetings in order to preserve the integrity of the evaluation. During our introduction we very clearly stated that there are two different kinds of evaluation: one is related to accountability which often goes hand in hand with funding decisions, another function of evaluation is learning which carries no sanctioning pressure. We emphasized the learning function of this assessment and that it was not meant to evaluate people or parties in order to cut funding. It was clearly stated that all issues could be freely and openly dealt with during the interview, that we would not quote anyone, that the objective of this assessment was to learn from the past and improve for the future.

It is worth mentioning that we were very impressed with the openness with which the interviewees shared their views. The atmosphere was at all times very relaxed and even when people would be very critical, a suggestion on how to make things better was never far off. As such, the very intense week of interviewing people became an interesting journey and a fruitful interaction process with the actors involved.

This report covers the period 2004-2007.

² The briefing at The Hague on September 28th and 29th was very helpful in better understanding the final objectives of NIMD and the approach used in Zambia. It was during that briefing that relevant documents for study were handed over to the evaluators.

³ An outline of the interview questions can be found in annex. This list was not used as a survey-type of interview, but more as an open framework of topics or issues. Interviewees were free to focus more on one topic or another depending on their interest or concern.

⁴ A complete list of interviewees can be found in annex. The interviews took place from September 29th to October 5th 2007

II. ZAMBIAN POLITICAL HISTORY AND CONTEXT⁵

II.1. Independence and the formation of a one-party State: Kaunda's legacy

Zambia, as an independent state was created in 1963. Dr. Kenneth Kaunda, leader of the United National Independence Party (UNIP), became the country's first president. Kaunda's legacy is the formation of a one-party state from 1972 onwards. He ruled continuously for the next two decades. During this time, all other political parties were banned. Popular opposition to Kaunda's rule increased in the late 1980s. Riots in the capital, a coup attempt and growing popular demand for multi-party democracy led to the signing of the end of UNIP's monopoly on power in December 1990. Lengthy, difficult negotiations between the Kaunda government and opposition groups, resulted in a new constitution in August 1991. The constitution enlarged the National Assembly from 136 members to a maximum of 158 members, established an electoral commission, and allowed for more than one presidential candidate who no longer had to be a member of UNIP.


II.2. 1991: The first multi-party elections, the first alternation of power

In October 1991, in the first multiparty election in more than 20 years, Kaunda lost the presidency to Frederick Chiluba, leader of the newly formed Movement for Multiparty Democracy Party (MMD). In legislative elections held simultaneously with presidential balloting the MMD also secured an overwhelming victory, winning 131 of 150 National Assembly seats. Despite the return of competitive electoral politics to Zambia (see increase in democratic scores in graph below), hopes of democratic consolidation soon evaporated as President Chiluba concentrated on consolidating his own power through the periodic use of emergency decrees, control of the media and, most importantly, through the manipulation of the constitution. Relying on the MMD's overwhelming majority in the National Assembly, President Chiluba pushed through a series of constitutional amendments in May 1996 that made only second-generation Zambians eligible for the office of president. The immediate political implication of this amendment was to make Kenneth Kaunda, Chiluba's primary political challenger, ineligible for the post of president. Not surprisingly, in the November 1996 elections President Chiluba easily defeated his weakened and fractured opposition.

⁵ Most of this information is taken from Polity (<http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/polity/>); Bizeck Jube Phiri (2005), A Political History of Zambia, From the Colonial Period to the 3rd Republic. Africa World Press; website US Department of State (<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2359.htm>); website Nation Master (<http://www.nationmaster.com/encyclopedia/Government-of-Zambia>); website Wikipedia (<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zambia>)

By the end of Chiluba's first term as president (1996), the MMD's commitment to political reform had faded in the face of re-election demands. A number of prominent supporters founded opposing parties. Relying on the MMD's overwhelming majority in parliament, President Chiluba in May 1996 pushed through constitutional amendments that eliminated former President Kaunda and other prominent opposition leaders from the 1996 presidential elections. This drop in 'democracy' can clearly be noticed in the graph below⁶. Scores range from minus 10 (autocracy or dictatorship) to plus 10 (full democracy).

Graph 1: Zambia's authority trends



⁶ The graph was downloaded from: <http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/polity/>

II.3. From multi-party to dominant party system? Chiluba seeking a third term

In the presidential and parliamentary elections held in November 1996, Chiluba was re-elected, and the MMD won 131 of the 150 seats in the National Assembly. Kaunda's UNIP party boycotted the parliamentary polls to protest the exclusion of its leader from the presidential race, alleging in addition that the outcome of the election had been predetermined due to a faulty voter registration exercise. Despite the UNIP boycott, the elections took place peacefully, and five presidential and more than 600 parliamentary candidates from 11 parties participated. Afterward, however, several opposition parties and non-governmental organizations declared the elections neither free nor fair. As President Chiluba began his second term in 1997, the opposition continued to reject the results of the election amid international efforts to encourage the MMD and the opposition to resolve their differences through dialogue.

Early in 2001, supporters of President Chiluba mounted a campaign to amend the constitution to enable Chiluba to seek a third term of office. Civil society, opposition parties, and many members of the ruling party exerted sufficient pressure on Chiluba to force him to back away from any attempt at a third term. Despite the overwhelming dominance of Chiluba's MMD in the National Assembly, over 50% of the MPs signed a petition vowing to oppose his proposed amendment to the constitution. In the face of increasing street protests and widening fissures within his own party and cabinet, Chiluba abandoned his desire to seek a third term. However, in a last gasp effort to secure his influence in the future government, President Chiluba sidestepped party procedures and hand-picked the MMD's candidate for the upcoming election, Levy Patrick Mwanawasa.

II.4. MMD continues to rule: Mwanawasa consolidates the dominant party system

Presidential, parliamentary, and local government elections were held on December 27, 2001. Eleven parties contested the elections. Despite winning a combined 70% of the popular vote, the ten opposition candidates in the campaign could not defeat Levy Mwanawasa, who won 28.6% of the ballots cast. Opposition parties won a majority of parliamentary seats in the December, 2001 election, but subsequent by-elections gave the ruling MMD a slim majority in Parliament. While the presidential campaign was not overtly fraudulent, international electoral observers indicated that pre-election manipulation of the process and numerous administrative hitches had distorted the playing field in favor of the candidate of the ruling party. The MMD's alleged abuse of public resources in campaigning and its control over the state-run media gave Mwanawasa an unfair advantage, while logistical and administrative shortcomings disenfranchised thousands of people across the country

(mostly in rural communities with pro-opposition leanings). Three parties submitted petitions to the High Court, challenging the election results. The petition remained under consideration by the courts in February 2003. Both the European Union and the Carter Center have indicated that the election results did not reflect the will of the people. However, despite the irregularities associated with this election, the failure of the deeply divided opposition to promote a coalition candidate also provides us with significant insight into the electoral success of Mwanawasa.

As a result, MMD presidential candidate Levy Mwanawasa was declared the victor by a narrow margin, and he was sworn into office on January 2, 2002. Three parties submitted petitions to the High Court, challenging the election results. The petition remained under consideration by the courts in February 2003. Opposition parties won a majority of parliamentary seats in the December, 2001 election, but subsequent by-elections gave the ruling MMD a slim majority in Parliament.

The autonomy of President Mwanawasa from Chiluba - who remained head of the MMD -was initially unclear. During the campaign Mwanawasa presented himself as both a political reformer and a populist. His pledge to eliminate the presidential discretionary funds used extensively by Chiluba to buy political loyalty and his desire to soften the country's adherence to the structural adjustment policies negotiated by his predecessor both indicated a general desire by Mwanawasa to distance himself from his political benefactor. Nevertheless, given the manner in which President Mwanawasa gained his party's nomination, it was widely perceived that his main function as president would be to protect Chiluba and his associates from their legacy of corruption and theft of public funds. However, the autonomy of Mwanawasa from Chiluba became evident in July 2002 when the President asked parliament to lift Chiluba's immunity from prosecution. With the arrest of Chiluba on 60 counts of theft and abuse of office, divisions within the ruling MMD have emerged.

Unable to easily garner the two-thirds majority vote to pass many controversial bills, President Mwanawasa has been forced to negotiate executive branch policy initiatives with a relatively strong parliament. However, in a gamble to limit the power of the opposition in the legislature, in late January 2002 the MMD sought to elect a sympathetic Speaker through a closed election within the Assembly even though the Constitution requires that this position be filled through an open electoral ballot. Fearing that the MMD had bribed some opposition MPs to vote for their candidate, the opposition staged a boycott of the institution until this issue could be resolved.

Thus far the rule of Levy Mwanawasa has not been characterised by the flamboyant expenditure and increasingly apparent corruption of the later years of Frederick Chiluba's time in office. Indeed, the

former president has been arrested and charged with several counts of embezzlement and corruption, firmly quashing initial fears that President Mwanawasa would turn a blind eye to the allegations of his predecessor's improprieties. However, Mwanawasa was perceived as demonstrating an authoritarian streak in early 2004 when he issued a deportation order to a British citizen and long-time Zambian resident Roy Clarke, who had published a satirical attack on the president in the *Zambian Daily Mail*. His early zeal to root out corruption has also waned somewhat, with key witnesses in the Chiluba trial leaving the country. The Constitutional Review Commission set up by Mwanawasa has also hit some turbulence, with arguments as to where its findings should be submitted leading to suspicions that he has been trying to manipulate the outcome.

II.5. Is the power balance slowly tilting towards a second real alternation in power?

A presidential election in Zambia was held on September 28, 2006. Incumbent president Levy Mwanawasa of the Movement for Multiparty Democracy was re-elected to a second term. His main competitors were Michael Sata of the Patriotic Front and Hakainde Hichilema of the United Party for National Development.

The winner of the election was determined in one round according to the first past the post system. Initial results from the election gave Sata the lead, but further results put Mwanawasa in first place and pushed Sata into third place. Interim results released after votes from 120 of 150 constituencies were counted put Mwanawasa on just over 42% of the vote; Hakainde Hichilema had 28%; and Michael Sata had slipped to 27%. When opposition supporters heard that Sata had slipped from first to third place, riots erupted in Lusaka. Late in the afternoon of October 2, the Zambian Electoral Commission announced that Mwanawasa had officially won the election with 43% of the vote; Sata took second place with 29% and Hichilema took third place with 25%. He was sworn in for another term on October 3. Voter turnout was 70.77%. International and local electoral observers declared the 2006 elections free and fair and they noted the significant improvement of the electoral process and access to the media by opposition parties.

It is quite evident that the election results came as a shock to MMD. They had lost support in major cities and in certain rural areas where MMD was traditionally strong. The PF emerged, apparently, out of nowhere and increased their parliamentary seats from 2 to 43. The PF is now the government's biggest opponent and they seem to mark a slowly but potentially important shift toward a greater power balance.

II.6. An overall assessment of the political situation

The relevant question after having gone through Zambia’s political history is to what all this adds up. Is Zambia’s governance situation improving or not?

Below an overview is given of the World Bank governance indicators for Zambia for the period 1996-2006. It is worth noticing that the indicator on voice and accountability has improved slightly in ten years (moving up from -0.53 to -0.34), while political stability has received an impressive boost (from -0.51 to +0.29). Control of corruption has improved substantially in ten years, whereas the government effectiveness (which basically measures the quality of the public administration), and rule of law (effectiveness of the judicial system) remained more or less the same. A strong decline can be noted in regulatory quality which indicates a very strong decline in the prominence of market friendly policies.

Governance Indicator	Sources	Year	Percentile Rank (0-100)	Governance Score (-2.5 to +2.5)	Standard Error
Voice and Accountability	14	2006	37.0	-0.34	0.14
	5	1996	30.6	-0.53	0.24
Political Stability	9	2006	56.7	+0.29	0.23
	5	1996	28.8	-0.51	0.29
Government Effectiveness	13	2006	25.6	-0.74	0.16
	4	1996	29.4	-0.59	0.27
Regulatory Quality	11	2006	29.8	-0.56	0.17
	5	1996	60.5	+0.36	0.33
Rule of Law	17	2006	31.9	-0.61	0.14
	6	1996	31.0	-0.60	0.23
Control of Corruption	13	2006	22.8	-0.78	0.15
	4	1996	12.1	-1.04	0.25

Source: World Bank Institute: http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi2007/sc_chart.asp

Overall, and especially in political terms, it seems that Zambia is slowly yet surely improving its democratic qualities.

III. EVALUATING THE NIMD PROGRAMME IN ZAMBIA

The NIMD programme consists of two major pillars: the first one is the support of bilateral and cross party programmes, the second is the setting up of platforms where parties can dialogue on issues of national interest.

We will first and foremost dig deeper into the programmes NIMD funded in Zambia between 2004-2007. The first section is based on a desk study. The reported programme and project results are held against the light of NIMD goals. The attentive reader will note that it is virtually impossible to draw any substantive conclusions because of the methodological problems encountered (bad quality of data, indicators were erroneously formulated). Any objective measurement at this stage and within the given time limits was therefore impossible. In order to address this very incomplete picture we include in the second section a perception based evaluation. Important to mention is that in this period the NIMD Zambia programme was managed on the ground by a local NIMD coordinator and several Zambian consultants. In the third section we will take a closer look at the second pillar of NIMD interventions: the creation of multi-party democracy centres (CMD). In Zambia this structure was baptized as the Zambian Centre for Inter-Party Dialogue (ZCID). As it only started up in 2006, this institution is still very young with its own share of teething problems. These problems have to be addressed adequately in order to avoid substantial setbacks in a near future. This is why we dedicate quite some space in this report to describe at length what the different positions are in ZCID.

III.1. Facts and Figures: overviewing programmes, goals, funded activities and reported results 2004-2007⁷

III.1.1. Programme goals and financed activities in 2004

NIMD started to work in Zambia in 2003 with funding a study of the main institutional challenges which Zambian political parties and democracy in general face. Based on this study and a subsequent discussion with the parties involved, NIMD started a programme focussing on institutional strengthening of parties. Implementation started in 2004. One of the most important political events of 2004 was related to the constitutional review. The debates on how to draw a roadmap towards a revision of the constitution intensified. Increasing polarisation was taking place. NGOs and opposition parties preferred a constituent assembly, whereas the government preferred a government

⁷ Important to mention is that we do not give a full overview of all funded activities.

appointed constitutional review commission. At this time, civil society was playing a major role in the debate.

The overall goal of NIMD at this stage was to focus on the strengthening of the internal organisation and capacity of the Zambian parliamentary parties. Given the profound distrust between parties, NIMD decided not to push the inter-party dialogue too much, but rather stick to skills oriented cross party initiatives, and the funding of bilateral projects.

Table 1: Financed activities 2004⁸

	CROSS PARTY	RESULTS	BILATERAL	RESULTS
2004	8 provincial workshops on media strategies and internal party communication	200 parliamentarians trained	FDD: capacity building & institutional development	36 senior party officials trained
	Inter-party workshops on strategic planning	Representatives from 5 parties trained	PF: seminar on strengthening party organisation and membership expansion	Enhanced communication between different levels within PF
	Training for trainers	52 trainers from 5 political parties trained	PF: strategic planning process	Bi-annual strategic plan
			UNIP: institutional development	Stronger internal democracy
			UNIP: Action plan towards the strategic planning for UNIP	Bi-annual strategic plan

Something that catches the eye is difference between the results indicators of the cross-party and those from the bilateral projects. Most of the result indicators of the cross-party are specific and measurable, which is positive. The same goes for some of the bilateral projects: the existence of a bi-annual plan is a good indicator. Some indicators of the bilateral project results however bring up some questions: What does enhanced communication exactly mean? What does stronger internal democracy mean? This kind of indicators are not measurable or controllable.

What is however missing in all of the above cases is a clear link between the overall objective of ‘institutional strengthening’ and the specific result indicators related to the projects. The fundamental question if all these results add up to better en stronger parties cannot be answered at this stage.

III.1.2. Programme goals and financed activities in 2005

In 2005 the major political event centred around the preparation of the upcoming 2006 elections. NIMD therefore wanted to make progress on the process of parties manifesto summaries, voters’ registration, the electoral law and the constitution review process. The governing MMD initiated

⁸The column ‘results’ are the self-declared results as found in the reports.

cross party talks around these topics and NIMD started to support these activities in order to give an additional boost to the cross-party component.

Table 2: A selection of financed activities 2005

	CROSS PARTY	RESULTS	BILATERAL	RESULTS
2005	Visit to Kenya, Ghana and Malawi	Exchange experiences on establishment of multi-party foundations	PF: regional capacity building workshops	Discussions held
	Training in financial management for provincial officials	Regional party representatives of 4 regions trained	HP: strategic planning	Formally endorsed and comprehensive strategic plan
	Joint strategic plan	Code of Conduct	UNIP: local and regional capacity building	Representatives of 50% of all constituencies trained
	Constitution-consultation	Key issues identified for interparty discussions	UNIP: strategic plan	35 party representatives participated
	Media campaign	Joint media message on voting	PF: internal elections	Elections held in two provinces
			UPND: capacity building	Regional discussions held
			MMD: human resource capacity building	Internal workshops held

Important to mention is that the cross-party initiatives initiated in 2003-2004 started to produce tangible results in 2005. The production of a Code of Conduct which was later endorsed by the Electoral commission could be marked as a stepping stone for increased inter-party cooperation and dialogue. Added to that parties were able to jointly identify key issues for the debate around the constitution and to jointly call for citizen participation in the elections. Once again the results for the bilateral projects are quite ‘activity-oriented’, which makes an institutional assessment quite difficult, if not impossible. At first sight it seems that cross-party initiatives produce results that are more easily identified than results linked to bilateral funding.

III.1.3. Programme goals and financed activities during 2006 and 2007

The year 2006 is a turning point for NIMD in Zambia. During this year, time seemed right for the creation of the *Zambian Centre for Interparty Dialogue (ZCID)*. Throughout 2005, parties had had increasingly contact with each other and had been able to jointly step forward in topics of shared interest. The identified need to organize regular interparty dialogue in the run-up to the elections, and the need to continue the constitutional debate were additional impulses to start with ZCID.

Throughout 2006, the elections served as a strong drawing force to organize different kinds of trainings for the political parties. A strong interest was detected around media and communication, both elements which can make or break the success of a political party. Therefore quite some

activities hovered around communication training, media training and the setting up of communication plans. Dutch experts were involved in these media-strategy trainings. But also more ‘structural issues’ came to the forefront like the problem of unequal access to the media for the different parties. NIMD therefore facilitated amongst other things a very meeting between the heads of media and ZCID in order to discuss the issue of access. ZCID also supported the political parties in summarizing the different political programmes and publishing these in an attractive brochure. Training party agents to monitor the elections was another very important activity. In order to ensure sufficient financial support for the latter two activities, NIMD negotiated with other donors to involve them. DFID joined in, and they were very satisfied with the result. NIMD also sought contact with several NGOs in order to establish cooperative links with ZCID in the pre-election phase. NIMD supported the updating of the official Code of Conduct which was presented by ZCID. At the same time NIMD invited party officials from a couple of other countries to present their own code of conduct. This resulted in the adaptation of the official Code of Conduct in Zambia (in which quite some elements of the ZCID version were introduced). The ZCID code of conduct proved to be a useful guideline during the elections because it leveled the playing field for opposition parties. Lastly, NIMD contacted the European Commission (EC) in Zambia, in order to involve ZCID in the making up of the Governance Profile for the Governance Incentive Tranche of the EC.

Throughout 2006 the debate on the redefinition of the political system through the constitutional debate remained very high on the political agenda, yet it also risked becoming increasingly conflictive due to the electoral fever. This electoral fever also jeopardized the integrity of the bilateral pillar. The risk that donor resources would become instrumental in campaigning needs was perceived as realistic by NIMD, hence increased monitoring and a somewhat ‘tougher donor attitude’ can be traced throughout the 2006 documents. NIMD started to apply ‘sanctions’ to those parties that had not fulfilled the agreed upon reporting duties. Another important element is that NIMD started to apply lessons learned from the problems and shortcomings of projects registered during the earlier years. An increased call to the parties with regards to strategic planning, the submission of year plans, the need for continuity, learning cycles, feedback loops and the urgent need for better and more measurable indicators is clearly identifiable in the different appraisal documents of NIMD throughout 2006. This is a very positive evolution!

Table 3; A selection of financed activities 2006⁹.

	CROSS PARTY	RESULTS	BILATERAL	RESULTS
2006	Workshops on financial	Training of national and	MMD: strategic plan	Formally endorsed

⁹ Given the fact that a lot of the 2006 projects are not yet closed (no final report yet), this report could not compare the project goals with the results as stipulated in the final report.

	management	regional treasurers Handbook for political parties developed		strategic plan
	Inter-party dialogue on electoral process and draft constitution	Constitutional Conference Joint resolution	PF: strategic plan implementation & revision	Production of the PF revised draft manifesto and the log-frame of concrete indicators and benchmarks for measuring the activities of the strategic plan
	Training Media – Politics, Zambia Development of Communication Plan	An agreement in principal between the ruling party and the opposition parties on the main components of a strategy that guarantees equal access to the media in the run-up (and during) the upcoming elections; To have discussed various aspects of a sound internal media-strategy with the Zambian parties; Each parliamentarian party has developed a media-strategy and prioritized policy issues, through an internal consultative process after the training.	MMD: Human Resource capacity building	Enhancing institutional capacity, developing HR capacity, increased appreciation of citizens ...
	Training party agents (with DFID)		HP: enhance internal democracy	The party would have established structures and systems that ensure the participation and inclusion of women, the physically disadvantaged and the youth. The party will be able to put in place people who are going to carry out its programmes at the constituency level.
			UNIP: Sensitizing UNIP women, youth and professionals on candidate selection, campaign strategy formulation and implementation	At least 20 female members of UNIP are trained in candidate selection, campaigning strategies and implementation. At least 20 youth of UNIP are trained in candidate selection, campaigning strategies and implementation. At least 20 professional members of UNIP are trained in candidate selection, campaigning strategies and implementation.

			UPND: Capacity Building	To develop capacity in governance, civic and voter education for the elected party members; To enhance practical skills in campaign strategies for the party members; To publicize the UPND programmes and activities amongst the members as per strategic plan,
			HP: review strategic plan	review the plan and essentially beef up the indicators of progress attempting as much as possible to quantify them for ease of measurement.
			UNIP: Ensuring Performance Indicators in the Strategic Plan	The objective of the proposed activity is to ensure that UNIP formulates activities and indicators that can be used to measure their progress in implementing the strategic plan.

In June 2007, ZCID¹⁰ was formally launched. Just a few days before President Mwanawasa officially launched ZCID, the political leaders had reached consensus on the roadmap and time schedule to move ahead in with the constitutional reform. ZCID played a major role in this. A short overview of the events:

In the beginning of 2007 NIMD and the political parties agreed that ZCID would facilitate the constitutional review. Parties received support to organize internal consultations on the content of the constitution and the different roadmaps (developed by the constitutional review commission, government and civil society). These internal consultation reports were subsequently being analyzed by ZCID staff. A working document formed the basis for inter-party dialogue in order to bring about a political consensus. Next, ZCID managed to reach an agreement between the President of Zambia and the political parties that a political dialogue would take place around the revision of the constitution. On June 23rd ZCID organized the Summit of Presidents (presidents of parliamentarian

¹⁰ ZCID contains a professional secretariat, a Summit of Presidents and a Board (more details on this structure later in this report)

parties and state president) where the launching of ZCID took place and where the political agreement was presented. Following the successful Summit on June 23 2007, mixed reactions arose from the Zambian society. One sector of society commended ZCID for scoring a major breakthrough in providing a solution on the longstanding impasse between CSOs and Government on the Constitution making process. Others, notable the Oasis Forum which took a lead on the Constitution making process for more than four years, reacted lukewarm to this milestone. After these events, ZCID became a central actor in the Constitutional process. In order to prepare the ZCID secretariat for its role, NIMD organized a three days workshop for ZCID staff inviting Prof. PLO Lumumba who is the Kenyan Secretary to the constitutional review commission (2001-2005). He informed ZCID about the possible traps and dangers of reviewing the constitution and which coping strategies can be used by ZCID.

Through contacts with NIMD various donors indicated their willingness to finance a broad civic education programme on the main content issues related to the constitutional review. UNDP and Scandinavian donors confirmed their interest.

On a more practical management level, more efforts went into establishing a reporting monitoring system for ZCID in coordination with NIMD. ZCID also organized a training for the political parties in which the NIMD project reporting and management requirements were treated.

The 2007 annual plan of ZCID identified 5 central pillars around which the activities and objectives were formulated:

1. strengthening the multiparty system through developing a national agenda for electoral and constitutional reform, increase dialogue on policy issues between political parties.
2. enhance the institutional capacity of parties through strengthening internal democracy, knowledge generation within political parties, increase management capacities of political parties, institutionalise political coalitions
3. relations with civil society
4. expanding strategic networks and agreements
5. promote inclusivity

Purely based on documents, not a lot can be said on the advancement of the plan in 2007. There is no solid indication that these objectives are or aren't reached. In order to get more insight we have to turn to the perceptions on the field in Zambia.

III.2. Perceptions and views: perception-based evaluation of bilateral, crossparty, ZCID programmes and results

III.2.1. Perceived effects of bilateral funding

During the interviews with the secretary generals of the parties, all agreed that bilateral funding is very much needed. At the same time needs are so vast (and funding so precarious), that any serious institutional impact might still take some time.

During each interview the secretary generals were asked about the effects of bilateral funding on their institutional development. They could not get beyond the summing up of some workshops and meetings. Not one party could mention lasting effects or lasting results. The impression that bilateral projects are not (yet) reaching their goals (of institutional strengthening, reform and internal democracy) thus seem to be confirmed.

External observers (civil society) also noticed that ‘internal reform’ in political parties is not an issue. There seems to be very little ownership within political parties over the reform idea. As evaluators we endorse this assessment. Parties are worried about a lot of things (mostly resources, power and how to get to state house, or remain there) but internal reform wasn’t mentioned once.

The lack of institutional effects is not too surprising for a number of reasons.

- Being a young programme, still rooting and trying to find its way, the matching is still going on. Initial problems of a mismatch between NIMD expectations (too high, too ambitious) and the actual needs of parties will undoubtedly still raise some tensions in the future, but this is most probably unavoidable.
- What are the preconditions for aid leading to improved institutionalization? It is very clear that institutionalization is the end goal but in order to get there resources are also used to detect ‘leaks in the piping system’. This implies accepting losses in financial terms but hopefully a return on investment in terms of understanding the system in order to ‘fix-it’ with more adapted aid instruments.
- One could hypothesize that serious institutionalization can only take place if a minimum level of resource security is achieved.
- With regard to political parties, driven by the need to continuously recruit members and voters, going out to the field is a very important survival strategy. But going out into the provinces requires a lot of money which is spent on transport, gasoline and overnight stays.

Donors do not like to fund these kind of things because it doesn't seem to have a link with institution building (contrary to reform programmes, capacity building etc).

Political parties do not give any information on other sources of funding. It is impossible to find out how important NIMD funding is in the whole budget of the parties. It is however beyond any doubt that parties are active fundraisers. They visit donors and civil society organizations to get funding for all kinds of activities. Several interviewees stated that one of the problems is transparency on donor funded projects within parties. In most occasions not even the party's National Executive Committee has clear oversight of raised funds on different levels by party members. Obviously, access to resources increases the political capital of the person involved and disclosing information on this diminishes political leverage. On the positive note: the parties are fully aware that accountability is needed and have – in so far – no problems whatsoever with the NIMD cycles, formats and requirements. Parties also accept that not respecting the rules of the game will have consequences on funding. Also positive is that the review of the constitution tackles party funding and this might be an important breakthrough in terms of transparency or at least it increases the pressure to become more transparent. On the other hand, ZCID staff and local monitoring reports indicate that the parties' willingness to be monitored varies highly. Parties apparently use different strategies to escape monitoring:

- monitoring agent is not invited
- monitoring agent is invited too late
- monitoring agent is sent to the wrong place on the right date, or, to the right place on the wrong date¹¹

One interesting suggestion made by one of the interviewees is that the contracts between NIMD and the political party might consider including a clause where the secretary general is named or appointed as the responsible manager for the NIMD resources. This would limit the presidents' inclination for using the resources for other purposes than those stipulated in the contract and project.

Most parties, and some external observers mentioned that they were not progressing a lot on the implementation of their year plans of 2007. With the dynamics around the constitution, everything else is set on hold. A couple of interviewees mentioned that ZCID is also not realizing its programme. The fact that ZCID has been launched into the highest spheres of political life also

¹¹ although a consensus and agreement was reached that the monitoring agent should be informed 48 hours before the start of the activity, there are still parties that try to escape monitoring by not informing in due time

means that the rest of the strategic plan is pushed to the background. One interviewee complained about the fact that especially on the inclusion of vulnerable groups absolutely no progress is being made.

In sum: closely monitoring the implementation of the bilateral projects is not a wasted investment. Given the delicate nature of giving aid to parties, it is worth the effort to invest disproportionately in monitoring them. The combination of little transparency, huge hunger for resources and predatory politics adds up to a substantial fiduciary risk. The efficient use of carrots and sticks is in this context more than necessary. Given the fact that some players keep on resisting the monitoring efforts by the secretariat one might consider launching the idea of a ‘monitoring track record’. For example if parties ‘escape’ the monitoring a certain number of times a sanction can be implemented. In coordination with the secretariat there must be a possibility to think out adapted scenarios on this.

Suggestions:

Reflect on ways in which the constitution debate can revitalize the issue of internal reform within parties.

Invest disproportionately in M&E and make the willingness to be monitored a benchmark in the overall funding procedure.

The momentum of ZCID Board meetings (before or after the meeting) can be used to inform the ZCID director or the monitoring agent about upcoming activities.

III.2.2. Perceived effects of cross party activities and ZCID as a platform

Based on the deskstudy, it seemed that cross party initiatives produce more results than bilateral projects. The interviews confirm this assessment. The most tangible outputs have been: joint communications and joint resolutions, a joint media message, a code of conduct (part of which was integrated in the official code established by the Electoral Commission), the drawing of a roadmap for constitution review, training party agents who would monitor the elections, in developing media strategies based on policy issues, in improving inter-party policy debates within the country and in improving the access to (public and private) media. These are enormously important results!

More importantly, since 2007, in less than one year of existence ZCID has become a key player in the Constitutional debate. Thanks to NIMD financing, parties could realize intra-party consultations on the constitution. Some parties spontaneously mentioned the intra-party dynamics the constitution

consultations have brought. The mobilization of members in between elections is rare, yet through the funds made available by NIMD/ZCID this exercise could take place for the first time.

Although political parties strongly prefer bilateral over cross-lateral programmes, and strong pressures are exercised upon the secretariat to decrease the budget for cross-party initiatives and substantially increase the budget for bilateral funding, it was the impression of the evaluators that cross party programmes seem to display more dynamic effects on parties and on their interaction. Parties seem to be more inclined to accept cross party initiatives if part of the funding can be used to mobilize intra-party activities (like the consultation on the constitution within parties).

Achievements:

The fact that ZCID has succeeded in bringing together all the presidents of political parties (including President Mwanawasa) is in and by itself an achievement.

The first Summit of Presidents endorsed the Code of Conduct which was defined by the board, and they endorsed the plan on intra- and inter-party consultation on the revision of the constitution. Thanks to this, the whole idea of reviewing the constitution – which was caught in a trap at that time – was revitalized. Not only did parties agree on the process of reviewing the conference through initiating a National Constitution Conference (NCC), they went as far as discussing on content: each and every article under revision was discussed by way of preparing the NCC.

The process used by ZCID has led to strong feelings of ownership within political parties over the platform.

Trust building and more tolerance between key people in politics is most definitely an achievement. Today they are able to communicate with each other.

Political parties are no longer ‘dormant’ in between elections.

The agreements reached within the Board often prepare and facilitate the parliamentary sessions.

Elections 2006 were ‘less conflictive’ thanks to the Code of Conduct, more equitable access to the media, polling agents trained by ZCID. The 2006 elections have been more issue based.

ZCID has become a key player within the constitution debate. Thanks to the inter party dialogue efforts ZCID contributed to the cooperation between political parties in regaining their space in the constitutional debate.

ZCID figures prominently in the media. The organization has in less than one year achieved a key role in political life.

Political parties –or at least some key players in those parties- have developed the maturity and ability to be fierce competitors in the public arena on a whole range of issues, yet with regards to issues of national interest the competition is replaced by dialogue, attempting to come up with a negotiated solution.

Today there is more activism, more debate, more political activity, including in parliament; parties in opposition have not disappeared from the scene after the elections of 2006 (while usually they are dormant in between elections). This might not be entirely attributable to NIMD/ZCID since the constitution review might also play an important role in keeping the parties awake and active.

The crossparty initiative around the constitution and intra-party consultations is a perfect example on how cross-party advantages and bilateral advantages can be combined.

However, although trust and communication is growing between key-persons in political parties, it is very unclear to what extent this spills over into the larger structures of the parties. The interviewees who touched upon issue clearly stated that there are no spill-over effects yet. Most probably this lack of spill over is related to the weak institutionalization of the parties. Politics and representation remains very much about individuals trying to increase their power position. The impact of bilateral projects is by outsiders perceived to be limited if non-existent – controversies in the press between personalities of parties goes on just like before and this seems to suggest that trust is limited to the persons on the board. ZCID should think about making an effort in involving more people from the parties – if not they are basically just supporting the personalistic culture already dominant within politics.

Suggestion:

Revitalize the ZCID strategic plan, see how the strategic plan can benefit from the dynamic around the constitution.

Look for more ways on how to combine the advantages of bilateral funding (ownership) and cross party programmes (effects). With some creativity it might be possible to combine both worlds.

ZCID has become a key player in the constitution debate. President Mwanawasa launched the idea of constituting the National Constitution Conference (NCC) at the summit of presidents, and from then ZCID skyrocketed to the highest spheres in political life. People appear in the press and on the television talking on behalf of ZCID. In the eyes of all stakeholders, ZCID has become a player with substantial weight in the constitution debate. The chairman of ZCID (who is member of the ruling party MMD) has used the ZCID in several occasions to make forceful points in the whole debate on

the constitution. This suggests a ZCID success, but not necessarily in the good sense. This can backfire in three ways.

First, Mwanawasa and the MMD have embraced ZCID and the chairman (MMD) talking on behalf of ZCID also encounters suspicion. Reactions from the public and from civil society suggest that ZCID is an extension of government, or that the ZCID has been turned into a MMD steered vehicle. Put differently: is the MMD cuddling the ZCID to death? In that same sense it is also not clear whether ZCID was the key variable in the constitutional breakthrough, or vice versa. It is impossible to identify the exact causality, but that they were mutually re-inforcing is very clear.

Second, deeper analysis reveals a substantial tension between ZCID as a process facilitator (giving room for inter party dialogue) and ZCID as a political player involved in the game. The whole discussion on the composition of the National Constitution Conference (NCC) was thoroughly prepared by the ZCID board. It resulted in a composition where political parties are overwhelmingly well represented in the NCC while civil society has been marginalized. Positive is that political parties did come to an understanding – thanks to ZCID – but as a result civil society is to a large extent excluded. The question is if ZCID should be held accountable for that. In the eyes of the public ZCID is already a political player and several stakeholders are of the opinion that this could seriously backfire on ZCID.

Third, the relation with civil society is affected by the former two points. The mandate of ZCID mentions establishing relations with civil society but the relations with some influential civil society organisations has become quite tense. Especially because of the role ZCID has played in the whole constitution process. It is their perception that until ZCID got involved, civil society was carrying this exercise and holding consultations, working with political parties from the opposition. Civil society thought that they were winning this constitution battle, but then ZCID showed up and ‘the parties ganged up with each other’ (as one civil society spokesperson mentioned). The whole exercise of civil society was wasted (in their perception) and the pendula swung in favour of the government. According to some civil society representatives ZCID is civil society and should play that role. ZCID is in dire need of a good PRstrategy and a proper imaging. They think that it is not a good idea that politicians talk on behalf of ZCID.

The above mentioned problems have been dealt with on an ad hoc basis by a staff which has little experience in working with politicians. The staff has been swept away with the dynamics of the constitution revision, without time to step back, think, reflect on the institutional aspects and impacts

of what was going on, without time to look for support on how to manage this process in a healthy way which would actually strengthen the ZCID and not weaken it.

Formulated differently NIMD and ZCID must evaluate how 'political' ZCID wants to become. Is it okay if it is perceived as a political organization (a super party?) in which political parties make deals which are then subsequently brought to the public as 'ZCID'? Can the deals made in ZCID be referred to as ZCID-resolutions which then become a weighty factor in the debate? Can ZCID itself be held accountable for these 'political decisions' and the outcomes they will produce? Or can ZCID just give room for a process, without having an opinion on the outcome, without being accountable for the outcome. Can ZCID have its own separate points of view, without necessarily be linked to every decision the board makes? And how does all this relate to relations with larger civil society?

Suggestion:

Discuss the ZCID responsibility with regards to process and outcomes, distinguish the NGO part of ZCID (with own values and norms and a clear development agenda with regards to political parties) from the political platform it offers and the decisions that come out of that.

Discuss when ZCID is a stage and when it is an actor.

Clear code of conduct when it comes to speaking on behalf of ZCID in parliament or in public.

Develop a sound marketing strategy for ZCID, with clear communication formats so as to rise above the 'misuse' of ZCID by politicians (without being confrontational).

Think about which role to play as a civil society organization.

Serious backstopping should take place –especially the coming months-, given the turbulent environment in which the staff works they need people to bounce off ideas, they need time to reflect and take a distance in order to think about the long term effects of whatever is going on.

III.2.3. Attracting more donors

The interviewed people expressed their respect for the setting-up of ZCID. All were very much in favour of supporting political parties while pushing a 'change'-agenda. The only way of supporting this initiative is through an intermediate body – in this case the ZCID structure and its programme – but never directly to the parties.

DFID was very satisfied with the way in which ZCID handled the Polling Agents Project and they are open to discuss other possibilities. The APRM is already one way of cooperating with ZCID. At this moment DFID is reformulating its country assistance strategy and this process must be completed before taking new engagements.

UNDP is in the process of organizing a pooled fund in order to finance civic education around the constitution. Cooperation with ZCID – financing part of the programme on civic education – is therefore a logic strategy. Another project in the pipeline is related to election and gender issues. Capacity building for women only has sense if the parties also are willing to put women on the lists. ZCID could take up the challenge to sensitize political parties in doing this.

Donors agree that funding ZCID must happen in a coordinated way. The declaration of Paris in terms of harmonization is more than relevant in the context of supporting political parties.

III.3. Perceptions with regards to the institutional set-up of ZCID

III.3.1. ZCID: institutional set-up by design

Some interviewees refer with some nostalgia to ‘the good old days’ when the IPB (Inter-party Bureau) was still a reality. That period is perceived as very important in two ways. First, it was a time with a lot of close and direct contact with the donor NIMD, which was perceived as very positive. Secondly, abundant reference is made to the south-south exchange trips to ao Kenya and Malawi because of the political implications of this initiative. The opportunity to travel and get acquainted with CMDs in nearby countries appeared to have functioned as a real eye-opener. Not only was it the first cross party activity, but more importantly it had a huge political effect: it was the period that political parties started talking to each other.

Less than a year ago, the IPB was transformed into the Zambian Centre for Inter-Party Dialogue (ZCID) with the purpose to provide for an institutionalised platform within which each parliamentary party is represented. The drawing below (Figure 1) shows the institutional set-up by design. The arrows refer to accountability obligations.


The Summit of Presidents (SoP) is the highest political organ in ZCID and is composed of the presidents (+ 3 senior members) of all parties in parliament 3 senior members of each political party

in parliament and 5 representatives of political parties outside parliament. The Chairman of the SoP is non-partisan. The SoP is designed to meet about twice a year, but up until now it just has met once (launching the ZCID). It is supposed to give the broad policy directions to ZCID (board and secretariat). - give guidance, approving broad activities ZCID board

But it seems that SoP has a split personality and it does not really do all the things that are written in the trust deed. It is very difficult to get them together (busy schedules) and when they get together it is not guiding ZCID as an NGO-institution with its own agenda/programme/values & norms, but it is guiding on which issues a party-platform should focus (mostly contentious national issues). Because it doesn't meet regularly enough it is still a question how this SoP fits into the general decision making of ZCID. The board is really making all the important decisions.

The Board itself meets monthly and is composed of the political parties in parliament (secretary general + another party official) and 2 representatives for political parties outside parliament. The board has three topical groups (administration, finance and public relations) to prepare those issues for the board meetings. The chairman of the Board is a politician, elected from within the board and by the board. Today this role is taken up by a MMD partisan. In design the Board and the Secretariat are mutually accountable but on different issues. The fact that in figure 1 the secretariat is situated 'above' the board does not imply that it is higher up in the hierarchy, but rather that it forms a coordination entity, a cushion between NIMD and the board.

Figure 1: ZCID: Institutional set-up by design



The Secretariat is composed of three professionals. Their role is to implement the ZCID programme, to follow up on decisions of board, to formulate and follow-up cross party projects, to function as a resource centre for assisting the parties in formulating and reporting on their bilateral projects, they also monitor the implementation of the projects. The secretariat is the entry point for getting access to NIMD: the secretariat is held accountable by NIMD for following up on the large programme and with regards to the administrative and financial follow up of the bilateral and the cross-party programmes.

This institutional set-up serves a specific purpose of course. ZCID stands for some values and norms of democratic functioning (transparency, inclusiveness, participation, accountability...), which, if not safeguarded in a turbulent non consolidated democratic setting where predatory politics still prevail, might become overruled by other dynamics. Encapsulating these values and norms must receive constant attention and nurture by a staff that can be partially held accountable for this. This is one reason why the ZCID secretariat was set-up: on the one hand providing room for parties to meet, on the other hand however ZCID is an organisation which stands for certain principles which its wants to realize. When doing the interviews however it became clear that the mission, vision, the mandate of ZCID as a separate entity is not known or recognized by direct and indirect stakeholders (with the exception of two interviewees). Especially relevant is the perception of political parties: as far as they are concerned ZCID is a political organization which has no reason of existence beyond the

orders/tasks given by political parties. ZCID is thus an extension of the parties. Not one political party knew what ZCID actually stands for in terms of values and norms.

ZCID has to deal with a strange duality which is in part schizophrenic: on the one hand it is an NGO, a trust and thus part of civil society. It has its mandate, its programme, its own long term objectives, it tries to achieve systemic change. Yet on the other hand it contains a very strong political organisation at its centre. The tension between being a political organisation –driven by parties- and being an organisation in its own right is substantial (as we will see furtheron).

Suggestion:

ZCID should undertake a serious effort in diffusing its mission statement and market what it stands for.

The vision, mission should be printed on a billboard and put in the board room.

Image management is crucial! A good communication and PR strategy is urgently needed, both toward the parties and the general public.


III.3.2. Institutional set-up: evolution by default

All of the interviewed political parties and the staff perceive the set-up of ZCID to be quite problematic at this stage. It was a topic that spontaneously popped-up during every interview, and it often entailed an outburst of all kinds of –generally negative- emotions, ranging from disdain to discomfort, and from disappointment to anger. The tension lies between the accountability from the Secretariat towards NIMD, versus the accountability from the Secretariat towards the Board. Whereas the Secretariat is less upset about this tension, and thinks that by re-arranging some responsibilities the problem will be solved, the political parties are very emotional about the issue. The Secretariat might be less upset because although working for 2 bosses might be at times stressful and confusing, it also creates ‘black holes’ which can increase ‘residual power and autonomy’ of the secretariat (especially if there is no communication line between the bosses). The strong reaction of the parties is most probably linked to the expectations they have on the future of the ZCID, which stands in stark contrast with the way in which ZCID was designed and has evolved by default. The problematic situation de board and the secretariat are confronted with today is drawn out in figure 2.

Board members regularly referred to the popular saying: ‘he who pays the piper, calls the tune’, pointing to the idea that the professional secretariat is more accountable to NIMD (pays the salaries)

than to the Board (selected the staff). According to the Board members “the employee cannot control the boss”. Parties made a very clear and very strong point in stating that the secretariat is ‘theirs’. This discontent has tentacles in different directions:

Figure 2: Evolution by default



First, board members do not like it that the secretariat has more direct contact with NIMD (contrary to the good old days of IPB), they feel that the secretariat plays a ‘gatekeeper’ and a ‘broker’ role. A gatekeeper refers to the idea that a person X decides which information (documents, project proposals etc...) can enter into the upstream decision making process (in this case at NIMD). A broker works in two directions: he/she gives information back and forth between two actors who are not connected directly with each other. Particular about both positions is that they increase an individuals’ power position: the swiftness (or lack thereof) with which information is allowed into the stream, with which information is given (or not given), etc... can become strategies for intimidation, revenge etc... This is not to say that the secretariat actually does this. But quite some members of the board perceive this as a given reality. The problem with these kinds of accusations is that:

- they are very difficult to assess because of the subtlety with which these kinds of abuses take place. One would have to spend quite some time in and around ZCID to find out if the distrust has an objective raison d’être.
- Zambian political parties are so penetrated by distrust that they see conspiracies even when there aren’t any. Apparently trust cannot exist without control. The idea that the locus of control is situated and mediated beyond their scope of influence (The Hague) is quite torturous for most members.

Secondly, board members find it highly disturbing that the secretariat sometimes disagrees with them or with the board, or that the secretariat can steer, control or block off certain requests. In their perception, an employee cannot ignore orders. The secretariat, in this view, exists only by virtue of the parties' orders. It is the administrative, practical secretariat of the board and the parties in that board and it must do as it is told.

Thirdly, in the same line of argument board members find it unacceptable that the secretariat monitors their bilateral and cross-party activities. In several occasions they highlighted that they have no problems with being monitored as such. The discussion is not about whether or not they should be monitored, evaluated, controlled, audited. The discussion is about who has the authority/credibility to do so. Most of them plead for external M&E (external to ZCID, non-partisan, neutral, professional) and do not agree with the ZCID secretariat fulfilling this role. There seems to exist widespread consensus over this, so this might be worth looking into. This discussion is closely related to the question which capacities should be present within ZCID and which ones can be outsourced.

Suggestion:

Outsource M&E of bilateral and cross-party initiatives

Pré-condition: decent indicators, good planning of activities, good information flow between parties and Monitoring agencies on planning of activities.

Think strategically about which capacities and which expertise has to be present in-house and what can be outsourced.

In short: deep distrust seems to exist between a fair share of board members and the secretariat. This distrust is just an extension of the kind of distrust one can find in the wider political context in Zambia, and between political parties in general. In Zambian politics, control is everything and what one cannot control is potentially threatening. It is as such not a surprise that suspicion abounds and accusations fly back and forth insinuating that the secretariats' staff is not non-partisan. The latter suspicion received a particular boost when the issue of PF's lack of accountability leaked to the press. Quite some board members accuse the secretariat of leaking this information.

Suggestion:

The trust deeds should be revisited in order to clear out tensions and contradictions.

Particular attention should be given to the distinction between: control rights and information rights.

This distrust is also reflected by party people hanging around the ZCID offices. Some try to use the equipment (PC, telephones...) of the secretariat for their own party work. One party even got so far as to install his office at the ZCID. Although one might argue that it is a small party, hence no harm done, it is worth mentioning that this sets precedents which will difficult to counter. Added to that other parties feel very uncomfortable with this situation. Suspicion remains an issue and ZCID must try to keep neutral grounds.

Suggestion:


Clear rules on use of infrastructure, equipment, premises.

III.3.3. Projecting into the future: stakeholders' perceptions on what should be (changed)

Up until now this report has focussed on those institutional issues which are perceived to be pertinent and in need of being taken care of. In this part a reflection is given about how the direct stakeholders (political parties, secretariat) view the solution to these and other problems that were tackled during the interviews.

With regards to the confusion accountability issue, figure 3 clearly shows how political parties would solve the issue.

Figure 3: Solving the institutional problems: parties' perception



If given the choice political parties would prefer to place the Board above the secretariat in terms of hierarchy, but also in terms of having contact with NIMD. The secretariat would be fully accountable to the Board without any other mandate but to execute what the Board decides. The secretariat would cease to have links with NIMD directly. Political parties would also not be accountable in any way to the secretariat. In terms of cross-party initiatives parties would be accountable to the board through their representative, but bilateral links would be directly between the party and NIMD.

When it comes to the future role and the identity of ZCID, two visions exist:

- Most Board members see ZCID as a platform of and for parties. ZCID as such is an extension of the political parties without a separate mission, vision or goal. In and by itself it has no mandate.
- Only two Board members mention the appropriateness of ZCID being a separate entity, with its own identity, values, norms, mandate and programme.

With regards to the relationship with NIMD, once again two visions surface amongst board members:

- Most board members feel that attracting other donors without them having links with NIMD is the preferred strategy. NIMD should not be the preferential partner, but just one of many donors. It could be that this attitude is partially linked to the tensions related with the secretariat. If they feel that the secretariat is on the one hand protected by NIMD, and the secretariat therefore gains power over the board, than one way of counterbalancing this is to bring in resources from other donors in order to counterbalance the NIMD-based power position of the secretariat. One interviewee even went as far as suggesting that NIMD is afraid to lose control over ZCID which is the main reason for this evaluation to take place, to restore order.
- Only one or two interviewees strongly disagreed with the idea that NIMD should not be the preferential partner. These people believed in the shared project, the shared values and norms and that NIMD should therefore remain the most important partner. Looking out for other donors should therefore be a coordinated effort with the NIMD.

With regards to the functioning of the Board, there are some frictions related to its functioning. Firstly the nature of the chairman. Should the chairperson be a politician or non-partisan? Opinions are very divided on this, with valid arguments on both sides.

- One group feels that a political platform should be presided by a politician, because only he/she knows the political business, how to deal with parties and how to manufacture decisions.
- Another group feels that the chairperson should not be a politician, but a non-partisan. A very strong argument against a politician chairperson was provided by one interviewed politician stating that coming from another party one cannot present oneself at the (party-) office of the chairman without running the risk of being lynched by co-party members of the chairman, or being seen as a traitor by own co-party members unaware of the aim of the visit. Each board member should be free and able to visit the chairman for ZCID business without running the risk of being harassed. Another argument relates to the trade-off or tension that might present itself between the role and interests of a chairperson (ideally ZCID-related) and the obligations coming with politicking or party politics. Conflict of interest is bound to take place at one given time and it is unclear how to remediate the abuse of ZCID in this case.

Suggestion:

Launch a discussion on what ‘the institution’ chairperson should be and do. This is closely related to the discussion on mission and vision of ZCID. It is not impossible to imagine a situation where at least one member of the board (may or may not be chairperson) can look out for the interest of ZCID as an institution, rather than ZCID as an institution being swept away by the more short term interests of political parties.

The second area of disagreement lies at the heart of the decision making process within the board. Should decisions be taken by consensus or should dissent be possible?

- One group seems to prefer the decisions by consensus because of obvious reasons: reaching agreements between parties lies at the heart of inter-party dialogue, which is one reason why the ZCID came into live.
- Another group finds this evolution worrisome. Strong pressures are exercised to come to a consensus which is then subsequently ‘signed’ by all board members. Some people find it very hard to resist these pressures, especially when they feel they are a minority within the Board, and when not signing implies a kind of stigmatization of non-compliance or non-cooperative spirit. The situation has presented itself where majority decisions have been taken which subsequently entered the public arena as ZCID decisions, while those not agreeing with the majority could not refer to ZCID. If the majority decision is the official ZCID position, while the minority point of view cannot refer to ZCID, this makes ZCID an exclusionary organization instead of an inclusive entity. It should therefore be possible to have, within ZCID, divergent views: why not experiment with majority views and minority

views, and leave room for shifting alliances depending on the topic? If democracy is about agreeing to disagree on certain issues, this can also be reflected in the decision making process of the ZCID board.

Suggestion:

Launch a discussion on the decision making procedure, revise the decision making process at the level of the board, leave room for dissent.

Closely related to the former point is the discussion whether the Board should have minutes of its meetings or not.

- One group seems to think that the ZCID is an informal space, where parties can speak freely and work towards decisions. It is the fact that nothing is recorded, and that it is informal which defines its strength. Added to that, the most important thing that has to be recorded are the decisions, not the process that has led to them.
- Another group within the Board would like to see minutes of meetings in which the discussion and the arguments are sketched and which show the variety of opinions and standpoints. Minutes would show the process of agreeing or disagreeing and the arguments behind all points of view.

Suggestion:

Minutes might help to sketch the process of agreeing and disagreeing in more detail.

Sketching the discussion does not necessarily mean that the presented arguments should be linked to name and surname or to a party. The written reflection of discussions can be 'anonymous' without revealing who said what.

A final point of discussion on the level of the Board relates to peer pressure and information on how parties are fulfilling their bilateral commitments. This is not to inform the board on 'what' and 'how' political parties are realizing their strategic plans, this is too sensitive and too delicate given the fact that they are fierce competitors (would be like opening up industrial secrets), but it is more related to the 'if': are parties fulfilling the administrative and financial accountability obligations they signed up to? Are parties giving sufficient room for M&E?

- One group of Board members found that the Board should never be informed on the fact if they are living up the deals made.
- Other people believe that board members should pressurize each other into compliance. "It cannot be", argued one member, "that one party is not complying at all with NIMD

requirements and that we are treating that member as if nothing happened. If one misbehaves, we all pay a collective price because all the parties share in the blame”.

By way of concluding this point on institutional issues: most of the above mentioned problems are closely linked to the board and the parties not understanding the complex dynamics and interaction of development agencies and public opinion in the donor country. The contentious nature of aiding political parties and the pré-requisites this implies in terms of institutional set-up of ZCID is not sufficiently put in perspective for them. The debriefing with the political parties¹² which took place on October 5th 2007, clearly showed this lack of perspective. Their short-term perspective on political gains, power, access to resources, increasing leverage often stands in stark contrast with what ZCID and by extension NIMD need to be effective. If parties would already understand and acknowledge the existence of this trade-off this would be a huge step forward. This being said, a strong secretariat is no luxury, but this will require some serious backstopping from NIMD. The staff at the secretariat has little experience in working with politicians and they are also in a learning curve. They need more support in constantly keeping the long term goals in mind, even when dealing with short term challenges and problems. Re-assuring that they do not lose track amidst this turbulent political environment which pulls and pushes in different directions, is a challenge in itself. The institutional contradictions between the secretariat and the board have evolved into a situation where neither of them (separately nor jointly) can work out a solution. A NIMD intervention is needed.

Suggestion:

NIMD could play an important role in straightening out the confusion. An important part of dealing with this is by explaining how donors work (the political economy of aid). Only when fully understanding how donors think, act and how the institutional incentives are organized parties will most probably understand better why the secretariat has to remain neutral, professional with strong accountability relations to the donor.

More backstopping to the secretariat is needed, more assistance in strategic thinking.

Revitalize the mission and vision of ZCID to both staff and board.

¹² Only three parties could make it to the debriefing : PF, UNIP and FPP.

IV. CONCLUSIONS

It is beyond any doubt that the ZCID initiative is a living experiment. Ambitious, unique, daring, risky, but utterly relevant and at the heart of what (political, social, economic) development really is about: politics!

The major challenge NIMD has to face are the political parties themselves: they are the main stakeholders, they keep this programme alive and relevant, yet at the same time they threaten the viability of the programme due to the predatory nature of politics in most developing contexts. Politicians, wherever in the world, strive toward power and increasing their power. Institutions, preferably strong and professional, have rules and procedures which carry the virtue of limiting arbitrary power abuses. Strong political parties, strong platforms, strong donors are thus the solution yet at the same time a threat for these parties where personal and arbitrary power schemes prevail. In developing contexts where political power is constructed upon clientelism, patronage (hence avoiding or bending rules) there is a deep conflict between the desires of politicians and the need for strong institutions. Finding a balance between both is by definition something that will raise conflicts of interest between ‘the technocratic staff’ and the ‘political staff’, both in parties and in platforms. It is about drawing the boundaries of power-territories and autonomy. This ‘battle’ is taking place right now in Zambia, within ZCID, and with good timing, NIMD might swing the pendulum in favour of a somewhat stronger institutionalization of ZCID. Admittedly both history and the daily context are strong adversaries in the battle for stronger institutions. In a context surrounded by predatory politics, and where social relations are mostly clientelistic, it is not easy to ‘create pure and neat islands’. But maybe it is already sufficient if NIMD could support ‘good enough institutionalization¹³’ in which every change (however small) is an improvement over past practices. In that sense NIMD and the secretariat could work toward gradual and small improvements. The challenge is to strike a strategic balance between keeping the parties on board, respecting certain levels of ownership yet avoiding the fact that ZCID becomes a prey which individual politicians can use to increase their political capital. This means that ZCID itself must become a political strategist, not as an actor on the political scene, but as a change agent in an adversarial context.

The effectiveness of NIMD funded programme is double-sided. On the one hand it is very clear that cross-party initiatives have proven to produce the kind of public goods NIMD strives for. The political arena has become less polarised, and, inter party dialogue positively influenced the resolution political conflicts. As such this pillar needs to be strengthened, deepened, broadened. At the same

¹³ I adapted Merilee Grindle’s ‘good enough governance concept’ and changed it into ‘good enough institutionalisation’.

time political parties prefer –quite logically- bilateral projects because resources create power and power can lead to (personal) victory. Maybe the bilateral pillar should be ‘instrumentalised’ more by NIMD/ZCID, as an incentive to keep parties on board, yet with the objective to ultimately give more weight to cross party initiatives. In this constellation a trade-off can present itself between the ownership (over wanting and needing bilateral access to resources, but not necessarily linked to a reform agenda) and effectiveness of cross party activities.

NIMD/ZCID will not be able to ‘buy’ willingness to reform within parties. Rather than stimulating reform from ‘the outside’, it might be more interesting to try and identify the ‘drivers of change’ within political parties. Direct and close contacts with political parties through secretary generals is very important and good for pushing the political agenda towards certain issues which are systemic (like the constitution), but this is not necessarily the best way to promote institutional change within parties. More entry points might be needed for this. NIMD/ZCID might consider supporting change from within by giving change agents the opportunity of getting their message better across. Having close and regular contacts with ‘reform minded people’ might be a valuable strategy. This strategy will also ‘diversify’ the information-flow towards parties. The information and resources that NIMD/ZCID hold can become monopolised power resources if one or two persons control the access (in this case the secretary general and one other person sitting on the Board). By diversifying relations (breaking monopolies) with different people in parties the flow of information will run a lesser risk of being manipulated.

With regards to ZCID we summarize those elements which are most urgent in tackling:

1. PR : Public imaging of the vision, mission of ZCID towards the public, towards political parties
2. The institutional implications
 - a. For the relations between secretariat and board (revise trust deed and link MoU)
 - b. Draw the boundaries between being an actor and being just a stage
 - c. Discuss strategies on how to differentiate ZCID accountability with regards to process versus being held accountability for the outcome
3. Link the above to strategies to realize and revitalize the programme

LIST OF INTERVIEWED PEOPLE

- Staff ZCID Chomba Chella (Executive Director), Horace Chilando (Programme Officer), Wilfred Mutale (Accountant)
- Chairman ZCID (member of the MMD) Dr Katele Kulamba (National Secretary)
- UPND Tiens Kahenya (Secretary General)
- FDD Newton Nguni (Secretary General)
- PF: Edward Mumbi (Secretary General), Sylvia Chalikosa (Administrative Assistant), Guy Scott (Vice-President)
- Forum of Political Parties (Langton Sichone (Zambia National Development Conference), Edwin Sakala (Zambia Direct Democracy Movement), Idon Dennis Sichande (Party for Unity Democracy and Development)
- MMD, dr Katele Kulamba (National Secretary) + Frank Bowa (National Organisation Secretary) + Nelly Mulenga (Financial Secretary)
- UNIP (Anamela Njekwa, Vice-President)
- United Liberal Party - Sikwiindi Situna (Acting Secretary-General)
- FODEP – Elija Rubvuta (Executive Director)
- Adrian Mwando Muunga – National Coordinator – African Peer Review Mechanism
- DFID Wilfred Mwamba (Governance Advisor)
- National Democratic Focus – Grace Chitambla (National Treasurer) Clifford Evans Mwaba (National Secretary)
- UNDP (Mr. Soko)
- Dutch Embassy, First Secretary Development Cooperation

ANNEX

Terms of Reference for the evaluation of the NIMD-programme in Zambia

Background information

Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy

The main objective of NIMD is to support the process of democratisation in young democracies by strengthening political parties as pillars of democracy in order to help create a well-functioning, sustainable, pluralistic system of party politics. The NIMD works in a strictly non-partisan and inclusive manner.

NIMD Programmes aim to facilitate reform agendas that are the result of either an inter-party or individual party's strategic planning process. These 'home-grown' agendas that reflect the need for full ownership of the process by the political stakeholders – taking into account that democracy cannot be exported – provide the compass for NIMD's assistance to the strategic activities identified by the local political parties. These interventions are supposed to make a contribution to three more or less interrelated objectives within the NIMD mandate:

- Reduce polarization and increase social and political cohesion
- Reduce fragmentation and increase stability and predictability in the political system
- Enhance the institutionalization of political parties, peaceful conflict resolution and policy development within the multi-party political system

In many NIMD programme countries, amongst others Zambia, the political parties have jointly established Multi-Party centres in order to guarantee full ownership of inter-party dialogue and the development of joint intervention programmes with the aim to strengthen democracy.

When implementing their activities, the NIMD's partners will cooperate internationally as much as possible with other organisations that support democratisation processes.

NIMD Programme in Zambia

In 2003, the NIMD funded an empirical and participatory study to identify the main institutional challenges to Zambian political parties and democracy in general. The results were subsequently discussed with the parliamentary parties. Because of high levels of inter-party tensions, the NIMD programme focused initially on individual support to political parties and skills related inter-party sessions. At the time it was considered too early to facilitate inter-party dialogue on contentious issues, and the priorities identified were: confidence building between political parties based on the one hand on inter-party training sessions and on the other on institutional strengthening of political parties. Priority areas of the parties, as highlighted in their individual strategic plans, include:

- (i) Development / strengthening of party identities;
- (ii) Design and operationalisation of sound resource mobilisation strategies;
- (iii) Strengthening of party unity (through conflict resolution mechanisms) and the practice of internal democracy;
- (iv) Strengthening research capacity; policy analysis and policy formulation;
- (v) Improving organisational capacity of the regional/local branches & communication lines between the various levels of the party.

A number of cross-party training sessions were organised at the national and regional level, focussing on political skills such as internal and external party communication. These sessions brought together representatives of the various political parties. This was followed by a high-level inter-party workshop on strategic planning in which the leadership of all the main parties participated.

From 2004 onwards, NIMD facilitated a process of inter-party dialogue between the main Zambian parties on issues of national interest. This was based on a joint strategic plan in which the parties jointly agreed upon six common objectives for the years ahead:

- developing a code of conduct for political parties in the run-up to elections
- dialogue on constitutional reform and on the electoral process
- explore possibilities for the funding of political parties
- improve the position of women, young and physically challenged people in political parties
- build capacity and strengthen political parties
- enhance civic education (to address voter apathy and the public image of political parties, i.e. image building) and
- improve access to media and party specific media strategies
- build partnerships and strengthen regional networking.

Finally, senior representatives of the Zambian parties actively participated in NIMD's regional programme for East and Southern Africa discussing transparency, political participation of disadvantaged groups in society, electoral systems and rules of engagement between ruling and opposition parties.

NIMD has assisted the political parties in the process of establishing the Zambian Centre for Inter-Party Dialogue (ZCID) with the purpose to provide for an institutionalised platform within which each parliamentary party is represented. Three seats in the ZCID Board are reserved for non-parliamentarian parties. The centre's staff assists the parties implementing intervention strategies and facilitates inter-party dialogue on issues of national interest.

In the run-up to the 2006 elections, ZCID played an important role as it assisted the parties in the development of a Code of Conduct (part of which was integrated in the official code established by the Electoral Commission), in training party agents who would monitor the elections, in developing media strategies based on policy issues, in improving inter-party policy debates within the country and in improving the access to (public and private) media.

Subsequent to the elections, the parties updated their strategic plan for the period 2007-2011. This year, much focus is being put on (a) facilitating inter-party discussions on (b) constitutional changes at the highest level and possibilities for the provision of public funding.

Throughout the programme various representatives of Dutch political parties have actively participated (notably in the area of party communication and media strategies).

Objectives of the evaluation

- To assess the achieved results of the NIMD Zambia Programme in relation to the three general objectives within the NIMD mandate mentioned in the first section;
- To assess the achieved results of the inter-party programme in relation with the objectives as specified in the strategic plan 2004-2006 and the logical framework of the annual plan 2007 (see annexes I and II);

- To examine the impact of NIMD's support regarding the institutional strengthening of the ruling party and one opposition party (proposal: Patriotic Front could be selected as it is the main opposition party), based on their individual strategic plans and annual plans and their performance indicators;
- To acquire a better understanding of the relationship between the methodology used and the effectiveness of the programme. This includes the use of the dialogue methodology to enhance ownership, the administrative procedures, the role of the representation and partnerships with other national and international organisations;
- To clarify which lessons can be learned for the work of NIMD in general.

Evaluation Parameters

The main objective of the NIMD Programme in Zambia is: *to contribute to the development and strengthening of the multi-party political system in Zambia.*

The evaluation will make use of the : longer term strategic plans developed by the Zambian Centre for Inter-Party Dialogue (ZCID), two individual political parties and the performance indicators clarified within these together with the independent monitoring reports.

The external evaluation will cover the period from October 2004 to September 2007.

Central questions:

1. Bilateral and cross-party projects

The evaluation of the projects will address the results at different levels:

- What are the achieved results, both qualitative and quantitative, in relation to the general and specific objectives of - a selection of - the individual programme activities?
- Is the assumption correct that the three specific objectives lead to the overall objective namely developing and strengthening the multi party system?
- What is the impact of the programme at the level of institutional strengthening of political parties?
- What is the impact of the programme on the development and strengthening of a multi party system in Zambia?

2. Implementation modalities

- Does the methodology as applied guarantee ownership of the process by political parties?
- How does the overall programme management function in Zambia and in the Netherlands?
- Are the lessons learned (e.g. from monitoring reports) adequately implemented?
- Is the organizational set-up of the Zambian Centre for Inter-Party Dialogue appropriate for the execution of its various functions?

- Has the cooperation between NIMD and other organizations (e.g. DFID) been executed successfully and effectively
- Has the registration and documentation of the projects been adequately organized?
- What is the added value of the NIMD programme in Zambia, compared to other local and international organizations like EU, UNDP and others working in the same field?
- Is the programme implemented in a coherent and comprehensive way?
- Is the programme sufficiently well prepared to attract other international partners to the programme on a longer term basis (e.g. through strategic partnership agreement with NIMD)
- Are the results of the projects sustainable?

3. Lessons learned

The evaluation should, amongst others, result in recommendations regarding the following issues:

1. The need for continuation of the programme and its possible future direction;
2. The effectiveness of the allocation of the budget between the different projects;
3. The active role of the ZCID and the main functions it should undertake;
4. The impact of the programme as stated in the objectives;
5. The relation between the political party ownership and the methodology applied.