

EVALUATION REPORT

NIMD'S TANZANIA PROGRAMME – 2007-2011

23 February, 2012

Consultants

Dr. Richard Whitehead

Dr. Bernadeta Killian

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF ACRONYMS	3
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	4
1. INTRODUCTION.....	8
1.1. NIMD’s Tanzania Programme	8
1.2. Evaluation Methods.....	9
2. POLITICAL CONTEXT	11
2.1. Historical and Contemporary Background	11
2.2. Significant Challenges.....	14
3. CROSS-PARTY VERSUS BILATERAL COMPONENTS	16
4. EVALUATING THE TCD PARTNERSHIP	17
4.1. The TCD.....	17
4.2. TCD Activities	18
4.3. Capacity and Sustainability	24
4.5. Strategic networks, cooperation, and financing.....	27
4.6. Remaining Issues.....	29
5. EVALUATING THE BILATERAL PARTNERSHIPS	30
5.1. The Bilateral Partnerships	30
5.2. Bilateral Activities.....	32
6. STRENGTHENING TIES BETWEEN CIVIL AND POLITICAL SOCIETY.....	34
7. KEY RECOMMENDATIONS	35
ANNEX: LIST OF INTERVIEWEES	40
ANNEX: STRATEGIC NETWORKS FOR NIMD	41
ANNEX: TERMS OF REFERENCE.....	46
REFERENCES	58

LIST OF ACRONYMS

APPT-Maendeleo	African Progressive Party of Tanzania
ASP	Afro-Shirazi Party
CCM	Chama cha Mapinduzi
Chadema	Chama cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo
CUF	Civic United Front
DDTP	Deepening Democracy in Tanzania Programme
DIPD	Danish Institute for Parties and Democracy
DP	Democratic Party
FES	Friedrich Ebert Stiftung
KAS	Konrad Adenauer Stiftung
KIC	Christian Democratic International Centre
LHRC	Legal and Human Rights Centre
NED	National Endowment for Democracy
NIMD	Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy
TANU	Tanzania African National Union
TCD	Tanzania Centre for Democracy
UDP	United Democratic Party
UDSM	University of Dar es Salaam
UNDEF	United Nations Democracy Fund
UNFEM	United Nations Development Fund for Women

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Since 2002, the Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy (NIMD) has been engaged in democracy assistance in Tanzania, with the goal of improving the country's multiparty system, assisting in the institutional development of political parties, and improving the relationships between political parties and civil society. The aim of this report is to evaluate the extent to which the intervention logic of NIMD's Tanzania programme has been successfully applied and achieved. In turn, the evaluation will look to assess the current and future political context in Tanzania, and then make some key recommendations on how NIMD's Tanzania programme might be adjusted in light of the programme evaluation and context assessment. In doing so, the report examines two partnership forms that constitute NIMD's programme – namely NIMD's bilateral partnerships with Tanzania's political parties and NIMD's partnership with the Tanzania Centre for Democracy (TCD). Whereas the former partnership engages in activities on an individual party basis, activities within the latter partnership are all conducted on a cross-party basis.

The evaluation consisted of 22 stakeholder interviews, which were then supplemented by information collected during the desk review. Interview questions were triangulated across stakeholders groups in an effort to “cross examine” data in the search for consistencies and inconsistencies in reporting, with the goal of shedding light on the validity of the underlying data.

Based on stakeholder interviews, the context analysis revealed that constitutional reform, an improving but still weak multiparty culture, and weak opposition parties are key contemporary challenges to consolidating Tanzania's democracy. We find NIMD's programmatic objectives to be highly relevant for all three of these challenges, especially in light of the country's general reform climate that has transpired over the past two decades. In terms of activities, we find the cross-party ones to be particularly relevant for the constitutional reform process that is currently unfolding, and for helping to minimize conflict in the lead up to the 2015 election.

In terms of NIMD's two partnership modalities, stakeholder interviews revealed that having two separately-managed partnerships was a sensible division of labour that allowed the TCD to avoid directly implicating itself in decisions about which parties have earned their bilateral support. Stakeholders also believed that separate management made sense when considering the differences between providing cross-party support, where activities are more generic in relation to particular parties, and bilateral support, where activities are more specific to the needs of individual parties.

In terms of cross-party activities, NIMD's approach to facilitating multiparty dialogue by partnering with the TCD has been quite effective in building trust and, quite possibly, reducing open conflict between national party leaders. At the same time, the atmosphere and events during the 2010 election also revealed that the dialogue efforts have not adequately trickled down to the local level. The evaluation also finds that stakeholder workshops, conferences, and TV and radio debates have been especially effective in shaping key pieces of

legislation, most notably the Election Expenses Act, the Political Parties Act, and the Constitutional Review Bill. We expect these workshops to play a vital role in current constitutional reform milieu.

Via the TCD, NIMD's Tanzania programme also engages in a wide variety of cross-party training seminars in areas like campaign strategies, media relations, mobilization and management, women and youth, and more. While a number of shortcomings were identified during the evaluation, cross-party training has generally helped to strengthen the competence of elected officials and enhance party knowledge in areas of accounting, budgeting, and ideology. However, despite seminars and workshops on ideology, we find little evidence that parties in election times actually reference ideology or substantial policies as a way to differentiate themselves from one another.

The evaluation finds that while the capacity of the TCD has improved during the past five years or so, and while the TCD has successfully secured a Memorandum of Understanding with the Registrar of Political Parties over government funding, the TCD is still faced with serious capacity and sustainability shortfalls. The TCD lacks the capacity to develop programmes and proposals for project funding, which in turn undermines its ability to sustain some of its activities outside of NIMD's support.

Finally, the TCD's strategic networks are still quite thin. While no other organization engages in cross-party activities as broadly and systematically at the TCD, there are a number of organizations that specifically engage in activities on a cross-party level. Moreover, there are a number of other organizations that are currently working within the area of constitutional reform. Several international donor institutions – most notably the UNDP, UNDEF, and DIPD – have also allocated resources into areas that overlap with NIMD's Tanzania programme. NIMD and the TCD should make concerted efforts to reach out to each of these institutions.

Achievements have also been made through NIMD's bilateral partnerships with Tanzania's parliamentary parties, although these achievements have been more modest. NIMD's "partnership, ownership, and inclusivity" intervention, which strives to facilitate change by garnering commitments and initiatives from the parties themselves, was clearly appreciated by all political parties as a unique approach that gave parties a sense of ownership and control over their activities. At the same time, "performance-based financial support" was acknowledged as a necessary and effective tool for ensuring that activities are consistent with party strategic plans and NIMD's mandate.

It is also evident that training in campaign management and tactics contributed to growing electoral fortunes for some of the opposition parties, most notably Chadema. In a one-party dominant context like Tanzania, a sizable election gain by an opposition party is indeed a sizable milestone for strengthening multiparty competition. As well, councillor training was appreciated as a key for inspiring much needed confidence and knowledge among those councillors who did not know exactly what the office entails.

Training activities – both in the bilateral and cross-party modalities – were not, however, without their fair share of shortcomings. A few respondents observed that some of the training seminars were too top-down, and that some of the trainees were either incapable of digesting the training material or not wholly interested in the training. On a more serious note, in the face of workshops and training seminars – whether cross-party or within each party – that are supposed to enhance intra-party conflict resolution with the hope of institutionalizing internal party democracy, all parties, and especially the opposition ones, still suffer from highly turbulent power struggles and/or the problem of having incontestable leaders.

NIMD's objective on enhancing the relationship between political parties and civil society applies to both the bilateral and cross-party modalities, and the evaluation finds that achievements in this area are totally lacking. This is partially because the NGO Act in Tanzania prohibits civil society organizations from engaging in political activities, and partially because the TCD has neglected to include reforming the NGO Act as a first step in bridging the divide between civil and political society.

The evaluation finds NIMD's programme to be highly relevant to Tanzania's current context and well received by nearly all the interviewees in this evaluation. There was an overall consensus that the interparty dialogues, along with the conferences and television and radio programmes, were relevant and made some impressive achievements in facilitating interparty trust and bringing public pressure to bear on key political issues. In light these findings, we believe that bilateral support and support for the TCD should continue, although we also believe that six key recommendations are in order. These recommendations should be understood within the context of an overarching recommendation: NIMD's Tanzania programme should be conservative by strictly improving on those activities that have already paid dividends, reducing those activities that have not, and avoiding new types of activities that lie outside current programme experiences and competences.

First, the evaluation suggests that NIMD give priority to activities that have clear relevance to the constitutional reform and the 2015 election. Conferences and workshops should continue to be held as venues for making inputs into the reform process, and radio programmes should be the medium of choice for sensitizing the public about constitutional reform issues. Bilateral activities too could include efforts to sensitize and inform party cadre about the constitutional reform, who in turn might convey this knowledge during their interactions with other citizens. The TCD should also use the constitutional reform as an opportunity to broaden its networks with civil society and other donors as a way to create coherence around reform and to further develop the TCD's strategic networks. In terms of the 2015 elections, which may be one of the more critical multiparty elections thus far, a higher priority should be given to issues of conflict prevention for 2012 to 2015 – during a time when the constitutional reform will be at its peak, when parties will be engaging in their internal nominations, and when the general elections will be held.

Second, if improving relations between parties and civil society is to be taken seriously, then NIMD-funded activities related to this issue should first seek to address the NGO Act. Therefore, relevant TCD activities might contain conferences and workshops on the

particulars of the act and ways in which the act might be changed. Bilateral activities might also include workshops designed to sensitize party cadre about the act and the need to reform it. Finally, given that most of the TCD's stakeholders would strongly agree that the NGO Act is highly problematic, the strategy adopted by NIMD and the TCD must include an eye for building lasting ties between the TCD and civil society.

While the third recommendation comes with some crucial caveats – as specified in the full report, the evaluation suggests expanding on cross-party activities, even at the expense of the bilateral activities if necessary. The evaluation found that the biggest achievements within NIMD's Tanzania programme took place within the cross-party programme, and when considering the limited resources available to the TCD, future partnership efforts should focus on consolidating the most significant achievements made thus far.

Fourth, the capacity and sustainability of the TCD needs to be developed. During the interviews, we repeatedly heard comments about the dire situation the TCD would face should one of its principle donors withdraw its support. That said, future budget allocations should give priority to professionalizing the TCD's capacity to become its own manager, visionary, and advocate. Priority should be given to training existing staff, and hiring additional personnel if needed, in the areas of programme development and project proposals. Greater effort should be made in raising the public face of the TCD and building lasting bridges between the TCD and civil society organizations – ones that might be able to act as future partners in organizing workshops and conferences and engaging civic education.

Fifth, while there were a lot of smaller complaints about some aspects of the bilateral and cross-party training programmes, perhaps the most notable finding was the weaknesses in using them as learning experiences that could inform the topics and organization of future training activities. On the one hand, all trainees should be given the opportunity to evaluate both the usefulness of the training programme and the quality of the trainer. On the other hand, trainers should also draft an end-of-evaluation brief on what he or she found interesting or noteworthy in the training process. These materials could then be returned to a TCD officer for further processing.

Finally, the evaluation finds that the bilateral and cross-party activities should continue to be managed separately largely because the TCD should be protected from having to make decisions over whether or not to approve funding for bilateral activities to particular political parties. Involving the TCD in such decisions could undermine the level of commitment that some of the parties have in TCD activities.

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. NIMD's Tanzania Programme

In many new democracies, parties are “upbraided with failing to provide the electorate with meaningful choice, with failing to instil democratic values...and with offering either ineffectual, or alternatively irresponsible, opposition”.¹ In Africa in particular, a variety of factors undermine the democratic credentials of parties and their capacities to contest elections. Parties tend to be moribund in the years between election times, thus undermining their ability to continuously cultivate ties with the electorate.² Parties in Africa, as elsewhere, are also faced with the rising costs of placing media ads; printing posters, leaflets, and manifestos; canvassing and conducting polls; and traversing across large distances on poorly maintained roads.³

The interaction between parties is also widely problematic throughout Africa. In some cases, the inability to form opposition coalitions due to, among other things, personal power rivalries, obstructs the ability of opposition parties to unseat long-standing incumbents. Throughout many African countries, the relationships between political parties, along with their respective leaders, are fraught with mistrust and mutual hostilities, which, in the worst cases, lead to widespread political violence between party supporters.

International assistance to political parties is meant to address these challenges. However, while most party assistance programmes are directed towards addressing the deficits of individual parties, the Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy (NIMD) is currently one of the few organizations that attempt to simultaneously address the institutional weaknesses of the individual parties and the deficiencies in the interactions between them. Indeed, NIMD's mandate is to “support the process of democratization in young democracies by strengthening political parties and political groups as bearers of democracy in order to create a well-functioning, sustainable pluralistic political party system”.⁴ This mandate yields three main programmatic objectives: improve the functioning of multiparty political systems, assist in the institutional development of political parties, and improve the relationships between political parties and civil society.

The aim of this report is to evaluate the extent to which the intervention logic in NIMD's Tanzania programme has been successfully applied and achieved. In turn, the evaluation will look to assess the current and future political context in Tanzania, and then make some key recommendations on how NIMD's Tanzania programme might be adjusted in light of the programme evaluation and context assessment. It is important to point out that the Political Parties Fund for 2012 to 2016, as managed by the Dutch Government's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, does not include Tanzania as a programme country. NIMD's Tanzania programme

¹ Randall, 'Political Parties and Democratic Developmental States', 638.

² Van de Walle and Butler, 'Political Parties and Party Systems in Africa's Illiberal Democracies'; Chege, 'Political Parties in East Africa'.

³ Nassmacher, 'Introduction', 4; Saffu, 'The Funding of Political Parties and Election Campaigns in Africa', 21; Randall, 'Political Parties and Democratic Developmental States', 644.

⁴ Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy, 'Political Parties: Pillars of Democracy', 7.

for 2012 is currently operating on the basis of a bridge fund. Therefore, while this evaluation is written in a tone that makes “suggestions” or “recommendations” to NIMD, it is also intended to inform any new partnerships that might fill the void left by NIMD’s departure.

NIMD’s Tanzania programme largely centres around the aforementioned objectives laid out in the multiannual plans at the institutional level, although priority in Tanzania has been given to improving the functioning of the multiparty system and assisting with the institutional development of the country’s political parties.

NIMD’s Tanzania programme is divided into two main partnerships through which all interventions are facilitated, and it is here where the evaluation will focus. The first is the bilateral partnerships between NIMD and those parties with representation in Tanzania’s parliament – currently the Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM), the Chama cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo (Chadema), the Civic United Front (CUF), the United Democratic Party (UDP), and the NCCR-Mageuzi. Within these partnerships, the primary goal is to strengthen the capacity of individual parties themselves and broaden their connections to civil society. The modalities of bilateral support include direct funding for those activities that are consistent with the party’s strategic plan and consistent with NIMD’s mandate.

The second relationship is found in NIMD’s partnership with the Tanzania Centre for Democracy (TCD), an NGO that was founded in 2005 by all political parties with representation in the Tanzania National Assembly. Whereas the bilateral partnerships focus on developing individual party capacities, NIMD’s partnership with the TCD largely, although not exclusively, centres on improving the functioning of the multiparty system as a whole. Hence, activities at the TCD consist of interparty dialogues, cross-party workshops, and cross-party training seminars. Topics within each activity include parliamentary politics, party accountability, constitutional and political reform, proportional representation, party-media relations, conflict prevention, advocacy, and management.

1.2. Evaluation Methods


In accordance with the Terms of Reference (ToR), which is conveniently provided in the annex, the overarching questions in the evaluation include the following: To what extent has the intervention logic within the Tanzania programme been successfully applied and achieved by the partners? What does the evaluation suggest about how to realign the current programmatic and organizational arrangements from the current political context to the future political context?

These two rather broad questions were explored first through a thorough desk review of existing documentation, and then through interviews with key stakeholders, or those groups and individuals that have an interest in NIMD’s Tanzania programme. Since democratic consolidation involves a wide variety of actors, we tried to cast a broad net when identifying relevant stakeholders. Identifying stakeholders began with an understanding of the overall priorities set forth by NIMD in relation to its Tanzania programme – priorities that focus on

partnerships with parties and with the TCD. As illustrated in figure 1, we have chosen to label these as *core relationships*.

At the same time, NIMD's approach has sought to broaden its reach by facilitating the development of the links between its partners and other stakeholders. After all, the advancement of political party institutionalization and multiparty democracy can only go so far when political parties operate in isolation from or are not trusted by other societal actors. Therefore, we found it useful to incorporate into the analysis views from stakeholders that operate outside these core relationships. Broadening the list of relevant stakeholders allows us to collect a potentially diverse array of views that are ideal for triangulation, or cross-examining the data to search for consistencies and inconsistencies between stakeholder groups with the goal of shedding light on the validity of the underlying data.⁵ As shown in figure 1, we have labelled these stakeholders as having *secondary relationships* with NIMD's Tanzania programme.

Figure 1: Project stakeholder map



However, with such a broad net, there is the risk of interviewing actors that might have little or no knowledge of NIMD or of the TCD. To hedge against this, we chose to only interview individuals from organizations that have been identified as having informal relationships with political parties or the TCD. These are actors that have, in one way or another, participated in dialogues, workshops, or training programmes, or have consulted the TCD or the political parties. These actors are drawn from the government, civil society, other donors, and academics at the University of Dar es Salaam.

Primary data was collected from stakeholder interviews conducted between January 23, 2012 and February 1, 2012. Two additional stakeholder interviews were conducted via telephone on February 16 and 17. The interview questionnaires were semi-structured – i.e. the questionnaires sought to maximize consistency and comparability across interviews while also allowing the flexibility for asking questions that are unique to each interviewee.

⁵ O'Donoghue and Punch, 'Qualitative Educational Research in Action', 78.

Questions centred on extracting answers about the relevance; effectiveness; efficiency, organization, and management; impact; and sustainability of NIMD's Tanzania programme as well as recommendations for how the programme might be refitted to an updated context analysis. Data from the interviews were then analyzed and synthesized with relevant data from the desk review.

We interviewed a total of 22 stakeholders according to the sectors identified in figure 1 above. The list of interviewees is provided in the annex. Because this study evaluates NIMD's party support programme in Tanzania generally, and the TCD partnership and the bilateral partnerships in particular, the emphasis was placed on interviewing first and foremost the political parties and the TCD. Furthermore, to the extent possible, we ensured that some of the interviews were held with party members who are also Members of Parliament and have some past exposure with NIMD-facilitated activities.

2. POLITICAL CONTEXT


2.1. Historical and Contemporary Background

Tanzania Mainland, sometimes referred to as Tanganyika, achieved its independence from colonial rule in 1961, and experienced a brief period of multiparty politics prior to the passing of the interim single-party constitution of 1965. At the same time, the archipelago of Zanzibar attained independence in December of 1963, underwent a rather turbulent revolution only a month later, and afterwards formally united with Tanganyika to constitute the present-day United Republic of Tanzania (URT). By 1965, each constituent territory of the URT was presided over by two separate single-party regimes, the Tanzania African National Union (TANU) on the Mainland and the Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP) on the Isles. In 1977, however, both parties formally merged to constitute the present-day Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM). Hence, to a large extent, the current political context is still shaped by the legacies of nearly three decades of de jure single-party rule.

The year 1992 was a landmark one for the political history of Tanzania. Due to economic malaise, a growing legitimacy crisis faced by the CCM, and mounting international pressure, Tanzania's constitution was formally amended to allow for multiparty elections. What makes Tanzania's transition to multiparty politics somewhat unique, however, was the relative weakness of the organized domestic opposition to single-party rule. Indeed, when compared to the overwhelming popularity of and organized impetus behind reform in neighbouring countries like Kenya, Malawi, and Zambia, the domestic actors in the push for multiparty reform in Tanzania were confined to a small group of intellectuals, lawyers, business people, and former CCM insiders with very few grassroots connections. This in part allowed the CCM to engage in multiparty reform while making minimal changes to the 1977 Constitution – a point that is highly relevant for the constitutional debates that are currently unfolding in Tanzania and for the work of the TCD and the political parties in the near future.

Against the backdrop of this transition milieu, it is not surprising to find that Tanzania today has yet to experience a change in regime and is widely characterized as a one-party dominant polity. The charts depicted in figure 2 illustrate this point. While opposition gains were made in the 2010 parliamentary and presidential elections, the CCM has overwhelmingly dominated all four multiparty elections and has enjoyed a monopoly in the country’s national assembly. While governance on Zanzibar has effectively been a two-party system between the CCM and CUF, opposition parties on the Mainland have been weak and unable to make grassroots inroads throughout broader swaths of the countryside.⁶ Altogether, the parties continue to operate in the absence of significant ideological differences between them, as demonstrated in the level of personal attacks, character assassinations, and broad, populist appeals made by all parties across all elections.⁷ As highlighted throughout the evaluation, it is our view that the persistence of one-party dominance and the comparatively weak opposition parties in Tanzania is a major challenge to both the bilateral and cross-party components.

Figure 2: Incumbent versus opposition in Tanzanian politics



In terms of individual parties, opposition parties continue to be highly personalized around their respective leaders. Hence, institutionalizing internal democracy and conflict resolution methods is highly problematic, as seen in recent defections and expulsions from Chadema and the NCCR-Mageuzi. While improvements can be seen among some of the larger opposition parties, all parties – especially the opposition parties – continue to show substantial deficits in technical knowledge related to organizing and contesting elections. Finally, parties have generally been constrained in their abilities to train their own officials and candidates about the particularities of the offices they hold or run for, although some notable improvements appear to have been made in this area as well.

⁶ Chaligha, Amon. ‘The State of Political Parties in Tanzania’; Whitehead, Richard. ‘The Institutionalization of the Tanzanian Opposition Parties’; Whitehead, Richard. ‘Historical Legacies, Clientelism, and the Capacity to Fight.’

⁷ Tanzania Election Monitoring Committee. *The 1995 General Elections in Tanzania*; Tanzania Election Monitoring Committee. *The 2000 General Elections in Tanzania*; The Tanzania Election Monitoring Committee. *The 2005 General Elections in Tanzania*; The Tanzania Election Monitoring Committee. *The 2010 Tanzania General Elections*.

In order to properly understand the political context in Tanzania, it is vital to make note of two additional trends. The first trend – one that characterizes Tanzania’s post-independence history generally – is that when compared to other sub-Saharan countries, Tanzania’s post independence history has been rather peaceful and politically stable. Part of this stability and peace is derived from the fact that the strength of national identity in Tanzania is unmatched by nearly any other sub-Saharan case,⁸ which according to some acts as a suppressor of ethnic conflict (Mpangala 2000; Miguel 2004; Whitehead 2012).⁹ The exception to this of course can be found on Zanzibar – the archipelago that constitutes the second part of the United Republic of Tanzania. Moreover, much of the violence that stemmed from controversies surrounding the conduct of the 2010 election, the Arusha Mayoral election during the final weeks of that same year, and responses to what were seen as the misuse of state authority to quell demonstrations, illustrate the degree to which confrontations between parties and between the opposition and the state threaten to undermine this record of peace and stability. Indeed, as reported by the Tanzania Election Monitoring Committee, election violence between Chadema and the CCM in places like Mpanda, Maswa West, Arusha, Musoma, and Moshi highlight the increase in violence on the Mainland during the 2010 election.¹⁰ As we will see later in the evaluation, the interparty dialogues facilitated by the TCD have an important role to play in cooling the temperatures within the interactions between parties.

A second trend is that despite the persistence of one-party dominance in Tanzania, there have been some notable gains in the consolidation of democracy generally. When compared to constraints faced in the past, the media in Tanzania today operates in a comparatively open environment. Politically-related human rights violations are on a much smaller scale when compared to many other African countries, as is election fraud (Whitehead 2009). As demonstrated in figure 3, these gains are evident in the Freedom House data on civil liberties and political rights, where decreased scores over time indicate that Tanzania has improved at a higher rate when compared to the average for sub-Saharan Africa.¹¹ Hence, NIMD’s Tanzania programme operates in an environment where democratic reforms have some reasonable prospects for success.

It is possible that three recent developments will continue to help consolidate democracy in Tanzania. First, while the political atmosphere on Zanzibar has been historically tense and sometimes visibly violent, a 2010 referendum yielded a series of constitutional amendments that provide for a government of unity between the leading opposition party on the Isles and the CCM. It is worth noting that the TCD played a strong role in informing and mobilizing citizens around this effort. Second, and most relevant for this evaluation, President Kikwete in

⁸ Okema, *Political Culture of Tanzania*; Robinson, *National versus Ethnic Identity in Africa*.


⁹ Mpangala, *Ethnic Conflicts in the Region of the Great Lakes*; Miguel, ‘Tribe of Nation?’; Whitehead, ‘Historical Legacies, Clientelism, and the Capacity to Fight’.

¹⁰ Tanzania Election Monitoring Committee, *The 2010 Tanzania General Elections*, 125.

¹¹ Civil liberties are defined by Freedom House according to four sub-categories. These include freedom of expression and belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of law, and personal autonomy and individual rights. Political rights are defined by Freedom House according to three sub-categories. These include electoral processes, political pluralism and participation, and the functioning of government. When aggregated, political rights and civil liberties scores range from 1 (most free) to 7 (least free). See Freedom House, ‘Methodology’.

late 2010 announced that a constitutional reform process would move forward. Indeed, when considering the CCM's 20-year long unwillingness to address constitutional reform, despite objections from civil society and opposition parties, as well as recommendations from a number of government commissions, the very act of opening up this debate is a milestone in itself, and again one that the TCD was actively involved in. Third, as seen in figure 2 above, the leading opposition party, Chadema, managed to make considerable gains in the 2010 elections. As our interviews with Chadema officials indicated, campaign assistance under NIMD's bilateral component contributed to Chadema's improved election performance.

Figure 3: Freedom House ratings for Tanzania versus sub-Saharan average¹²



2.2. Significant Challenges

In relation to the political context, one question that was asked to some of the interviewees was what they saw as the most critical challenge in consolidating democracy in Tanzania.¹³ While the answers were sometimes quite lengthy and encompassed a wide array of topics, the responses can generally be broken down into three topical areas. First, six interviewees mentioned constitutional reform and one-party dominance as the most challenging issue. Among these responses, one mentioned the need to reform the constitution as a way to weaken one-party dominance, while another more specifically cited the challenges of getting a “good constitution” by preventing the CCM from controlling the entire reform process.

Another four mentioned what was often referred to as deficits in multiparty culture. John Chiligati, Deputy Secretary General of the CCM, cited that since multiparty democracy is still in its infancy, a new sense of multiparty tolerance is only now replacing the previous culture where multiparty politics meant fighting among enemies. UDP Chairman John Cheyo echoed

¹² Freedom House, ‘Freedom in the World and Historical Data’.

¹³ Time constraints did not permit us to pose this question to all the interviewees, as indeed the answers to it were generally elaborate and time-consuming.

this sentiment, where previous multiparty conflicts between “declared enemies” are only now being replaced by a culture where differences take place between friends.

Additional problems were also noted. One interviewee among the core stakeholder group mentioned the weak capacity of the opposition parties as a serious challenge to multiparty democracy today, where parties lack “human material resources” and a genuine sense of internal democracy. One of the party leaders made a plethora of different observations, some of which touched on the problems of poverty in the face of the “looting” of the state and the challenge of achieving a functioning democracy for the good of all, and the problem of having parties enter politics from a position of placing self-interest first. As we will elaborate later in the evaluation, NIMD’s Tanzania programme is highly relevant for a number of these challenges.

Current challenges to democracy in Tanzania include constitutional reform, cultivating a multiparty culture, and weak parties.

It is interesting to make note of how the various responses correspond with the various positions of the stakeholders themselves. For starters, three out of four that mentioned deficits in multiparty culture were also members of the CCM or well-known CCM supporters. It is possible that this response reflects the age-old argument for rejecting multiparty politics in the first place – namely the country was not ready for it and the opposition itself is too “childish” to handle multiparty politics.¹⁴ This observation should be juxtaposed on the fact that none of the CCM members or supporters mentioned constitutional reform as a major challenge, while the remaining stakeholders did mention this. This means that the priorities given to constitutional reform will likely diverge quite widely among those that have stake in NIMD’s Tanzania programme – a divergence that seems to reflect established power asymmetries. We should, however, also mention that these positions might change should the outcome of the 2015 election become less certain, especially for the well-established CCM status quo.

Another difference among the stakeholders was the tendency for opposition parties to place a lot of stock in the benefits from constitutional reform, while those stakeholders operating outside the party milieu viewed constitutional change as important, but not as the most pressing issue. Indeed, several interviewees mentioned poverty as the most significant challenge to democracy, and Harold Sungusia, Director of Advocacy Reforms at the LHRC, noted his apprehension about the tendency for party leaders to see constitutional reform as a “fix-all” solution, when in fact it is not. As discussed in more detail in the conclusion, this again means attaining a consensus around constitutional reform will be a difficult and time-consuming challenge, and meeting that challenge will require a concerted effort among a wide range of stakeholders.

¹⁴ Whitehead, ‘Single-Party Rule in a Multiparty Age’.

3. CROSS-PARTY VERSUS BILATERAL COMPONENTS

As pointed out earlier, there are two components in NIMD's Tanzania programme: the cross-party programme via NIMD's partnership with the TCD and the individual party programmes via NIMD's bilateral partnerships with the individual parties. This section will talk a bit about the relationship between the cross-party and the bilateral components and then move into section 4, where we will evaluate the cross-party programme. An evaluation of the bilateral component will be provided for in section 5.

The bilateral component is the older of the two, which effectively began in 2002 between NIMD and those Tanzanian parties with representation in the National Assembly.¹⁵ At the same time, the bilateral partnerships also became the conduit for NIMD's involvement in the formation of the TCD. For example, NIMD helped to facilitate a 2004 conference entitled *Enhancing the Quality of Democracy: Deepening Political Party Cooperation throughout Southern and Eastern Africa*, where party leaders discussed the prospects of achieving a multiparty milieu defined by mutual respect and tolerance.¹⁶ NIMD also facilitated a February, 2005 Mwanza conference, where five party leaders agreed on the need for a "structured platform of dialogue", thus paving the way for the opening of the TCD only six-months later.¹⁷

Operationally-speaking, the bilateral and cross-party components are managed separately, where the cross-party component is managed by the TCD and the bilateral component is managed by NIMD and the political parties. The justification for separate management is that the TCD should refrain from entering into bilateral negotiations with particular parties during a time when it is supposed to be focusing on cross-party activities, although the separate management is just as much a function of the fact that the TCD was formed after NIMD already had bilateral partnerships with the individual parties.

In reality, however, the two components do not operate in isolation from the TCD. For starters, to be eligible to receive bilateral support, parties must, among other things, also participate in the cross-party component via the TCD. Moreover, while the bilateral programmes are still managed directly by NIMD, the TCD in some sense functions as an administrative intermediary within the bilateral programme; for example, financial, final, and progress reports are sometimes submitted to NIMD via the TCD. Nevertheless, oversight and the allocation of resources within each partnership do in fact operate separately.

With some noteworthy qualifications, most of the stakeholders interviewed in this study agreed that the separate management of the bilateral component and the TCD functioned smoothly, and most believed that the separation should continue in the future. Several of the interviewees mentioned that separate management made sense when considering the differences between providing cross-party support, where activities are more generic in relation to particular parties, and bilateral support, where activities are more specific to the needs of individual parties. There was a general consensus among the party stakeholders that

¹⁵ Mallya and Rugumamu, 'Needs Assessment for the Tanzania Centre for Democracy', 14.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 10.

¹⁷ Tanzania Centre for Democracy, 'Launch Report', 17.

separate management made economic and administrative sense, where each partner could specialize in what it does best. These interviewees did not see anything to be gained by blurring the boundaries between the two components. As evaluators, we tend to agree with the stakeholders and other experts in the field that certain forms of assistance – most notably campaign assistance – is “not something that can easily be shared with competing parties”.¹⁸

For practical reasons, most stakeholders believe that cross-party activities and bilateral activities should continue to be managed separately in the future.

Perhaps the most compelling argument for maintaining two distinct components under two distinct management bodies was the risk that particular issues arising in the bilateral partnerships – unfulfilled obligations for example – might have a greater risk of spilling over into the cross-party component should both be managed under the same authority. We tend to agree that involving the TCD in decisions on whether or not to provide funding for particular parties could weaken the commitments that some of the parties have in the TCD’s activities.

In connection to the relationship between the bilateral component and the TCD, one problematic issue did turn up during our interview with the Executive Director of the TCD. As previously noted, the TCD often liaises between NIMD and the political parties. According to the director, shuffling documents between NIMD and the political parties can be stressful at times, especially when the administrative work coincides with other events that are more central to the TCD’s objectives.

4. EVALUATING THE TCD PARTNERSHIP

4.1. *The TCD*

The TCD was launched on July 5th, 2005 at a gathering that included 100 delegates from each of the parliamentary parties and another 100 guests, including representatives from NIMD and delegates from the remaining parties.¹⁹ The launching of the TCD marked the point where parties came together to voluntarily agree to cooperate to enhance, deepen, and sustain multiparty democracy by promoting “dialogue” and “mutual consultation”.

The TCD has multiple provisions for membership, two of which are important in this evaluation. On the one hand, the TCD is constituted by what are widely referred to as “full members” – i.e. those parties with representation in the National Assembly. On the other hand, “associate members” – i.e. those parties without representatives in the National Assembly – are also allowed to participate in the TCD, but to a much more limited extent. Table 1 provides a summary of the differences between the two membership forms. This table will serve as a reference point for the discussion on membership issues later in this section.

¹⁸ Canton, *Effective Party Assistance*, 14.

¹⁹ Tanzania Centre for Democracy, ‘Launch Report’, 2.

Table 1: Full members versus associate members

	Full members	Associate members
Definition	Parliamentary parties	Non-parliamentary parties
Representation in TCD?	Each party	1 rotating representative for all parties
Voting rights?	Yes	No
Participation in activities?	Yes	Yes
Qualified for bilateral support?	Yes	No

4.2. TCD Activities

When asked about specific activities, nearly all of those interviewed for this study believed that the TCD’s cross-party approach was making valuable contributions to strengthening multiparty democracy and political parties in Tanzania via interparty dialogues, stakeholder workshops and conferences, television and radio debates, and training activities. Let us now take a look at each of these activities.

Interparty dialogue

Since all TCD activities are done on a cross-party basis, the interparty dialogue component to a large extent applies to most of the TCD’s activities, including stakeholder conferences and workshops, radio and television discussions, Summit and Technical Committee meetings (see figure 4 on page 25), and even training seminars. In nearly every case, NIMD’s support through the TCD offers up the opportunity for interparty dialogue, and evaluations of other cross-party initiatives undertaken by other organizations found that interparty dialogue is widely seen as successful in reducing interparty animosities.²⁰ Our findings here reach similar conclusions. In what was consistent across all stakeholder groups, most of the praise in this evaluation was bestowed on multiparty dialogue because it offers a venue for politicians to come together and interact by discussing politically important matters. In almost every stakeholder interview, cross-party interaction through dialogue was seen as building trust between parties and undermining political tension that might otherwise result in violence. John Chiligati from the CCM commented that “the TCD has succeeded in being an institution that brings parties together to talk [...] It has led the way in creating mutual trust and cooperation [...] As a consequence, debates in parliament have become more conciliatory over the years”. John Cheyo echoes these sentiments when stating that in 1992, party leaders were “declared enemies”. Interparty dialogue has helped to create a “friendly” atmosphere.

The dialogue programme has made positive changes to multiparty democracy; it has been and will continue to be highly relevant to Tanzania’s political context.

Some of the interviewees also praised the TCD’s efforts to use the interparty dialogue approach as a means for mediating conflicts on a regional level. For example, conflicts

²⁰ Henningsen and Braathen, ‘Norwegian Party Assistance in Tanzania’.

between CUF and the CCM in Mtwara, between Chadema and the CCM in Kilimanjaro, and between the UDP and the CCM in Mwanza were fruitfully mediated by the TCD's dialogue approach. One of the interviewees felt that successes like these illustrate the importance of expanding the TCD's dialogue programme to include the regional level or lower, and was disappointed that more funding for these efforts has not been forthcoming.

It is our view that the dialogue component within the TCD's activities, along with the fruits from that dialogue, is certainly one of the reasons for why parties are committed to participating in the TCD. For example, a number of interviewees commented that the CCM liked the TCD because it promotes peace and stability – something that works to the incumbent's advantage during election times, and participates in the TCD because it demonstrates the CCM's sincerity in advancing peace and democracy. As for the opposition parties, they too like the dialogue aspects of TCD activities insofar as they promote peace and stability. It is our view, however, that participation is also tied to the individual interests of the parties themselves. For example, because opposition parties complained when the CCM started sending low-level delegates to TCD events, we get the impression that opposition parties participate in the TCD partly because it provides them with status and a chance to express their political concerns to the CCM's top brass. Moreover, one cannot ignore the incentives of the bilateral component in explaining why the parties appreciate and participate in the dialogue activities, even for the CCM. While some of the interviewees thought that the contributions through NIMD's bilateral programmes were too small to entice party participation in dialogue, it is also true that the financial situation of the parties – including the CCM – is so dire that they are willing to do what is needed for even a relatively small amount of financing.

The dialogue component was not praised by all stakeholders. One of the leaders from a smaller party believed that the dialogue programme lacks local ownership, and is instead imposed by NIMD. He also believed that interparty dialogue, as it unfolds today, is itself destructive because it helps to institutionalize a process whereby politicians engage in political discourse from positions where personal self-interests are placed above the interests of the country. As the party leader noted, this process only undermines the chances of achieving “true” democratic dialogue. At the same time, it's quite possible that his comments reflect his frustration with the associate-member status of his party. Whatever the case may be, it is important to note that he was the only interviewee that voiced staunch objection to NIMD.

With the exception of the DIPD stakeholder, the remaining donor stakeholders we spoke with – two from the UNDP, one from Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES), and one from Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS) – were a bit more apprehensive in giving their views on the TCD's dialogue programme – or any TCD programme for that matter. One interviewee from this stakeholder group simply stated that answers to questions about impact or outcome were questions for scientific research, and therefore he could not provide any comments on the TCD's activities. Some of the donors we spoke with did, however, believe the dialogue aspects of the cross-party approach to be useful, and that the TCD was “filling a crucial gap”

by acting as a dialogue facilitator. But, as we will see below, there were a number of reservations among some of the donors about other aspects of the TCD.

As mentioned previously, quite a few of the non-CCM interviews unearthed reservations about the lack of commitment the CCM has shown towards the TCD activities. In the past at least, the CCM would send officials with no decision-making authority to the Summit meetings. In paraphrasing one of the opposition interviewees, “I could have met with the Secretary General of the CCM more easily than this [junior CCM] delegate could have”. In turn, three party-based interviewees argued that the lack of adequate participation of the CCM made it difficult to come to credible agreements within the Summit because the participants could not be confident that the CCM leadership was actually on board with the Summit decisions. In fact, this has been mentioned in reference to other activities as well, where CCM officials have sometimes failed to attend workshops and seminars.

While most of the interviewees have acknowledged that the CCM has, as of recently, been sending higher-level delegates to the TCD activities, we believe it is important that the TCD and NIMD continue to monitor and, if needed, encourage meaningful CCM involvement. This is especially vital since, in our view, one of the reasons for why opposition parties participate in the TCD is that it gives them a channel to express their political concerns with the CCM. Despite some of these misgivings, however, we believe that the near universal praise across the various stakeholder groups overwhelmingly testifies to the success and relevance of the interparty dialogue in helping to diffuse some of the tensions between political actors and to facilitate a more conciliatory multiparty milieu.

At the same time, there are clear empirical examples of the limits to the dialogue thus far. Despite the election code of conduct and the dialogues in the lead up to the 2010 election, it is obvious that interparty dialogue was unable to strengthen trust in a way that prevented the rise in violence in the 2010 election. While perhaps more violence would have transpired in the absence of dialogue, the fragmented and localized nature of the violence suggests that the fruits of the dialogue programme do not trickle down to tame political conflicts at the local level. This fact is of course one the reasons for why some of the stakeholders believed that the dialogue effort needed to be strengthened at the local level. As we mention in the conclusion, the 2015 elections promise to be quite competitive, and with the help of a consultant, NIMD’s Tanzania programme should look to identify potentially troubled areas and then engage in dialogues within those areas during the party nominations and the general elections.

Stakeholder workshops, conferences, and TV and radio debates

Some of the TCD’s achievements include its ability to provide an arena for making inputs into the Elections Expenses Act and the Political Parties Act.²¹ The TCD will look to position itself in a similar way around the upcoming constitutional reform agenda. Indeed, one might argue that the December, 2010 constitutional workshop, which was organized by the TCD with NIMD support, was successful in bringing together prominent people, including the

²¹ Mallya and Rugumamu, ‘Needs Assessment for the Tanzania Centre for Democracy’; Cook, Munishi and Mutembei, ‘Deepening Democracy in Tanzania’.

Registrar of Parties, in a way that brought a critical mass of pressure to bear on the President's decision to go forward with constitutional reform. If this argument is sound, then the TCD has, to some extent at least, vindicated itself against past criticism pertaining to the organization's poor efforts to address constitutional reform.²²

Information born out from the interviews largely support the statements made in the foregoing paragraph. In the eyes of almost all interviewees across all stakeholder groups, stakeholder workshops and conferences have proven to be useful in part due to many of the positive outcomes mentioned under interparty dialogue. Furthermore, a number of the interviewees cited the positive impact that workshops have had on the Political Parties Act and Elections Expenses Act. Professor Max Mmuya labelled the workshops and conferences as "forums for fresh thinking about policies". Similar sentiments were voiced in many of the other interviews.

Stakeholder events have clearly impacted the course of legislation in the past. Likewise, TV and radio programmes have served to spread awareness about reforms.

More specific and recent benefits were also mentioned. For example, one political party interviewee mentioned that events like the January 15th, 2011 televised constitutional workshop, which was attended by hundreds of people, and more crucially the April 16th, 2011 public debate, "unified" stakeholders and opened up demands to have the Constitutional Review Bill tabled in Kiswahili – an achievement that is clearly necessary for instilling broader participation in the constitutional reform process. Another political party interviewee commented that the workshop entitled *Healing the Wounds of the 2010 General Election*, which was held on May 5th, 2011 and was attended by representatives from political parties in Tanzania and Uganda, allowed participants to "talk in a more civilized way" about the problems of recent elections. In our view, comments like these should be taken as justification for continuing – or ramping up – similar stakeholder workshops as the constitutional reform process heats up and the 2015 election approaches.

The TCD has also held a seemingly countless number of television and radio debates over the years. For example, television and radio programmes on the democratic principles of political campaigns and the benefits of voting were held in the weeks before the 2010 election, while a televised civic engagement programme was held during the day of the election. Moreover, radio and newspapers were also utilized as a way to ensure the dissemination of codes of conduct, a summary of a section from the Elections Act, and information on how to contact regional police commanders in the event of open conflict and violence. Harold Sungusia, who served as a resource person for the TCD, commented that in the absence of a government institution with the responsibility for civic education, the TCD's programme generally, and their television and radio campaigns in particular, were valuable and relevant sources for civic engagement around political issues. Hebron Mwakagenda, another resource person interviewed for this evaluation, echoed Sungusia's comments. Both believed that the live, televised debates where viewers could call in played a vital role in building critical awareness

²² See Cook, Munishi and Mutembei, 'Deepening Democracy in Tanzania'.

around constitutional reform. By helping to inform the public, both also believed that similar debates should be an integral part in the reform process to come, and we concur with their views.

At the same time, it was surprising to find that amid the television and radio programmes, and relatively publicized stakeholder workshops and conferences, some of the interviewees believed that the public face of the TCD was somewhat weak. Some of the interviewees went on to note the negative impact that the TCD's weak public face has on its ability to broaden its network with other organizations. To be sure, one secondary stakeholder believed that the lack of a public face was a reason for why the TCD is sometimes not invited to other civil society functions, although one of the primary stakeholders mentioned the lack of trust that civil society has in political parties as the main reason for this. Stefan Reith, director of the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung office in Tanzania, commented that it was difficult to see what the TCD was actually up to, and agreed that this was because the TCD seemed to lack a public profile, despite its sponsorship for television and radio programmes. From his vantage point, he did not see the role that the TCD was playing in the constitutional reform process. In short, it appears that, outside of the stakeholders that participate in TCD events, few people actually know about what the TCD is up to. Therefore, the TCD should perhaps examine ways to thoroughly communicate its role in organizing and sponsoring events, possibly through more extensive media advertisements and invitations or communications to a broader array of stakeholders.

Cross-party training

The TCD engages in a wide variety of cross-party training workshops in areas like campaign strategies, media relations, mobilization and management, women and youth, and more. Consistent with findings made by other evaluations of similarly-styled training programmes,²³ cross-party training under the TCD was viewed by the interviewees as highly useful – both in terms of improving the relations between party members and imparting knowledge about important political topics. Quite a few interviewees commented on the value that councillor training has had in helping to “empower” or “strengthen” the ability of local councillors to do their jobs. Based on the number of comments, we suspect that councillor training is one of the more useful training programmes, although some of these comments reflected councillor training under the bilateral partnerships.

Two party-based interviewees also mentioned a 2010 workshop on that intended to improve the financial management of the parties. According to the responses from both interviewees, the workshop was highly relevant insofar as it included a variety of practical and easy to implement information on accounting and budgeting. Another party-based interviewee made similar comments about a training seminar on election manifestos. Hebron Mwakagenda, who helped design youth and women training seminars in the past, commented on the potential value of training women and youth in campaign strategies, and believed it was important to ramp up these activities as the 2015 elections approached. Lupa Ramahadi, another resource

²³ Henningsen and Braathen, ‘Norwegian Party Assistance in Tanzania’.

person interviewed for this evaluation, talked extensively about two cross-party training courses he conducted – one on party ideology and one on conflict resolution. Both courses were extremely interactive, where the trainees were able to learn something new about the importance of ideology and resolving conflicts peacefully and how to differentiate party platforms and engage in conflict resolution. At the same time, the trainer was also able to obtain information on the limitations of conflict resolution within the parties and the practical challenges in articulating party ideologies.

At the same time, cross-party training clearly had a number of shortcomings, two of which were most widely referenced among the interviewees. First, some of the participants were either not purely interested in the training programmes or not trainee material. As one of the interviewed resource persons recounted his experience in a training seminar, “there was one group that was clearly more knowledgeable and active. They knew why they came. Another group was less conversant and did not take the time to read [the material]. Some did not even know their [party’s] constitution”. He went on to explain that, in some cases, attendees would “abduct” the sessions when trying to use them as platforms for venting political anger. Others drew attention to the fact that some of the trainees in the cross-party programmes were simply ill-equipped to benefit. One primary stakeholder interviewee, for example, commented that parties sometimes send folks who are “unknown” and lack the educational background to digest the training material, a fact that was also widely mentioned in the previous DDTP evaluation. The interviewee suggested a need to devise a mechanism for holding parties accountable for the people they send to the training seminars, although we would like to point out that most of the trainees appeared to be genuinely interested in the training and capable of using it; misuse of the seminars seems to be rather marginal.

While cross-party training appears to have had some clear shortcomings, we believe that most of the training programmes have been highly relevant and somewhat successful in strengthening the competencies of party and public officials. Based on our own longitudinal perspectives, the party officials we have spoken with over the years

While cross-party training has had some clear shortcomings, we believe they are highly relevant for strengthening the competencies of party and public officials.

appear to have an improved ability to talk about party management issues and articulate party platforms in ways that illustrate some sense of ideological distinctiveness, although it is difficult to say with any certainty what the cause of the improvements might be. At the same time, parties are still weak with respect to internal democracy – to the extent that, in the realities of how parties operate, it appears that training with the goal of advancing internal party democracy has had very little impact. Moreover, election campaigns today are still remarkably devoid of issues that connect to a broader sense of ideology, and are instead focused on catchall promises and personalities.

4.3. Capacity and Sustainability

Sustainability and capacity were major issues raised in past evaluations of the TCD, and both issues continue to be serious challenges for the TCD today. The consultants for the DDTP evaluation, for example, found that the TCD had little in the way of resources for sustaining itself in the future. The TCD had a mandate that exceeded its implementation capacity. The TCD lacked a “competent staff to facilitate the interparty dialogues and capacity-building process” and “lacked the capacity to mobilize resources and absorb funding”. Overall, the TCD component of the DDTP “was not managed very well”, although some of this was the result of delays in funding.²⁴ Mallya and Rugumanu pointed out that inadequate funding means that the TCD “has failed to execute some of its critical capacity-building activities for political parties, failed to mobilize resources, failed to acquire adequate office space, failed to purchase office vehicles and other equipment, and postponed the recruitment of approved professional and support staff”. The TCD also experienced significant delays in establishing a resource centre and an office building in part due to delays in the release of government commitments.²⁵

Table 2: TCD’s 2011 budget

Category	Amount in Euro
Multiparty political system strengthened	108,005
Political parties institutionalized	8,581
Relations between parties and civil society	12,144
Strategic networks expanded	42,050
Institutional capacity	129,220
TOTAL	300,000

In recent years, about 60 per cent of NIMD’s funding for the TCD has gone to institutional activities,²⁶ while the remainder has gone to activities related to the TCD’s core programmes. These percentages are consistent with the 2011 budget data provided in table 3 above. Likewise, a significant portion of the money given by other donors also goes to support the TCD as an institution. While the proportion of the money spent is quite high relative to programmatic expenditures, stakeholder interviews and our visits to the TCD revealed that this funding has helped to improve upon some of those issues raised in the previous evaluations. There has been an increase in material and human infrastructure in the form of a new and spacious office building and additional staff, including a programme officer, finance officer, and three support staff (see figure 4 below). In contrast to the findings from Mallya and Rugumanu’s 2007 study, the TCD now communicates regularly over email and has an established website, although its frequent “coming soon” messages and lack of Kiswahili content limits its value. The TCD has managed to secure an amazing 23 computers, 5 printers, 8 receivers, and 2 copiers – all of which are useful when parties use the TCD as a resource centre for copying, printing, and accessing the internet. The pastel accounting system has


²⁴ Cook, Munishi and Mutembe, ‘Deepening Democracy in Tanzania’.

²⁵ Mallya and Rugumamu, ‘Needs Assessment for the Tanzania Centre for Democracy’.

²⁶ This includes expenses for institutional capacity and strategic networks. In the TCD’s 2011 annual plan, the total amount spend on institutional activities was €171,270 versus €128,730 for the remaining activities.

been installed, and arrangements are currently underway to train the finance officer. PME training for the programme officer is expected to take place in 2012. And comments made by NIMD’s Tanzania programme officer in 2010 noted that the TCD’s annual plan for that year was “the best ever received from the TCD, both the narrative and the planning frame”.

Figure 4: TCD organizational composition



Most notably, the TCD has now reached a memorandum of understanding with the Registrar of Political Parties on the terms of government funding for the TCD, which is without a doubt a significant step in a more capable and sustainable direction. Moreover, a number of interviewees made it clear that the TCD was very “active” and “committed” vis-à-vis its objectives and activities. Most remarkably, the TCD seems to have a high level of respect from nearly all the opposition parties, and is able to enlist their participation and, at times, assistance in programmatic and technical matters.

Yet, it is clear that the TCD still has some substantial issues in terms of capacity and sustainability. For starters, while the TCD has managed to secure a new and spacious office building, our tour of the building also revealed that an overwhelming shortage in staff meant that some of the office space, along with quite a few of the computers, was simply not being utilized. In short, the physical infrastructure is there, but the human infrastructure is still wholly lacking by comparison.

Secondly, there is a notable absence in the capacity of the TCD to develop its own proposals independent of NIMD. Peter Kuga Mziray, founder of the APPT-Maendeleo, talked extensively and thoughtfully about the need for TCD to have the internal capacity to develop programmes and proposals for project funding. Professor Max Mmuya echoed these sentiments when stating that the TCD needs “sharp minds” who can engage in “programme development”. Some of the party-based interviews revealed that the capacity of the secretariat

is “still very inadequate”, which sometimes undermined the level of preparation for the activities, led to confusion about timetables and venues, and resulted in failures to adequately inform all relevant and potential participants about TCD-organized events. In some cases, members of the technical committee have had to help to support the work of the secretariat. One of the interviewees commented that the TCD management itself was weak on vision and planning and, at the very least, needed to be supported by a highly competent programme officer with the ability to draft projects and grant proposals.

At its current state, the TCD simply lacks the capacity to develop its own proposals independent of NIMD. The weak capacity of the TCD secretariat sometimes impacts its ability to implement activities effectively.

These comments do not bode well for the sustainability of the TCD if finances from NIMD cease without another source of funding to fill the void: At the very least, the TCD’s current capacity would be reduced. Our CUF interviewee reflected on the matter by referring to the “dangerous times” – with the constitutional reform and the uncertainty within the CCM around the next election. But, it will be “impossible” for the TCD to hold discussions around the reform or play a significant role in the 2015 election in the face of diminished funding. Dr. Slaa from Chadema convincingly argued that the cessation of funding from NIMD without a replacement will “undermine the credibility of the TCD in the eyes of the government”, who is just now finally coming to terms with providing financing to the TCD. One of the more dire forecasts was described by an associate member, who claimed that should NIMD funding stop, “the TCD will collapse on the very same day”. As table 3 indicates, NIMD funding constitutes some 35.8 per cent of the TCD’s budget. A cut of this size will undoubtedly mean that TCD activities will, at the very least, have to be drastically reduced.

If NIMD funding is discontinued and another partnership is not established, the capacity of the TCD to carry out its existing commitments will be greatly compromised.

Table 3: TCD 2012 budget according to source

Source	Amount in Euro
NIMD	200,000
Government	288,955
DIPD*	50,000
Political Parties	3,000
Centre Party of Norway	23,312
TOTAL	565,267

*Funding still tentative

The data in table 3 also point to an additional problem. As they stand, the proportion of TCD funding derived from the government subvention is about 51 per cent of the TCD’s total budget. All other things being equal, the removal of NIMD’s funding would raise that ratio to roughly 79 per cent. While securing the government subvention is certainly a big win for the TCD, especially in light of the fact that the subvention was pushed by a unified effort of all

the parties, and while all of the core institutional costs are still covered by NIMD and DIPD, we find that such a strong reliance on the government subvention raises serious questions about the real and perceived leverage that the government, and especially the Registrar of Political Parties, has over the TCD. In terms of perception, a strong reliance on a government subvention may raise doubts about the political neutrality of the TCD, just as the subventions to parties have raised questions about the true political loyalties of the opposition. Despite the recent MoU between the TCD and the Registrar of Political Parties, questions of real leverage are especially crucial in one-party dominant contexts, where incumbent parties maintain tenure by bending the rules and exploiting access to state resources as ways to neutralize potentially challenging organizations or individuals.²⁷ In light of this, one should perhaps ask a counterfactual: Could we expect the TCD to remain a critical advocate for democracy if doing so challenged the incumbent party, and in turn jeopardized 50 per cent of the TCD's budget? If the answer to this question is no, then what would the implications be for the role of the TCD and why would opposition parties continue to take it seriously?

4.5. Strategic networks, cooperation, and financing

Considering the possible changes in funding from NIMD, expanding strategic networks to find new ways of meeting financial needs and objectives will be decisive for the future survival of the TCD (see Annex for additional information strategic networks for NIMD). In the past, the TCD submitted funding proposals to UNDEF, PACT Tanzania (USAID funded), ESP, and others, all of which were unsuccessful. The TCD's 2011-2015 plan mentions new cooperation and links with state and non-state actors, and organizations like NED, Pact Tanzania, UNFEM, etc. The 2012 plan mentions IDEA and the Christian Democratic International Centre (KIC) in Sweden, and mention was made of ongoing discussions with IDEA around some funding for constitutional and local democracy initiatives, although the TCD's role in these initiatives would be limited to areas of project management. As part of the constitutional reform effort, NIMD's 2012 plan also mentions that International IDEA will provide much needed support and advice to the TCD on gender issues. The Association of European Parliamentarians (AWEPA) has also expressed interest. Finally, there is also the possibility of the TCD partnering with the Danish Institute for Parties and Democracy (DIPD). At the same time, however, most of these remain as possibilities, and it is unclear on the extent to which some of them will entail budget support for TCD activities generally.

What is clear is the presence of a plethora of existing programmes and organizations that are currently operating in some areas that overlap with specific activities outlined in the TCD's strategic plan for 2012 to 2015. These programmes and organizations offer up some potential sources for cooperation with and expertise from democracy-promoting institutions, but the TCD also needs the ability and drive to successfully connect with them. Indeed, the TCD has partnered with Haki Elimu and TAMWA to jointly fund broadcasts of discussions on the constitution, and currently works with the Norwegian Centre Party in a new student training programme in Mtwara. However, additional opportunities exist and, in our view, the TCD networking efforts have been rather light. For example, by working with teacher

²⁷ See Whitehead, 'Africa's Parties and the Role of Political Party Assistance'.

organizations, KAS is currently steering a non-partisan programme that seeks to advance teacher and student awareness about the constitutional reform with the aim of empowering them to meaningfully participate in the reform process. This programme might be especially relevant for the TCD target of “designing and implementing an effective but affordable” civic education programme with the ability to reach ordinary citizens. Similarly, the FES has years of legal experience in topics like media freedoms and information rights, and could be an important source for dealing with technical or niche aspects of the constitutional reform. The United Nations Democracy Fund (UNDEF) allows organizations to apply for funding for particular projects, most notably in the areas of dialogue and constitutional reform, and civic education and voter registration – each of which is highly relevant for the TCD’s activities.

While no other organization engages in cross-party activities as broadly and systematically at the TCD, there are a number of organizations that specifically engage in activities on a cross-party level. The NDI’s Regional Youth Political Leadership Academy (RYPLA), for example, used to operate at the East Africa level, where participants were nominated by their respective parties. The KIC, who also takes a cross-party approach to training youth, is currently looking for a partner to help fill the void left by the NDI’s departure. Relatedly, the Hanns Seidel Foundation operates a *Women Ward Councillor Training Programme* on a cross-party basis. As mentioned earlier, the DIPD, which takes on both bilateral and cross-party modalities, has expressed an interest in working with the TCD, and NIMD and the TCD need be proactive in securing this partnership. Last but not least, the United Nations Development Assistance Plan (UNDAP) provides support for strengthening the internal democracy of Tanzania’s parties and interparty dialogue around development issues. It is important to note that the UNDAP will be working with the Political Parties Advisory Council, which is currently under the Registrar of Parties.²⁸

Each of these organizations clearly has a wealth of expertise in areas that are relevant to the TCD’s upcoming strategic plan, especially in relation to training women and young people in contesting the 2015 election, and NIMD and the TCD should make concerted efforts to reach out to them. In an effort to help identify potential resources, the TCD and NIMD might also want to ask member parties to report on which organizations and activities they are currently engaged in. Another possibility is for the TCD to hold an annual conference for political party assistance providers as a means for the TCD to stay informed about the latest developments in the area of political party assistance, as well as a means for networking and raising the profile of the TCD itself.

²⁸ The Political Parties Advisory Council, or *Baraza la Ushauri wa Vyama vya Siasa*, is a statutory organization composed of all political parties. The council’s role is to advise and inform the Registrar on matters related to political parties and election conduct. According to one interviewee, the Council meetings are often not taken seriously by the political parties, who generally send lower-order delegates to the meetings. At the same time, the interviewee also expressed his concern that the council could be a threat to the TCD given. After all, the council is a statutory body, the Registrar has demonstrated his intent on exerting control over the TCD, and there are questions raised about the logic of providing a subvention to the TCD in addition to the council.

4.6. Remaining Issues

With respect to the TCD, two other issues came up during the interviews. First is the possibility that some see the TCD as an affiliate of the CCM. Indeed, since the onset of multiparty politics, a variety of organizations, including some of the opposition party leaders, have been accused or suspected of having ties to the CCM, and it is possible, and perhaps natural, that some see the TCD in this light. Stefan Reith mentioned that during the times when the TCD Summit was chaired by the CCM, opposition parties sometimes talked about the TCD as being an affiliate of the CCM, although he was not sure if these views were still prevalent. While it is difficult to say how widespread this view might be without additional exploration, it is clear that the inability of the TCD to manage its public face will make it more susceptible to these claims.

Second, the nature of the TCD's membership arrangements is one of the principle sticking points and sources of division among the political parties. As pointed out previously and illustrated in table 1, the TCD's Constitution, which was agreed to by all members during the founding of the TCD, provides for two memberships grades: full members and associate members. On one side, there are those – mostly leaders from the larger opposition parties – who are fine with the current membership arrangement. Some believe that the associate membership provision is quite fair, and they object to including smaller parties as full members. Most objections centre on the perceived lack of seriousness among the smaller parties, which, according to two interviewees, have the tendency to “bicker” amongst themselves and “make a mess of things”.

At the same time, most of the stakeholders – namely those from the CCM, the smaller parties, and all the secondary stakeholders – clearly favoured including the smaller parties as full TCD members. According to one interviewee, some of the leaders of the smaller parties “demonstrate the courage to speak out” and they “need to be listened to”. Interviewees from the smaller parties in particular complained about the need to have their councillors trained. According to the interviewees, however, while training workshops often include numerous trainees from each of the parties with full membership status, the workshops sometimes allow space for only one trainee from all the associate members combined.

The divisions among the primary stakeholders around the issue of membership status largely reflect the organizational interests of the political parties themselves and help point to some suggestions. For parties like Chadema and the UDP, allowing smaller parties in as full members introduces greater complications and the need to share resources with a larger number. Moreover, full membership is seen by the larger opposition parties as a type of “graduation” and the mark of “seriousness” that provides the larger parties with a sense of status, which is one of the reasons for why they take the TCD seriously. For the CCM on the other hand, allowing smaller parties to participate as full members is probably a tactical manoeuvre that would help to fragment their opponents. As one interviewee commented in reference to the CCM's position, “the more the merrier”. We therefore suggest that if the priority of NIMD's cross-party approach is maintaining commitment to the TCD among the larger parties, then expanding the basis for full membership is probably not advisable. In our view, doing so would likely undermine the sense of privilege that comes with full

membership, where the larger opposition parties might respond by sending lower-level delegates to the TCD. We also feel that expanding full membership will complicate the TCD's activities and add greater stress on the TCD's resources. At the same time, the exclusivity of representation within the TCD risks undermining the credibility of organization's democracy focus and misses the chance to enlist some of the smaller parties as advocates for the organization. It is also important to note that one of the sticking points in the disbursement of government funds to the TCD was the Registrar's demand for the TCD to allow parties with councillors to participate as full members within the TCD – a point that was interpreted by some, including those within the CCM, as the Registrar's attempt to exert control over the TCD. While the recent MoU between the Registrar and the TCD on government funding did not include this issue, it is possible that the issue of associate member status may come up again in future negotiations over government funds.

5. EVALUATING THE BILATERAL PARTNERSHIPS

5.1. The Bilateral Partnerships

Bilateral partnerships between NIMD and the parties officially began in 2002. Whereas the cross-party component is more focused on strengthening the multiparty system, bilateral support is more focused on the institutionalization of the individual parties. In line with NIMD's objectives, NIMD supports a variety of bilateral activities. Most notably, budget support goes to building organizational capacities and individual competencies through training seminars and workshops for local party leaders, councillors, publicity secretaries, political activists, campaign managers, and women and youth on topics like party structures, party history, policy issues, and manifesto development; political party management and internal democracy; training of trainers (TOT); training in campaign management; and civil and political rights and good governance. Support also goes to organizing panels of experts to assess programme impacts and helps to draft strategic plans, to print party documents, and to support the drafting of new party constitutions.

The bilateral activities are managed according to three intervention logics, two of which were widely commented on during the interviews. First “partnership, ownership, and inclusivity”, which strives to facilitate change by garnering commitments and initiatives from the political parties, means that political parties themselves are responsible for drafting strategic plans and requesting funds for activities that can be justified by those plans. Based on the interviews, this intervention logic functions quite smoothly, especially in relation to “partnership” and “ownership. Dr. Slaa from Chadema, for example, described the relationship between NIMD and the parties as “highly unique” when compared to the relationships that parties had with other partners. He felt that NIMD offered up a “real partnership”, where the parties would draw up the plans that NIMD would fund. Shaweji M. Mketo from CUF stated that the NIMD-CUF partnership allows enough space for “us to implement our vision” (1206). He too cast the question of ownership in a comparative light, where “other donors run the training

programmes” while NIMD allows “us to run it”. John Chiligati of the CCM described NIMD as a “facilitator” and a “partner, not an owner”.

The second widely-referenced logic is “performance-based financial support”, where parties are given support when they demonstrate that their activities are consistent with their strategic plans and NIMD’s mandate. Based on appraisal reports, it is clear that some parties, including the largest ones, have had outstanding issues with regards to reporting outcomes and audits, with the quality of the reports, and with the lack of clarity around some cost estimates.

NIMD’s “partnership” and “ownership” logics were generally well-received by the interviewees, especially when they compared NIMD’s approach with relationships their parties had with other similar organizations.

Although more recent appraisals appear to capture improvements in these areas,²⁹ there continues to be some serious reporting issues among some of the smaller parties, most notably the TLP.³⁰ While some of the interviewees acknowledged the continual need for improving the quality of the reports, most felt that monitoring and support has already helped to make improvements in a variety of other areas. Dr. Slaa, for example, commented that NIMD’s method of programme monitoring has “helped them and us” to ensure that resources are used in the most efficacious way, and several other party officials made similar comments. One interviewee specifically noted that once funding was disbursed only after parties drafted detailed plans on how their activities fit within their overall strategic plans, the quality of the programmes born out of the bilateral partnerships improved.

Funding under the bilateral programme is allocated according to three variables: 50 per cent is given in equal distribution to each party, another 30 per cent is given based upon the number of parliamentary seats, and 20 per cent is given based on the percentage of votes collected in the previous election. Based up this formula, the total disbursements to the political parties for 2011 are given in table 4 below.

Table 4: NIMD’s 2011 bilateral allocations to each party

Party	Amount in Euro
CCM	40,745
Chadema	16,673
CUF	12,582
NCCR-Mageuzi	10,000
UDP	10,000
TLP	10,000
TOTAL	100,000

²⁹ This is based on an analysis of NIMD’s party appraisal reports between 2007 and 2011.

³⁰ See NIMD’s 2011 appraisal of the TLP.

5.2. *Bilateral Activities*

The activities undertaken within the bilateral partnerships are largely focused on strengthening party institutionalization, and the bulk of the specific activities consist of training seminars. Given its sheer organizational breadth and depth, the CCM is most able to demonstrate the successful implementation of training seminars throughout the country, although Chadema is considered by NIMD as a “strong bilateral partner with a good track record in terms of return on investment as well as reporting”.³¹ In the past, however, CUF posed as one of NIMD’s most significant challenges due to its lack of presence on and identification with the Mainland, as well as some of its stances on women – stances that were described as incommensurable with NIMD’s values.³² The TLP too has suffered from a “lack of political skills...and civic education among their leaders, members, and staff”, as well as a distinct lack of “internal party democracy”.³³

One positive indicator taken from the desk review is that the individual bilateral programmes appear to adequately reflect each party’s unique strengths and weaknesses. For example, while training programmes within the UDP and TLP appear to centre on issues of internal party governance – to which both parties are clearly lacking, programmes within the more institutionalized Chadema appear to increasingly consist of campaigning and election management.³⁴ At the same time, it appears that the bilateral programmes could benefit from a dose of uniformity, most notably in an effort to solve problems of making comparative party assessments based on plans that lack a uniform planning format.

Training activities were by far the most widely mentioned activity. Training programmes focus on strengthening partner capacities by training in topics like financial administration, strategic planning, the use of ICT, and other programmes requested by the bilateral partners. All interviewees valued training activities. The most commonly-mentioned among them was the councillor training, which, according to UDP’s John Cheyo, inspired “confidence-building” and “knowledge” of how to work as a councillor. In reference workshop topics like mobilizing, organizing, and campaigning, Cheyo spoke at length about being able to reach out to new constituencies, as demonstrated in the party’s gains in councillorship seats in Mtwara, Lindi, and Morogoro. Dr. Slaa too felt that bilateral support in helping to train local-level party leaders in campaign management was helpful in allowing Chadema to broaden its reach into new areas of the country. Another interviewee commented that by increasing the Chadema’s campaigning capacity, the bilateral support was instrumental in helping the party to establish some sizable electoral gains in the 2010 election. In a one-party dominant context like Tanzania, a sizable election gain by an opposition party is indeed a sizable milestone for strengthening multiparty competition.

When compared to some of the serious issues uncovered by evaluations elsewhere, the problems uncovered within the training seminars under NIMD’s bilateral programme were

³¹ Extract from NIMD’s 2007 appraisal of Chadema.

³² See NIMD’s 2007 and 2008 appraisals of CUF.

³³ See NIMD’s 2007 appraisal of the TLP.

³⁴ See NIMD’s 2010 Evaluation of the bilateral plans.

comparatively small.³⁵ One of the interviewees felt that while trainers sometimes listened to the views of the trainees, the programmes were overall too “top-down” in nature, where the trainers would simply educate on topics like ideology or campaign management without seeking knowledge about the experiences of the trainees. In a few cases, interviewees mentioned problems that were similar to those identified in the cross-party training. Shaweji M. Mketto from CUF commented that in a small number of cases, participants seemed to attend for no other reason than to extract a monetary reward. Indeed, using workshops and training seminars as a means to extract some sort of personal monetary benefit is a widely-cited problem in evaluations made of other programmes operating in Tanzania and elsewhere.³⁶ In other examples, party trainees were reported to have lacked the educational experience that could permit them to digest the training materials.

On a more serious note, in the face of workshops and training seminars – whether cross-party or within each party – that are supposed to enhance intra-party conflict resolution with the hope of institutionalizing internal party democracy, all parties, and especially the opposition ones, still suffer from highly turbulent power struggles and/or the problem of having incontestable leaders. In a series of critical statements, one of the interviewees cited that weaknesses in internal democracy are exemplified by the expulsion of dissenting party members, by the fact that few of the smaller parties are looking to recruit folks with fresh ideas, and by the level of personal control that centres on the top two positions in the parties. He even cites a case where the secretary general and the chairmen of one of the smaller parties are occupied by a wife and husband team, respectively. Similar comments were mentioned by nearly all the secondary stakeholders.

Despite workshops and training seminars that are supposed to enhance intra-party conflict resolution and democracy, all parties, and especially the opposition ones, still suffer from highly turbulent power struggles and/or the problem of having seemingly incontestable leaders

Indeed, finding the political will for instituting more inclusive decision-making procedures within highly personalized parties remains as a daunting challenge for training seminars and workshops, a fact that has been widely noted by a number of experts in the field.³⁷ This is complicated by the difficulties in identifying specific outcomes that are measurable, thus undermining the ability to see progress in a more democratic and institutionalized direction. Both the lack of education among trainees and the lack of internal democracy are systemic features that are truly difficult – maybe impossible – to address through party training alone. While the level of education among trainees could be controlled for by more careful screening or by sectioning the training seminars, it is likely that changing the realities of internal party decision-making and power structures can only be done when a critical mass of members

³⁵ See for example NORAD, ‘Evaluation of the Norwegian Centre for Democracy’; USAID, ‘A Study of Political Party Assistance in Eastern Europe and Eurasia’.

³⁶ See for example NORAD, ‘Evaluation of the Norwegian Centre for Democracy’; Henningsen and Braathen, ‘Norwegian Party Assistance in Tanzania’.

³⁷ See for example Carothers, ‘Confronting the Weakest Link’; Erdmann, ‘Political Party Assistance and Political Party Research’.

begin to expect their party leaders to behave democratically and according to party constitutions. In our view, this will not only require training for current and future party leaders, but also broader efforts at civic education and, perhaps, enlisting the pressures from civil society.

6. STRENGTHENING TIES BETWEEN CIVIL AND POLITICAL SOCIETY

One point that has yet to be mentioned is NIMD's objective of enhancing the relationship between political parties and civil society – an objective that applies to both the bilateral and cross-party components. Indeed, in light of the previous comments about the need for democratizing internal party power structures, strengthening the ties between civil and political society might help to generate the counterweight that could truly inspire change within parties, and within politics generally. However, this evaluation only has a few comments with respect to this objective, in part because strengthening dialogue and party institutionalization have, and in our view rightfully, been emphasized by NIMD's Tanzania programme as more important than strengthening the connections between political and civil society. Moreover, there is very little evidence that relations between political and civil society have improved over the years. In short, there's not much that can be said about the progress in this area.

One reason for the weak ties between civil and political society is the continued lack of trust and confidence that civil society organizations have in political parties, a comment that was made at least four of the interviews. At the same time, the connection between the two societies is a legal and political matter, and we are surprised to see past evaluations overlook this point. In accordance with the Non-Governmental Organizations Act, civil society organizations are legally proscribed from engaging in activities that are deemed to be political in nature.³⁸ Moreover, the government has periodically demonstrated a broad definition of what might be deemed as "political" in nature, and has shown its disposition to de-reregister or threaten to do so those organizations that engage in activities which fit that definition. Previous research found this to be one of the key reasons for why civil society organizations in Tanzania refrain from working with political parties in the first place.³⁹ Indeed, legally and politically-speaking, it would be risky for civil society organizations to associate with parties who are always bashing the government.

At the same time, the bridge between political and civil society is a critical element in deepening democracy, and given the objective of strengthening this connection, mobilizing to reform the NGO Act seems to be the only logical course of action to take at this time. For example, such a topic could serve as a workshop or conference topic – one organized by the TCD as the constitutional reform milieu heats up. This would not only help to facilitate legal changes, but might also strengthen the greatly needed strategic networks between the TCD and civil society. This point will be taken up in more detail under the recommendations.

³⁸ Makaramba, 'The Legal Context for the Non-for-Profit Sector in Tanzania'.

³⁹ Whitehead, 'The Institutionalization of the Tanzanian Opposition Parties'.

7. KEY RECOMMENDATIONS

We find NIMD's programme to be highly relevant to Tanzania's current context and well received by nearly all the interviewees in this evaluation, although secondary stakeholders were generally more sceptical towards the achievements made by NIMD's Tanzania programme. This suggests that some of the positive comments made by the core stakeholders may partly reflect their vested interests in portraying NIMD's Tanzania programme in a positive light. Nevertheless, there was an overall consensus that the interparty dialogues, along with the conferences and television and radio programmes, were relevant and made some impressive achievements in facilitating interparty trust and bringing public pressure to bear on key political issues. In light these findings, we believe that bilateral support and support for the TCD should continue, although we also believe that six key recommendations are in order. These recommendations should be understood within the context of an overarching recommendation: NIMD's Tanzania programme should be conservative by strictly improving on those activities that have already paid dividends, reducing those activities that have not, and avoiding new types of activities that lie outside current programme experiences and competences.

Refocus activities towards constitutional reform and the 2015 election

Key issues in the current and future political context include constitutional reform and the 2015 election. However, the TCD's 2012-2015 multiannual plan enlists a lot of resources on issues that seem unrelated to either of these two monumental issues, although the plan does not specify if these are specifically-funded programmes from donors outside the TCD-NIMD partnership. Examples include introducing and implementing a parliamentary scorecard, empowering citizens to track government budgets, conducting a survey on the perceptions of the achievements of the Constituency Development Funds, and supporting public hearings on the performance of the Parliament and Councils. While each of these issues is important, each also seems quite distant from the priorities taken from the current and emerging political context, not to mention the realities of the TCD's resource constraints.

While a new constitution will not fix Tanzania's political problems, if the process of reform is done properly, the product of that process will help to legitimate the outcomes of multiparty competition in the future and perhaps help to level the playing field. However, ensuring a smooth, transparent, and inclusive reform process will be a daunting challenge and one that the TCD and the political parties cannot hope to confront in isolation or by engaging in activities that extend beyond their resource bases. In conjunction with a consultant, the TCD and NIMD should, first and foremost, devise a specific strategy for how it will continue to involve itself in the constitutional reform process and then look to allocate NIMD funding into that involvement – even if that means scratching some of the issues that are less clearly related to constitutional reform. To the best of our knowledge, no such strategy exists outside the specifics outlined in the annual and multiannual plans. Moreover, and in light of this strategy and the TCD's limited resources, the TCD should use the constitutional reform as an opportunity to broaden its networks with civil society and other donors, especially some of the party-based donors mentioned earlier, as a way to create coherence around reform and to

further develop the TCD's strategic networks. Finally, while continuing to hold workshops and conferences around constitutional reform will be vital in this process, there will need to be a sufficient level of public sensitization that, in our view, is best played out on the radio rather than television and some of the other methods mentioned in the 2012-2015 multiannual plan. For example, it is unclear how allocating resources for drafting a book on lessons learned from the reform is really a relevant communication channel for getting reform passed. After all, radio is still the primary source of information for most Tanzanians, and the TCD's programme should reflect that fact. Bilateral activities too could include efforts to sensitize and inform party cadre about the constitutional reform, who in turn might convey this knowledge during their interactions with other citizens.

In our view, the election of 2015 will be one of the most critical elections in Tanzania's recent multiparty experience. For starters, the CCM will be nominating a new candidate, and as was demonstrated in the 2005 election, internal nominations within the CCM can be incredibly turbulent affairs. Secondly, in light of the CCM's need to nominate a new candidate, and in light of Chadema's remarkable gains in the 2010 election, not to mention the possibility of a new constitution, the 2015 election is perhaps the biggest opening that the opposition has had in ending the CCM's tenure. An increased level of insecurity around tenure might also mean greater apprehension about the security of political careers, which in turn might translate into an increased risk of electoral violence.

Given the possible uniqueness of this election, along with the high-stakes nature of the constitutional reform, we strongly recommend giving a high priority to issues of conflict prevention for 2012 to 2015 – during a time when the constitutional reform will be at its peak, when the parties will be engaging in their internal nominations, and when the general elections will be held. We strongly recommend the development and implementation of a robust early warning system. We also recommend taking the dialogue programme to the local level. Interviewees, for example, clearly valued the Healing the Wounds conference, and we suggest holding similar conferences prior to elections, but in areas that are prone to conflict. The TCD might want to hire a consultant to help identify these areas.

Rethink the approach taken towards bridging civil and political society

As mentioned previously, the NGO Act explicitly prohibits civil society organizations from engaging in political activity and gives the state rather broad latitude to define what constitutes a political act. We therefore find it problematic that, in the 2012 budget, NIMD provides the TCD with some 11 thousand Euros to fund activities that make no mention of this act. If improving relations between parties and civil society is to be taken seriously, then NIMD-funded activities should first seek to address the NGO Act. After all, NIMD funding for the TCD was successful in shaping the Elections Expenses Act and the Political Parties Act, and there is no reason to assume that the same successes could not be obtained with respect to the NGO Act.

Relevant TCD activities might contain conferences and workshops on the particulars of the NGO Act and the ways in which the act might be changed. Both bilateral and TCD funding

could also be allocated towards training some key party officials – ones with a track record of advocacy – on the best approach to take to change this act. Given that most of the TCD’s stakeholders would strongly agree that the NGO Act is highly problematic, the strategy adopted by NIMD and the TCD must also include an eye for building lasting ties between the TCD and civil society – networks that can be used to strengthen the capacity and sustainability of the TCD and its ability to address future reform issues.

Expand cross-party activities generally

Expand on cross-party activities, even at the expense of the bilateral activities if necessary. This recommendation is rather complicated and comes with some caveats and caution. For starters, the cross-party component has clearly resulted in some critical successes. The interviewees almost unanimously concluded that facilitating dialogue between actors has paid sizable dividends in terms of cultivating a multiparty culture and cooling the tensions between political actors, each of which is highly relevant to the past, current, and future political context in Tanzania. Workshops, seminars, and television and radio programmes were without a doubt instrumental in inspiring change in the country’s legal milieu and helping to raise the public’s awareness about crucial political issues. When compared to the bilateral training programmes, the balance of the success stories mentioned during the interviews clearly favoured the cross-party training workshops. Besides, with the exception of training in campaign strategies, the more beneficial bilateral training programmes – e.g. training public officials – can be and have been successfully pulled off at the cross-party level.

The one sticking point with this recommendation is this: Would parties continue to participate in TCD activities without the leverage of the bilateral support? It is our opinion that they would, but only if each individual party continued to see tangible benefits from participation. Indeed, while bilateral support makes up a rather small amount of the funding available to parties, especially since they are now receiving government subventions, parties still very much value NIMD’s bilateral contributions. This is even true for the CCM, especially since its government subvention shrank following the party’s losses in the previous election. Without some sort of carrot – like the bilateral support, for example, the level of commitment that the parties have in the TCD would likely decline. At the same time, we feel that one of the key reasons for participation in the TCD is that it gives the opposition parties a channel for discussing political concerns with high-level CCM officials, which is one reason for why opposition parties complained so much when the CCM was sending seemingly unknown, lower-order delegates to TCD events. As for the CCM, it is our view that part of their incentive for participation is based on their desire to be seen as genuinely interested in advancing democracy and preserving peace and stability. All-in-all, all parties are clearly committed to the TCD, as demonstrated by the assistance that the technical committee sometimes provides to the secretariat. However, more tangible carrots will still be needed if a reduction in bilateral support will be met with the same level of party commitment to the TCD.

One issue that sometimes came up during the interviews was the fact that some of the parties appreciate the TCD as a resource centre, as demonstrated by their use of the TCD’s facilities.

Moreover, comments were also made about the extent to which the parties appreciated bilateral support because writing proposals and reports helped parties to strategize and use their funds effectively. In light of both findings, NIMD, via the TCD, could offer parties strategic analyses of their internal organizations or continue to offer technical support in drafting strategic proposals. NIMD could also continue to provide bilateral support, but only in the areas of campaign assistance, while moving all other forms of party assistance to the cross-party level. After all, based on the interviews, the parties clearly benefited from cross-party training, and it is likely that such training in the future would continue to offer reasons for individual parties to remain committed to the TCD. At the same time, it is clear that the TCD itself lacks the capacity assume greater responsibility. Therefore, expanding cross-party activities, especially where these activities implicate the use of the TCD as a resource centre for the parties, will require significant improvements in the TCD's capacity.

Develop the capacity and sustainability of the TCD

During the interviews, we repeatedly heard comments about the dire situation the TCD would face should NIMD's funding withdrawal not be offset by another partner. In the context of nearly two decades of pushing for constitutional reform and now finally having the chance for it, in the context of past evaluations that chastised the TCD for having failed to adequately politicize constitutional reform and now having successfully done so, and in the context of the sheer relevance of the TCD's activities in the face of constitutional reform, it is rather disheartening to see commitments to the TCD fade away. In light of Tanzania's reform milieu generally, as previously identified in figure 2 in this report, and in light of the constitutional reform milieu specifically, we feel that TCD partners will be able to demonstrate some sizable returns on investment over the next few years.

That said, the withdrawal of NIMD support should also inspire change within the TCD. It is our view that future budget allocations should give priority to professionalizing the TCD's capacity to become its own manager, visionary, and advocate. Time and again, the interviewees in the evaluation mentioned the sheer inability of the TCD to draft 'sellable' programmes and funding proposals independent of NIMD's assistance. Therefore, priority should be given to training existing staff, and hiring additional personnel if needed, in the areas of programme development and project proposals.

Moreover, it is evident that the weak public face of the TCD adversely impacts the ability of the TCD to expand its strategic networks. According to some, this weakness reduced the likelihood that the TCD would be invited to relevant events held by other civil society organizations. Based on these comments, we suggest that greater effort should be made in raising the public face of the TCD and building lasting bridges between the TCD and civil society organizations in the process – bridges that extend beyond simply employing individual civil society members as resource persons. One solution is to be a bit more active in ensuring that civil organizations attend all public functions that are organized by the TCD. Another possible approach, which was recommended to us by Hanne Lund Madsen, is to utilize party members for facilitating the upstream and downstream exchanges of information that would not only allow the TCD to stay informed about political developments at the local

level, but also allow local actors to stay informed about the activities undertaken within the TCD.

Maximize the value of the training

While there were a lot of smaller complaints about some aspects of the training programmes, perhaps the most notable finding was the weaknesses in using them as learning experiences that could inform the topics and organization of future training activities. One of the resource persons spoke about trainee comments on why ideological and platform training would not work within their district. Yet, as far as we can tell, information like this does not feedback into the design of future training programmes. Therefore, we make two specific recommendations. First, as mentioned by Daniel Loya, we suggest that all trainees should be given the opportunity to evaluate both the training programme and the trainer. Evaluations could include questions about what the trainees thought was most useful, how successful the trainer was in communicating the material, and what the trainees thought should have been done differently. Second, we recommend that the trainer draft an end-of-evaluation brief on what he or she found interesting or noteworthy in the training process. These materials could then be returned to a TCD officer for further processing.

Bilateral and cross-party activities should continue to be managed separately

Assuming that the bilateral components continue, we recommend maintaining a certain degree of managerial distance between the bilateral and cross-party components. While the hours consumed by the TCD in administering the bilateral programme should be included as a secretariat cost within the TCD, it is also advisable that the TCD should be protected from having to make decisions over whether or not to approve funding for bilateral activities to particular political parties. Involving the TCD in such decisions could undermine the level of commitment that some of the parties have in TCD activities.

ANNEX: LIST OF INTERVIEWEES

Daniel Loya	Executive Director, TCD
John Chiligati	Deputy Secretary General, CCM (Mainland)
Pius Msekwa	Vice Chairman, CCM
Shaweji M. Mketo	Deputy Director for Organization, Election and Political Affairs, CUF
Dr. Willibrod P. Slaa	Secretary General, Chadema
Anthony C. Komu	Director of Finance and Administration, Chadema
John Cheyo	Chairman, UDP
Peter K. Mziray	Chairman, APPT Maendeleo
Nderakindo Kssy	Foreign Secretary, NCCR-Mageuzi
George Khangwa	Acting Secretary General, NCCR-Mageuzi
Rev. Christopher Mtikila	Chairman, DP
Hebron Mwakagenda	Director of TCIB (TCD resource person)
Harold G. Sungusia	Director of Advocacy Reforms, LHRC (TCD resource person)
Prof. Rwekaza Mukandala	Chairman, REDET; Vice Chancellor, UDSM
Prof. Max Mmuya	Department of Political Science, UDSM (TCD resource person)
Lupa Ramahadi	Department of Political Science, UDSM (TCD resource person)
John B. Tendwa	Registrar of Political Parties
Steve Lee	Senior Governance Advisor, UNDP
Nora Pendaali	Programme Officer, UNDP
Hanne Lund Madsen	Senior Advisor, DIPD
Dr. Stefan Chrobot	Resident Director, FES
Stefan Reith	Head of Tanzania Office, KAS

ANNEX: STRATEGIC NETWORKS FOR NIMD

This annex is a supplement to the discussion in section 4.5 on strategic networks, cooperation, and financing. However, whereas the discussion in that section was taken from the perspective of locating possible partners for the TCD, the discussion in this annex focuses on prospective partners for NIMD's Tanzania programme generally in the years beyond 2012. At the same time, some of the organizations and initiatives mentioned in section 4.5 are also relevant for this annex.

A cursory review of existing trends within democracy assistance broadly defined reveals that programmes are by and large 1) increasingly mentioning the importance of gender-related issues and 2) often rhetorically and/or programmatically linked to objectives defined in the Millennium Development Goals (MGDs). It is our view that NIMD's initiatives will have a greater chance of securing funding when they are explicitly tied to both of these issues. In terms of party assistance, the trend clearly favours funding for initiatives and activities that address governance issues on a cross-party basis, as opposed to a bilateral basis. It is our view that NIMD's experience and leadership in cross-party initiatives should continue to be a cornerstone to the organization's approach.

Another approach might be to partner with donors and civil society organization around a political dialogue on reforming the NGO Act (see section 6 of the report). Without a doubt, this act is a huge obstruction to the ability of civil society to speak out against the government generally and to the prospects for cooperation between political parties and civil society in particular. From a funding and a partnership perspective, this approach has two advantages. First, the need for reforming the NGO Act is something that nearly every non-governmental actor in Tanzania can agree on. Secondly, the importance of such a reform should be somewhat obvious to donors within the field of democracy assistance, and the arguments for why it is important are rather easy to make. The disadvantage is, however, that, given the existence of the NGO Act, civil society organization will have a difficult time coming out in open support of reform. Therefore, reforming the NGO Act will likely require working with parties as the main partnership modality, but where civil society organization could participate in conferences and workshops on the NGO Act.

Partners

The Association of European Parliamentarians with Africa (AWEPA)

AWEPA is a non-governmental organization with broad support from Sida, Norad, UNDP, and the European Commission, to name a few, and works to advance parliamentary democracy throughout Africa. AWEPA's thematic areas include advancing the representation of women in parliament and increasing government accountability in the use of official development assistance (ODA) through activities like workshops and seminars, inter-parliamentary dialogues, and election monitoring. Since 1997, AWEPA has been a partner with the Tanzania National Assembly and has conducted a number of governance-related activities. One of the more interesting initiatives, and perhaps relevant for NIMD's work, was

AWEPA's partnership with the Amsterdam Institute for International Development (AIID) to hold "public consultations" in five different locations as a way to help local communities to communicate their needs to the parliament.

Composed partly by members of national parliaments in Europe, AWEPA's membership base has crossover with NIMD, and this might serve as an entry point for strengthening cooperation in core activities, most notably training and seminars that advance the representation of women in parliament. It is worth noting that AWEPA and NIMD are already in a partnership arrangement on gender research through NIMD's Africa Regional Programme (ARP). This partnership of course will strengthen NIMD's existing networks and their image when looking for funding. As an additional note, it might be useful for NIMD to consult AWEPA's list of donors when looking for funding for its own activities (see <http://www.awepa.org/index.php/en/donors.html>).

DEMO Finland

Demo Finland is active primarily through its support to the Tanzania Women Cross-Party Platform (T-WCP). As a local NGO, T-WCP brings together women from parties to realize the common goal of gender equality. As such, the organization works with the women's wings of the parliamentary parties and the Tanzania Women Parliamentary Group and works on training in the areas of gender, democracy, leadership, and control of resources. Among other things, specific training activities focus on campaign management and strategies for increasing the representation of women from the 2015 election, and the activities primarily focus on the village level. These activities are clearly relevant for NIMD's efforts to strengthen the capacity of parties and increase the representation of marginalized groups.

As such, DEMO Finland looks to be an interesting partner, although it must be emphasized that its only engagement in Tanzania is through T-WCP. Indeed, DEMO Finland is a sister organization to NIMD and the two organizations cooperate around programmes in other countries. It is important to note that the T-WCP also receives support from UN Women, and both of these organizations might be potential partners should NIMD decide to more strongly pursue a gender-based programme in Tanzania.

International IDEA

IDEA is currently composed by 25 member countries that combine to constitute about 50 per cent of IDEA's funding. Other partners include the International Press Institute, Parliamentarians for Global Action, and Transparency International, and NIMD might want to approach some of these organizations when looking for funding. IDEA operates in a wide variety of democracy-related area, including elections, constitution building, and political parties. A significant portion of IDEA's sub-Saharan focus also includes the representation of women. At this time, IDEA is partnered with the African Union in implementing the African Charter on Democracy, Elections, and Governance. Although a lot of the organization's activities focus on providing information and research, they have also assisted in preparing for elections and training political party representatives. In fact, they are now "striving to increase focus on implementing programmes", which also means that IDEA will be looking to operate

in “synergy” with partners. To be sure, IDEA and the TCD have already linked up on a non-financial basis around two projects, and the time might be ripe for a closer cooperation between NIMD and IDEA.

IDEA’s *Political Parties, Participation, and Representation* programme, which addresses, among other things, dialogue between parties, is especially relevant for the work that NIMD does. While IDEA does not provide funding or grants per se, the organization’s credibility and expertise in the field of democracy assistance is outstanding and could serve as a valuable asset for strengthening NIMD’s efforts to secure funding from other sources.

Donors

The Department for International Development (DFID)

Based in the UK, DFID allocates approximately 8 per cent of its governance portfolio to elections and strengthening parliaments, political parties, and political rights. While the bulk of their past activities have dealt with assisting in voter registration, supporting election management bodies, and training election observers, DFID is now also recognizing the importance of providing assistance to political parties, and is working with the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) to support parties and party systems. Moreover, a substantial portion of the work undertaken by DFID in Tanzania between 2011 and 2015 emphasizes improving the lives of women. While DFID’s funding portfolio for Tanzania has declined substantially, DFID has recently opened an 11-million pound envelope fund for governance-related programmes in Tanzania, and DFID works through partnerships with governmental and non-governmental organizations.

The Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD)

Within the context of an academic debate within Norway on foreign assistance to political parties, NORAD has shown an interest in political party assistance and, in some cases at least, has provided support for political parties. At the same time, Norway also lacks a multiparty foundation similar to NIMD, and thus NORAD might be open to capitalizing on NIMD’s expertise.

NORAD, and Norway in general, has enormously robust relations with Tanzania and provides considerable ODA to the country. In 2010, NORAD allocated approximately €100 million in bilateral assistance to Tanzania, of which some €87 million went to good governance. NORAD also cooperates with international organizations and civil society organizations in developing countries. In fact, of the previously-mentioned €100 million, approximately €12.2 million went to international and local non-governmental organizations.

PACT Tanzania

While PACT Tanzania’s STAR project was officially closed in January of 2012 and while PACT Tanzania should not be seen as a donor per se, it is still useful to looking at some of

their initiatives and who funded them. Pact Tanzania's STAR project was largely funded by USAID and worked in the area of good governance and democracy by focusing on capacity building among civil society organizations and public institutions. Relevant activities include enhancing the watchdog functions of civil society by helping to establish committees for Public Expenditure Tracking Systems (PETS) and by training journalists in investigative journalism. PACT Tanzania also provides mentoring and technical assistance for a variety of actors and organizations in areas like financial management, programme development, and grant applications. In one two-year-long project, PACT Tanzania worked with the City University of New York in training effort with Tanzania's parliamentarians.

Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida)

Sida has demonstrated its willingness to provide funding for a wide range of initiatives undertaken by a wide range of organizations. For Tanzania in particular, Sida in 2011 allocated about €84.2 million to Tanzania, of which approximately €11.4 million went to democracy, human rights, and gender equality. They have provided a wide range of support to various local and international non-governmental actors, including TWAVEZA, the Legal Human Rights Centre (LHRC), the Tanzania Women Lawyers Association (TAWLA), and the Election Support Project (ESP). The website *openaid.se*, which is operated by the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs provides an excellent resource for examining country and organizational-specific financing that has been provided by Sida.

TWAVEZA

TWAVEZA is an East Africa-based, ten-year-long initiative that focuses on enhancing citizen involvement in creating political and economic change. Like PACT Tanzania, TWAVEZA should not be seen as a donor per se, but its activities and those who support them might be of interest to NIMD. TWAVEZA takes a relatively creative approach to helping empower communities to hold governments accountable. For example, in the lead up to Tanzania's 2010 elections, TWAVEZA partnered with religious leaders to develop an "illustrated booklet" designed to "popularize" ideas on leadership and accountability. The initiative is funded by a multiplicity of donors, including Sida, DFID, the Hewlett Foundation, SNV, and Hivos. Again, TWAVEZA's experience in promoting accountability might be a substantial asset for future NIMD initiatives.

United Nations Democracy Fund (UNDEF)

UNDEF is probably one of the easier places for NIMD to secure funding for highly specific projects that unfold over the course of two years or so. Indeed, UNDEF provides funding for projects that, among other things, "enhance democratic dialogue", support "constitutional reform processes", facilitate the "empowerment of women", and strengthen "civic education and voter registration". Tiri, for example, successfully secured UNDEF funding for a sub-Saharan wide initiative to bring actors involved in the electoral process together to devise a series of principles on electoral justice. The Young Professions on National Policy, a Kenya-based NGO, also received UNDEF money for educating and training young people to address

issues of governance reform. Support for training party youth or women councillors, for example, could easily fall within the scope of what UNDEF funds.

United Nations Development Assistance Plan (UNDAP)

UNDAP spans from 2011 to 2015, and with a \$777 million budget for Tanzania, UNDAP could serve as a valuable partner for NIMD's future activities in the country. According to its programme document for Tanzania, UNDAP will, in cooperation with the National Electoral Commission, the Zanzibar Electoral Commission, the Prime Minister's Office, and local governments, provide support to "political parties" for developing "platforms" and promoting "internal democracy and the leadership of women". Moreover, UNDAP will focus on "conflict prevention and resolution" by supporting "dialogue structures" in selected areas. These arena's clearly fall within NIMD's current programmatic objectives.

Other potentially relevant areas concern support for elections and the parliament. With regard to the former, UNDAP will work with the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and DFID to help strengthen the ability of Tanzania's election management bodies to manage elections through the use of "integrated management systems". With regard to the latter, UNDAP will focus on strengthening the representative roles of the National Assembly and the Zanzibar House of Representatives, as well as enhancing the ability of MPs to monitor and analyze Poverty Reduction Strategies (PRS).

UN Women (UNFEM)

UNFEM is engaged in gender-related activities in Tanzania, most notably through its support for the Tanzania Women Cross-Party Platform (T-WCP) (see previous discussion on Demo Finland). UN Women's focus on "Leadership and Participation" and its *Fund for Gender Equality* are of particular relevance for NIMD's desire to promote the representation of marginalized groups. While the fund's money is given directly to women's organizations, governmental and non-governmental partnerships are also provided with assistance.

ANNEX: TERMS OF REFERENCE

Terms of Reference (ToR)

Strategic review and programme evaluation

These are the terms of Reference (ToR) for the evaluation of the 2007-2011 multiannual NIMD Tanzania programme, which consists of both the NIMD partnership with the Tanzania Centre for Democracy (TCD) and the bilateral programmes of NIMD with political parties.

NIMD, The Hague, December 2011

Steering committee:

Mr. Jerome Scheltens, programme manager Tanzania at NMD

Ms. Annemieke Burmeister, PM&E officer at NIMD

Mr. Daniel Loya, executive director at TCD

Ms. Hanne Lund Madsen, senior advisor at DIPD

Political and organizational context

After decades of a formal socialist one party system, Tanzania in 1995 formally developed into a multiparty democracy. As general analysis was and is that this was rushed and too little legal and institutional frameworks were changed for this transition to be successful, indeed, two national elections later from that point on, in practice the dominant party remained unchallenged.

In 2006, after a multi annual period where NIMD had a hired consultant on the ground to manage the then already existing bilateral programmes with the general objective of political party assistance providing capacity strengthening support, NIMD started up interparty dialogue and stimulated interest and helped found TCD as a Centre for Multiparty Democracy (CMD), which can be interpreted as a move into intervention more on a party system level.

The choice to found a new organization for this is based on the policy of NIMD to found CMD's in countries where no existing neutral and respected local ngo can be contracted to be its implementing partner. CMD's have the specific set up of being 'owned' by the participating political parties who sit on its board and approve its funding and strategic direction. NIMD provides the core funding on approval of its proposed annual plan.

In the first years of the programme in the country before the 2007-2010 multiannual period of its current strategic plan, NIMD focused on getting parties on board to get involved in interparty dialogue in the first place. The bilateral programmes, apart from objectives of those activities, were also used implicitly strategically as a trade-off: receiving bilateral funding in exchange for participating in interparty dialogue.

With the founding of TCD a shift was made to stimulate parties to formulate joint reform agenda's, use TCD as an advocacy for those agenda's, and again later, to even look at broader type of activities for TCD to execute independently and other than direct interparty dialogue; Such as debates specifically targeted at relations with civil society: debates, documentaries, publications, etc...

One constant has remained, which is that the bilateral programmes for parties are managed directly by NIMD outside TCD, so that TCD does not have to enter into bilateral negotiation or management relations with one party and can focus on cross-party activities.

The years 2010 and 2011 institutionally at NIMD were characterized by a troubled relation with its core funder, the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, leading to external evaluation and internal reorganization and a scale down in size and staff. As such, the NIMD Tanzania programme in the last 1,5 to 2 years has seen too much rotation of responsible managers at NIMD and even an absence of management. The programme has incurred delays and lot of institutional knowledge on the programme is lost. Additionally, due to, amongst others, the death of the program officer, also TCD has seen a period of under staffing.

As a result of the decision of the current Dutch Government in power since summer 2010, to no longer consider Tanzania a priority partner country for development cooperation as of 2011, NIMD had to decide not to add Tanzania to its suggested programme countries in the Tender for the Dutch

Government's Ministry of Foreign Affairs Political Parties Fund II 2012-2016. For the year 2012 a final year of bridge funding has been agreed on for NIMD's Tanzania programme. As of 2013 NIMD has no core funding for its programme and is seeking new funder opportunities or strategic partnerships.

For this evaluation, these matters are of relevance for two reasons, also further discussed under 'Evaluation context':

Firstly, as many unforeseen but by now well-known occurrences partly explain certain underperformances in the recent years, this evaluation should consciously focus on the future in the sense of both new political and funding opportunities, rather than a technocratic judgment in hindsight on the performance of the implementing partner.

As such, the new intervention logic and objectives of NIMD for the multiannual strategic period 2012-2015 are of relevance too and included in this ToR. The backward looking evaluation should focus on strategic and programmatic level, while scrutiny of the capacity of the implementing partner is of use primarily to assess to what degree TCD is sufficiently equipped to perform newly proposed activities related to the assessed political opportunities for the next multiannual period 2012-2015.

Secondly, the board of the newly founded Danish Institute for Parties and democracy (DIPD) will use this evaluation as one part among many to decide on their strategic and funding partnership in the NIMD Tanzania programme for 2012 and 2013 with an outlook to longer commitment.

Programme objectives

The main objective of NIMD as formulated in the strategic plan 2007-2010 was to support the process of democratization in young democracies by strengthening political parties as pillars of democracy in order to help create a well-functioning, sustainable, pluralistic system of party politics. The NIMD works in a strictly non-partisan and inclusive manner.

NIMD has made a continued effort to support the process towards the following outcomes from its 2007-2011 multiannual strategic plan (plus specific outputs and indicators per consecutive annual plan, to be found in these plans):

Programmatic objectives:

1. Multiparty political systems strengthened:
2. Political parties institutionalized:
3. Relations between political and civil society improved

Institutional objectives:

4. Strategic networks expanded and funding realised
5. Developing capacity of TCD

As of 2012 NIMD's multiannual plan speaks of the following intervention logic and objectives:

The NIMD programme has a clear overall problem definition.

Parties play an inadequate role in accountability processes; have weak organisational and policy analysis and development capacities; have weak external networks and rootedness in society; are not trusted much by the population; and operate in polarised contexts that experience high levels of informality and fragmentation.

NIMD was founded to support political parties and party systems in emerging democracies. For its multiannual plan 2012-2015 NIMD's vision is formulated as: 'Democratic societies that observe the rule of law and foster the public good'. On the basis of this overall vision, a specific objective for the programme has been formulated:

The programme has a relevant specific objective:

A well-functioning democratic multiparty political system.

To this objective it related three outcomes:

Outputs related to outcome 1: Functioning multi party dialogue

- 1.1 Organisational capacity of multiparty dialogue platforms strengthened.
- 1.2 Interparty dialogue on issues of shared concern facilitated.

Output related to outcome 2: Legitimate political parties

- 2.1 Policy-seeking capacity of political parties improved.

Output related to outcome 3: Fruitful interaction between political and civil society

- 3.1 Engagement and interrelations between political society and civil society improved.

As the NIMD programme, next to the bilateral relations with the parties, is exclusively implemented through TCD, TCD's past and current strategic plans are part of this evaluation. As NIMD helped found TCD and helped design its initial strategy, both organizations' objectives are closely linked on the level of the institutional intervention logic and multiannual strategy.

Naturally, it is exactly the details in activities, output, outcome and indicators in both organizations' annual plans that determine the success of the programmes ambitions and are as such under scrutiny in this evaluation. Both NIMD's and TCD's past annual plans are available to the consultant for detailed reading.

Evaluation Context

NIMD has been working in partnership with the political parties for almost 8 years and with TCD for almost 5 year. Due to the new donor framework of the government of the Netherlands, NIMD will no longer be in the position to support the work in Tanzania for the future period with the usual government funding.

As standard policy, annually NIMD conducts programme evaluations in two of its programme countries. Tanzania had been foreseen in 2010 to be evaluated in 2011, well before knowing about the changes in funding. However, with the current ending multiannual plan and the need to secure future funding, this evaluation is very timely and should be instrumental to developing a forward look.

As first discussions with a potential funding, strategical and programmatic partner organization (The Danish Institute for Parties and Democracy, DIPD) are already in progress, it is the desire to include in this evaluation the specific points of interest for DIPD; matters which they would have looked at in their individual country assessment, such that a separate country assessment is not needed.

The current ending and soon newly to be applied future intervention logic of NIMD in general is not under scrutiny for this evaluation. The intervention logic at institutional level has been thoroughly evaluated in the IOB evaluation commissioned by the Dutch government (which is valuable for the consultant for this evaluation). Under scrutiny is the degree to which the intervention logic has been successfully applied and achieved through the decision and action taken within the Tanzania programme.

Evaluation Objectives

The evaluation will be used to realign the current programmatic and organizational arrangement from the current towards the future political context. The objectives of this strategic review and programme evaluation can be divided into 3 main pillars:

- 1) Political context analysis of, including expected developments in, the political context and the state of the multiparty system in Tanzania to determine relevant entry points for cooperation in the next multi annual period 2012-2015;
- 2) Programme evaluation of past performance of TCD and of the bilateral programme to establish the degree of strength and opportunities for future engagement including the synergies between the two components;
- 3) Provide for recommendation on strategic repositioning of interventions in the areas of political party assistance and multi party dialogue, including with an eye on search for partners of TCD.

Questions

Per issue of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability a core questions is asked on both the first and second pillars summarized as 'political context analysis' and as programme and partner performance' (Please note that *partner performance* relates to both NIMD and TCD, and depending on the subject also the political parties).

As such, we seek an answer to the 10 core questions stated below. The consultant is invited to reach beyond these questions in scope, but to answer these questions as a minimal requirement for the report. The additional questions, each time split up in several questions on the interventions through TCD and on the bilateral activities, are suggestions to take into consideration additionally and/or on how to approach the core questions.

RELEVANCE

On political context analysis:

- 1) **What are the –recent past, current and near future- challenges in the democratic system identified as problematic by stakeholders?**
 - a. What are in reality the roles of political parties in Tanzania? How do political parties define their roles and responsibilities?
 - b. What is the role of decentralized political activity? How important is the district level to political parties?
 - c. To what extend are 2012 plans for multiparty dialogue at district level, and plans for a multi annual training and mentoring trajectory by TCD for potential women and youth candidates of political parties, assessed relevant and feasible?
 - d. What are the key characteristics of the political context political parties operate in?
 - e. What is the power distribution between the political parties and how do parties currently relate to each other in parliament?
 - f. What is the relationship between the political arena and the public administration in Tanzania?
 - g. How do political parties relate to each other in the context of multiparty deliberation?
 - h. Which substantial issues does the political debate focus on? Which policy areas are of main concern for democracy to deliver on?
 - i. What is the relationship between the mainland political actors and the political environment on Zanzibar?

On programme and partner performance:

- 2) **Which programme components have had a strategic resonance in relation to the context?**
 - a. What is the current role and position of the TCD on the context of multi party dialogue?
 - b. Which programme components/activities where not or less related to contributing to change relevant in relation to the context?
 - c. Are the programme activities relevant and necessary to the achievement of stated long term objectives of the TCD?
 - d. Are the programme objectives still relevant in relation to the current situation analysis?

- e. Is the TCD mandate still relevant in relation to the current situation analysis?
- f. How do the direct stakeholders view the mandate and role of the TCD?
- g. How do other actors in the field of political party assistance (donors, academics, other NGOs) view the position, mandate and activities of the TCD?
- h. What is the overall goal or objective to be achieved through the bilateral cooperation programmes between NIMD and the political parties?
- i. How does this support contribute to positive change in relation to the challenges political parties face?
- j. Are there areas of cooperation, currently not included in the cooperation, which could be relevant to positive change in relation to the context analysis?
- k. How does the bilateral programme component relate to the relevance of the multiparty dialogue component?
- l. Are both programme components (bilateral and multi party) equally relevant?
- m. What would be the strategic objectives for the TCD and the bilateral programme in relation to the updated context analysis?
- n. What would be the “political” change objectives, what would be the organizational change objectives, and what would be the cultural and personal change objectives most relevant to the current context?
- o. How do these strategic objectives relate to the current and past objectives?

EFFECTIVENESS

On political context analysis:

- 3) **What have been the most effective ways (implementation modalities) to achieve change related to the strategic objectives stated to be relevant to the context?**
 - a. To what extent have the objectives identified in the last multi annual and annual plan of TCD been achieved?
 - b. Which of the activities has been the most substantial contribution to the stated objectives?
 - c. What were the major factors influencing the achievement or non-achievement of the objectives?
 - d. To which extent is the intervention logic attuned and sufficient to achieving the intended results?

On programme and partner performance:

- 4) **Was TCD able to implement the stated activities in an effective way?**
 - a. How can TCD performance in implementing activities be increased?
 - b. Are TCD staff members fully equipped to implement the programme they have planned for?
 - c. Do TCD staff feel they need more capacities or training?
 - d. To what extent has the technical assistance provided by the NIMD made a contribution to the achievement of results?
 - e. What have been the major contributing factors from NIMD side to the achievement or non-achievement of stated objectives?
 - f. How does the NIMD programme relate to other TCD activities?
 - g. Which other partnerships could be beneficial to the achievements of results of the TCD?
 - h. To what extent are the objectives of the bilateral cooperation between NIMD and the individual parties met?
 - i. What are the most important factors contributing to the completion of bilateral activities?

- and the work towards achieving objectives?
- j. What are the most important constraints in the bilateral cooperation programmes?

EFFICIENCY AND ORGANIZATION & MANAGEMENT

On programme and partner performance:

- 5) **Why are the TCD and bilateral activities separately managed components, why does the bilateral programme exist, why does TCD not manage it?**
- How does the spending on the bilateral programme and the multi party programme relate to each other?
 - Are the components equally efficient? How do the outputs of the programmes relate to the input (staff time, technical assistance, NIMD financial contribution)?
 - Are the activities and objectives achieved in the set time frame?
 - Are TCD and bilateral partners able to absorb the available funding? Are there gaps in the funding? Are there more effective ways to achieve the same outputs with less funding?
 - What has been the role of NIMD in ensuring efficient implementation of activities?
 - What is the added value (if any) that NIMD brings to the partnership?
 - How can the relationship between NIMD and TCD be exploited to the most beneficial extend? Where are the areas NIMD could make a contribution of comparative advantage?
 - Are there areas for improvement in the roles and responsibilities of the NIMD? Does NIMD have the most efficient relationship with TCD and the political parties?

IMPACT

On political situation analysis:

- 6) **In the past 5 years – what are the positive and changes in the political party field that could reasonably be identified as a contribution made through the TCD or the bilateral programme?**
- Which negative changes could reasonably be identified as consequences of the cooperation through TCD or the bilateral programme?
 - What are the wider changes the programme contributed to - at the level of the functioning of the political party system (for example: power relations, level of conflict, political culture, ability to deliver in programmatic areas)?
 - What are related changes the programme contributed to - at the level of organizational capacity and development of political parties (for example capability to relate to constituency, advocate, act in Parliament, structure internal democracy, organize membership)?
 - What are the direct and immediate changes the programme contributed to - at a personal or interpersonal level of political party actors (for example behaviour, trust, culture, experience through exchange, level of cooperation)?
 - Are there unintended consequences (both positive and negative) or results of the programme?

On programme and partner performance:

- 7) What is the level of ownership key stakeholders feel over the cooperation in the TCD and the bilateral activities they engage in?**
- a. What are the main real results as identified by stakeholders? Which activity has made a change for them?
 - b. What are the main results as identified by other actors in the field of political party assistance? Which concrete activity can be identified as a catalytic factor for this result?

SUSTAINABILITY

On political situation analysis:

- 8) What are the latest developments in Tanzania in the wider areas of political party assistance and good governance?**
- a. What are the latest developments in relation to the establishment of government funding for political parties and multiparty dialogue?
 - b. What are the other initiatives in Tanzania in the wider areas of political party assistance and good governance?
 - c. Which donors provide funding for these initiatives?
 - d. What are the objectives and methodologies of these initiatives?
 - e. How do these initiatives relate to the objectives of the TCD and the bilateral programme and is there an overlap?
 - f. Which are the most natural partners from TCD and the political parties in ensuring sustainability?
 - g. How do other actors and donors in the field of political party assistance view the sustainable support to political parties and the multiparty dialogue?
 - h. Is there a common understanding or shared situation analysis between the donors and actors in the field of political party assistance and good governance? If not – what are the contested issues?

On programme and partner performance:

- 9) What is the sustainability of the TCD if funding from NIMD would be stopped without alternative funding?**
- a. What are the identified results and achievements sustainable after withdrawal of structural funding by the Dutch government through NIMD?
 - b. What is the minimal level of investment needed to sustain the positive changes currently established?
 - c. How has TCD related to third party donors? What explains the successes or failures to secure funding or successfully implement commissioned projects?
 - d. What are the TCD strategies for ensuring institutional sustainability?
 - e. What are the TCD and NIMD strategies to insure sustainability of results?

RECOMMENDATIONS

- 10) **What would be the most critical activities for TCD to focus at for the next two to four years and what indicators of change can be useful? Considering:**
- a. Drawing on the experiences in the NIMD/TCD relationship, what is important to develop a possible new future partnership between DIPD and TCD?
 - b. While the Dutch government is ending financial support and NIMD continues to seek new means, are there relevant elements of the partnership that could be continued to the benefit of both parties?

Implementation arrangements

The evaluation will be initiated and monitored by a steering committee composed of at least the programme manager of NIMD, the senior adviser of DPID and the director of TCD. NIMD's PME-coordinator will provide technical assistance to the process.

The responsibility for the practical facilitation of this evaluation will lie with the NIMD programme manager. NIMD's PME-coordinator will receive the final report on behalf of the steering committee and is responsible for ensuring appropriate use and follow up of the report.

Evaluation Methodology

- The evaluation will be executed by a lead international consultant with support from a second local Tanzanian or regional East-African consultant, to be decided on jointly between the lead consultant and programme manager of NIMD.
- We expect the evaluation to be conducted through in-depth interviews based on a semi-structured questionnaire.
- A desk review of existing documentation should be part of the inception report.
- As part of the evaluation methodology a stakeholder approach is to be applied. All the evaluation topics should be addressed from a stakeholder perspective and with use of triangulation.
- The consultants are to explore the underlying theory of change employed by NIMD and by TCD and relate the evaluation findings to these change perspectives. Linked to this is a clarification of the analytical framework used by the consultants in evaluating the strengthening of political parties and multiparty dialogue.
- The evaluation is considered a learning process in itself and participative and appreciative methods are to be employed.
- The evaluators are expected to comply with best practices within evaluation, including the principles of impartiality and independence, credibility and usefulness as per DAC evaluation principles.

Time frame

We seek to reach a final version of the ToR, with input from the lead consultant included, in December. This will be done in parallel production of a project proposal by the potential lead consultants.

The planning will include sufficient time for the managing officer to comment on (and for the consultant to process these comments):

- The inception report for potential mutually agreed adjustment of the ToR
- The list of proposed interviewees and interview questions;
- a pre-final draft as proofreading on content and language.

The consultants are flexible in their planning within the margin of the steering committee expecting to receive the final report no later than 25th of February 2012, such to send it to the DIDP board a week before their meeting on the 2nd of March 2012.

If due to time restraints it is foreseen the deadline will not be reached, the consultant will contact NIMD at the latest before the end of January to discuss resolution of this situation. In case the final date is delayed the consultant will at least present a debriefing document before the 25th containing facts and conclusions as needed for a DIDP-Board to approve a further go-ahead for DIDP to start participating in the NIMD-TCD Tanzania programme.

Financial arrangements of the assignment

The available total budget for the evaluation is €40.000,-. A detailed budget is to be proposed by the lead consultant and approved by the steering committee. The final bill will be based on actual expenses made, with proof of these expenses. In case of expected over expenditure, the consultant will inform NIMD for approval as soon as these over expenditures are foreseen and before such expenses are made.

Deliverables

- Inception report
- List of desired interviewees
- Draft report
- Report (max 25 pages)
- Summary of the report (3 pages)
- PowerPoint presentation outlining the key findings and recommendations?

Use of the report - audience

In view of the stated objectives of this evaluation, we intend to use the report for a variety of purposes.

- For NIMD programme officer and TCD to be able to reposition the programme according to outcomes of the evaluation
- For potential new partners and donors to have a good overview of the relevance, effectiveness and efficiency of the past programme intervention and possible opportunities for the future
- For stakeholders to strengthen objective setting and planning and increase impact of the cooperation
- For other actors in the field of political party assistance in Tanzania to ensure more streamlining of initiatives and better donor coordination

Documents for desk review

- NIMD programme documents (strategic multiannual plans 2007-2011 and 2012-2015, past annuals plans and new 2012 annual plan, past mission reports, internal memo's)
- TCD statutory constitution
- TCD strategic multiannual plan 2010-2016, past annuals plans and 2012 annual plan, past narrative and financial reports, correspondence with NIMD)
- "Assesment of Political Parties Capacity in Tanzania Report, Prof T Mallya and Prof Rugumamu, 2007"
- UNDP Deepening Democracy Tanzania evaluation
- IOB Evaluation on NIMD as commissioned by Dutch Government ministry of Foreign Affairs.

REFERENCES

- Cantón, Matthias. *Effective Party Assistance: Stronger Parties for Better Democracy*. Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2007.
- Carothers, Thomas. *Confronting the Weakest Link: Aiding Political Parties in New Democracies*. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006.
- Chaligha, Amon. 'The State of Political Parties in Tanzania'. In *Democratic Transition in East Africa*, chap. 6. Dar es Salaam: REDET, 2005.
- Chege, Michael. *Political Parties in East Africa: Diversity in Political Party Systems*. Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2007.
- Cook, Margie, Gasper Munishi and Kokuteta Mutembei. 'Deepening Democracy in Tanzania Programme 2007-2010: Terminal Evaluation. 2010.
- Erdmann, Gero. 'Political Party Assistance and Political Party Research: Towards a Closer Encounter?'. *Democratization* 17, no. 6 (2010): 1275-96.
- Freedom House. 'Freedom in the World Comparative and Historical Data'. <http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=439> (accessed 31 May, 2010).
- '. 'Methodology'. <http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=35&year=2006>.
- Henningesen, Erik and Einar Braathen. 'Norwegian Party Assistance in Tanzania'. Oslo: NIBR, 2009.
- Makaramba, Robert. 'The Legal Context for the Non-for-Profit Sector in Tanzania'. In *Learning More About Civil Society Organizations, Their Capabilities and Challenges*, chap 5. Aga Khan Development Network, 2007.
- Mallya, Ernest and Severine Rugumamu. 'Needs Assessment for the Tanzania Centre for Democracy'. 2007.
- Miguel, Edward. 'Tribe or Nation? Nation Building and Public Goods in Kenya versus Tanzania'. *World Politics* 56, (2004): 327-362.
- Mpangala, Gaudens P. *Ethnic Conflicts in the Region of the Great Lakes: Origins and Prospects for Change*. Dar es Salaam: Dar es Salaam University Press, 2000.

Nassmacher, Karl-Heinz. 'Introduction: Political Parties, Funding and Democracy'. In *Funding of Political Parties and Election Campaigns*, eds. Reginald Austin and Maja Tjernström, chap 1. Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2003.

Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy. 'Political Parties: Pillars of Democracy – Multi-annual plan 2007-2010'. The Hague, 2007.

NORAD. Evaluation of the Norwegian Centre for Democracy Support 2002-2009. Oslo: NIBR, 2010.

O'Donoghue, Tom A. and Keith Punch. *Qualitative Education Research in Action*'. London: RoutledgeFalmer, 2003.

Okema, Michael. *Political Culture of Tanzania*. Lewiston, NY: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1996.

Randall, Vicky. 'Political Parties and Democratic Developmental States'. *Development Policy Review* 25, no. 5 (2007): 633-652.

Robinson, Amanda Lea. *National Versus Ethnic Identity in Africa: State, Group, and Individual Level Correlates of National Identification*. Working Paper No. 112, Afrobarometer, 2009.

Saffu, Yaw. 'The Funding of Political Parties and Election Campaigns in Africa'. In *Funding of Political Parties and Election Campaigns*, eds. Reginald Austin and Maja Tjernström, chap 2. Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2003.

Tanzania Centre for Democracy. 'Launch Report'. Dar es Salaam, 2005.

Tanzania Election Monitoring Committee. *The 1995 General Elections in Tanzania*. Dar es Salaam, 1997.

-----. *The 2000 General Elections in Tanzania*. Dar es Salaam, 2001.

-----. *The 2005 General Elections in Tanzania*. Dar es Salaam, 2006.

-----. *The 2010 Tanzania General Elections*. Dar es Salaam, 2011.

Tjernström, chap 1. Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2003.

USAID. 'A Study of Political Party Assistance in Eastern Europe and Eurasia'. Bethesda, MD: Democracy International, 2007.

Van de Walle, Nicholas and Kimberly Butler. 'Political Parties and Party Systems in Africa's Illiberal Democracies'. *Cambridge Review of International Studies* 13, no. 1 (1999): 14-28.

Whitehead, Richard. 'The Institutionalization of the Tanzanian Opposition Parties: How Stable Are They?'. Master's thesis, University of Bergen, 2000.

-----'. 'Single-Party Rule in a Multiparty Age: Tanzania in Comparative Perspective'. PhD diss., Temple University, 2009.

-----'. 'Africa's Parties and the Role of Political Party Assistance: Thinking about the Impacts of Dominant-Party Systems on Party Aid'. Paper presented at the APSA conference, Seattle, September 1-4, 2011.

-----'. 'Historical Legacies, Clientelism, and the Capacity to Fight: Exploring Pathways to Regime Tenure in Tanzania'. *Democratization*, Forthcoming.